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ABSTRACT
U.S. military bases and installations represent trillions of dollars of capital investment
towards the nation’s defense infrastructure. The Department of Defense, in its response to the
end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, sought to reorganize and optimize this
basing infrastructure to meet the emerging threats of the 21st century. A series of nationwide
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts were chartered by Congress to facilitate this task,
identifying hundreds of obsolete or unneeded military installations. During the last BRAC effort
in 2005, the Naval Support Activity New Orleans was targeted for closure, with its U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps tenants to be reassigned elsewhere. In response to this threat, a group of
retired military and civilian elites formed a non-profit entity known as the New Orleans Federal
Alliance (NOFA), chartered to lobby the BRAC Commission to salvage the West Bank portion
of the NSA from closure and establish a new mixed use, public-private Federal City complex in
its stead. The purpose of this study was to examine the life cycle of NOFA and its partners in the
context of the Federal City project over a ten year period. Interviews of key personnel involved
with this coalition revealed remarkable insight into the characteristics associated with its
formation, mobilization, sustainment, and fragmentation. The data illustrated the delicate
relationship between the military history of New Orleans and its unique culture, and how that
culture influenced actor behavior through the varied governing subsystems in the region. As one
would expect, local politics dominated the adverse dynamic of the coalition’s solvency,
heightened significantly in national visibility by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. The result was
the dissolution of the NOFA-centered coalition and the failure of the Federal City project to
achieve full maturity.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In the late 1980s, The Department of Defense (DOD) in response to the end of the Cold
War, initiated a comprehensive analysis of its infrastructure in light of the impending changes to
the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. To that end, a series of Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislative initiatives were enacted challenging the Defense
Department to overhaul and optimize its global basing architecture. These highly politicized
BRAC efforts completely engulfed numerous branches of the federal government, most state
governments, and every local municipality that had any association with a military installation,
including the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans.
While Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans, which was established in the early
1900s, had survived four previous BRAC actions (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995), it was identified
for deactivation in 2005, coinciding with the disastrous effects of Hurricane Katrina. The NSA, a
166-acre parcel located in the historic West Bank Algiers area of New Orleans and a smaller 25acre portion straddling the Mississippi River in the Bywater area adjacent to downtown New
Orleans, has supported various military functions over its century-old existence ranging from
logistics staging points to major personnel and communications support centers. At the turn of
the century, the NSA had been home to thousands of active duty Marines, Sailors, civilians, and
contractors, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in economic impact annually to the New
Orleans metropolitan region (Scott, 2002). In addition to the financial impact, the adjacent
communities of the naval base (and New Orleans as a whole) developed significant cultural ties
to the military as generations of New Orleanians integrated with the military through direct day-
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to-day community contact - socially, educationally, and recreationally. Simply put, the military
has become very much a part of New Orleans society.
In local response to the 2005 BRAC threat, a tremendous collaborative effort was
initiated within the New Orleans metropolitan region with the creation of a non-profit 501 (c)(3)
coalition named the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA). NOFA included select high-profile,
powerful New Orleans public and private political elites, in addition to several equally powerful
retired high-ranking military personnel (as described in Chapter 4). NOFA’s charter was solely
aimed at recapitalizing the NSA land through the establishment of the New Orleans Federal City
campus complex, envisioned to be a mixed-use development project that included construction
of new facilities for DOD, other federal agency tenants, in addition to local private commercial
ventures. In order to execute this vision, NOFA teamed with the Algiers Development District
(ADD), forming the nucleus of what would become a powerful local advocacy coalition. This
powerful coalition would be responsible for the successful modification to the BRAC law,
preventing the complete closure to the NSA and authorizing the establishment of Federal City.
Also, the coalition would be responsible for successfully acquiring the substantial State and
Federal public capital to be used in the project’s development.
While history is replete with examples of organized community resistance to military
base closure actions, some successful but with most not, the Federal City story – and specifically
that of NOFA – is uncommon and worthy of study due primarily to the unique nature of NOFA’s
membership, conduct, impact, and the timing commensurate with the devastation of Hurricane
Katrina on the region. The confluence of three major elements occurring in New Orleans, (1) the
BRAC decision to close the NSA, (2) the unique dynamic of Louisiana politics, and (3) the
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effects of the most costly natural disaster in U.S. history, present an opportunity to expand the
knowledge of advocacy coalition power, efficacy, and organization.
While numerous contemporary political science and organizational behavior theories may
explain a piece of this dynamic, very little explanation can be easily inferred or extrapolated
from this body of knowledge that describe an organization such as NOFA, created to serve as a
de facto growth machine in attempting to recapitalize on a planned military base closure. But
this success was in the aftermath of Katrina, the catalyst for a worldwide relief and
reconstruction effort accompanying billions of dollars of aid flowing into the region. One can
only wonder how effective NOFA, or the Federal City project, would have been had not Katrina
created this unique combination of human sympathy and unprecedented federal resources. As
Parent summarizes,
“The importance of the appeals to Washington was consistently underscored by the news
media and the public, as the needs of Louisiana in the aftermath of the hurricane quickly
mounted to billions of dollars. The urgency and immediacy of the situation at home
caused several alliances…across party lines. The success in gaining aid from the national
government became a necessary centerpiece to recovery and rebuilding” (Parent, 2006, p.
141-142).
Purpose
The goal of this research is to better understand the socio-political, economic, and
cultural conditions and associated belief subsystems that enabled the formation and mobilization
of the New Orleans Federal Alliance coalition in anticipation of the BRAC 2005 decision to
close NSA New Orleans. Analyzing the coalition’s ideological framework and associated sociopolitical relationships with local, state, and federal entities will advance aspects of numerous
contemporary theoretical frameworks to include Urban Regime Theory, Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF), Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), and urban Growth Machine constructs.
Furthermore, the timing of Hurricane Katrina’s devastating impact to the region in August of
3

2005 appears to have influenced the Federal City decision, both politically and economically.
This latter aspect may very well serve as an illustrative example of Punctuated Equilibrium
Theory (PET) and Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) theories, owing to the nature of the “policy
window” created by the “punctuation” of the natural disaster. Additionally, the research will
reveal why the apparent short-term success achieved by NOFA ultimately met with long-term
challenges as the Federal City project stalled. A detailed analysis of NOFA’s dynamic will
determine the primary and secondary causal factors that drove its evolution. Further, the
research will reconcile these causal factors in the context of prevailing theories, the results of
which advancing the latter both academically and practically.
Furthermore, it will be of value to understand how NOFA, as the base of a broader local
coalition of local, powerful body of politically-savvy individuals, was able to successfully
overturn a Department of the Navy decision to close the NSA. This uncommon organization and
the complex chain of events that it set in motion leads to many questions, the most significant of
which will be examined in this paper.
Research Questions
Creswell (2013) defines research questions as “open-ended, evolving, and nondirectional” (p. 138). Further, they are intended to restate the purpose of the study, but in more
specific terms – answering the questions such as how and what in order to explain the central
phenomenon. Applying this definition to the research design yields the following research
questions:
(1) What circumstances, conditions, or events led to the early success and subsequent failure of
the Federal City project? What contributing factors led to the evolution of the coalition life
cycle?
(a) What were the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the coalition and the project?
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(b) What lessons can be learned from the NOFA/Federal City experience that can inform
future military base closure efforts such as this?
(2) What contemporary theories (e.g., ACF, PET, NPF, GM, etc.) explain the dynamics of the
coalition during the various phases of its life cycle and to what extent?
It is through the deliberate examination of this unique coalition, brought together to
further a rather unprecedented land development initiative during a tumultuous time in a region
devastated by natural disaster, that we can learn from the experience and further our knowledge
into previously unexplored contexts such as the one illustrated in this study. The research
consists of a comprehensive qualitative analysis of NOFA and its coalition partners throughout
its existence over a decade, to include a detailed study of the key chronological events that
enabled or facilitated its evolution. This analysis reveals numerous themes that, when
synthesized, offer a plausible explanation to addressing the research questions.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Creswell (2014) offers significant guidance and recommendations for conducting
literature reviews. In qualitative research, the literature helps substantiate the research problem,
but fails to constrain the views of participants. Creswell suggests that a popular approach to
mitigating this is to include more literature at the end of a qualitative study than at the beginning.
Due to the complexity and design of my research, the literature review was extensive, with
additional research conducted after the qualitative data (e.g., interviews) had been coded and
analyzed. Additionally, a research map was used to ensure appropriate organization was
maintained throughout the period.
The literature reviewed to date has focused on three core areas: (1) growth machine
theory; (2) coalition policy theories; and (3) military base closure (BRAC) policy/actions. Each
category of literature represents an essential element towards a collective understanding of the
Federal City project, particularly in the context of the advocacy coalition brought together for its
fulfillment. Each category will be discussed further below.
Growth Machines
In most modern capitalist societies, the commodification of land and associated
improvements (e.g., buildings) enabled urban areas to serve as a principle arena for property
entrepreneurs, public entities, and other civic institutions to maximize investment return through
coordinated developmental ventures. Literature suggests that virtually all U.S. cities are
dominated by a small, parochial elite comprised of public and private members having business
and/or professional interests linked to the development and economic growth of their respective
locales (Molotch, 1988). Molotch further states that these elites use their public authority and
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private power as a means to stimulate local economic development to enhance/further their
individual business interests. Furthermore, this dynamic essentially transitions cities into fluid
instruments, or growth machines, to enhance the personal wealth of elites through the
accomplishment of associated growth goals and development projects. The growth machine
thesis contends that these local elite “place entrepreneurs” form a virtual political coalition that
lead collective efforts to further economic activity aimed to increase the “exchange value” of
local urban real estate (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) describe this
coalition as a forged alliance between formerly disparate groups with conflicting perspectives,
but with a common goal of a pro-growth ideology that associates urban growth with community
prosperity. The resiliency of the growth machine is directly tied to the resiliency of the
supporting coalition that exists to exploit it. Building upon the growth machine hypothesis,
Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) also claim that a growth machine’s viability is dependent upon the
ability of the growth coalition to secure an infrastructural framework that can support or sustain
the desired economic and land-use growth. These scholars further contend that growth machines
have become quite vulnerable or constrained in the context of looming structural fiscal deficits,
chronic infrastructural decline, and extreme capital-market volatility.
Molotch (1988) further describes the nature of how growth elites manage various
inherent constraints in the pursuit of their specific growth machine goals/objectives. Through the
descriptive categorization of five separate constraints - geography, civic leadership,
cosmopolitan capital, political entrepreneurial talent, and urban social movement - the author
offers an analytical framework that reflects the dynamic integration of these constraints in the
context of growth elite strategies. The resultant interplay between the constraints and strategies
offers a valuable perspective related to the deterministic shaping of cities and associated
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landscapes. Through his analytical framework, Molotch concludes that the capitalist productive
system is hegemonic over locality, to include the growth elites that must react to the system’s
changing forces. Conversely however, Molotch also suggests that within the local arena it is the
growth elites that are hegemonic. Through both a structural and ideological lens, the importance
of locality enables growth elites to prepare the ground for capital, thereby joining local growth
agendas with global systems of production (Molotch, 1979).
Kimelberg’s (2011) work focuses on the belief systems and perspectives of specific
individual actors within the growth machine, namely real estate professionals. The author’s
findings suggest that this particular category of development entrepreneurs view the application
of power at the local level to be much “less coordinated, concensus-driven, and growth-oriented
than the growth machine thesis suggests” (Kimelberg, 2011). Supporting this conclusion, she
cites other evidence of the existence of significant tensions within the growth machine construct
(Molotch and Logan, 1984; Molotch, 1988; Jonas and Wilson, 1999), suggesting that external
observations differ quite dramatically from those captured internally. The author concludes that
the real estate professionals’ power base and capacity is constrained by four factors: election/reelection interests of politicians; professional interests of public sector economic development
staff; governing bureaucratic policies/procedures and zoning regulations; and lastly, mobilized
community groups/factions (Kimelberg, 2011). The author challenges similar qualitative
research to examine the subjective perceptions of other key actors within the growth machine in
order to better understand urban power distribution, at least in the context of city and community
development. She also predicts that the growing body of research will lend itself to revealing the
limited utility of using the growth machine as a framework for understanding processes of local
economic development (Kimelberg, 2011).
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Relatedly, Hill and Durand (1987) analyze growth machine propositions through an
analysis of attitudes towards growth of three different elite groups: land-based elites (those
whose business interests are directly tied to land and the value of land, such as real estate,
banking, and mortgage companies); local government elites (elected municipal officials and
selected appointed officials); and absentee firm private sector leaders (officials of corporations
headquartered outside the area). Interestingly, the analysis revealed that while all three groups
register a considerable approval for growth, each perceives a different locus of control with
respect to community growth. Both the land-based elites and the local government elites each
associate control by the other. The authors reaffirm the contemporary scholarly wisdom that
states that there are significant constraints placed upon local government capability or capacity to
control growth within their jurisdictions.
On a larger, enterprise scale, Warner (2005) states that the urban growth machine
construct is relevant in the context of analyzing sustainable development projects throughout the
globe. The author discusses the core characteristics of the U.S. urban growth machine and offers
two analytical frameworks to be used to better understand the conditions for urban placebuilding and the capacities for sustainable urban place-building. Warner establishes a set of
dimensions for the former framework that include: valuing of place; center of authority; key
institutional realm; and dynamic tendencies. Additionally, he describes several factors for the
latter framework that include: capacity of place-based communities; capacity of intermediary
organizations; and state/society synergy for sustainability. Using these frameworks, Warner
analyzes numerous Chilean cities in the context of examining the general features of the urban
political economy and draws conclusions that illustrate the value of looking at the capacities for
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sustainable place-building within the contextual framework of the conditions for urban placebuilding (Warner, 2005).
Additionally, the literature is replete with contemporary examples of political coalitions
forming and serving as either proponents – or opponents - of urban growth machine efforts. For
instance, Gendron and Domhoff describe the evolution of urban power in the California city of
Santa Cruz over a period of several decades. The authors present data that shows how the
dominance of the Santa Cruz local growth coalition sustained decades of resistance until the
liberal progressive coalition gained community power and began to challenge the hegemony of
the former regime. Furthermore, through a study of the inner dynamics of the progressive
coalition, the authors explain how powerful a coalition can become if a shared ideological
framework can be created and mobilized through an activist participatory venue. The authors
conclude that the progressive coalition not only changed the entire political power landscape of
the city from that of the former pro-growth regime, but have been able to successfully hold on to
the power base through repeated attacks.
Stephen McGovern (2003, 2009), in two separate papers, offers two perspectives of
urban power applied to development projects in Indianapolis and Philadelphia. In his analysis of
Indianapolis, the author analyzes the impact of Indianapolis mayor Stephen Goldsmith's ideology
in shaping the political consciousness of prominent actors associated with community
development and the revitalization of numerous distressed neighborhoods. McGovern shows
how Goldsmith advocated a populist ideology based on limited government and citizen
empowerment. He reveals, however, an extensive deployment of public power and resources
along with efforts to empower neighborhood organizations. This emergent populist culture
stimulated a nascent progressive consciousness in the minds of a growing number of community
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leaders and city officials. McGovern shows that an activist government, along with an
empowered citizenry, is a viable approach to community redevelopment. However, he also
warns that empowering people without supplying sufficient public resources and authority leads
to (at best) modest expectations and outcomes. McGovern’s second work, an analysis of a
redevelopment effort of Philadelphia’s historic waterfront area, reveals critical characteristics of
regime formation, dissolution, and reconstruction. In the multi-year debates and controversy
associated with the decision on how to redevelop the Phillie waterfront area, McGovern provides
a valuable lens through which an examination of the dynamics of regime change can occur. The
author concludes that regime theory "largely overlooks or explicitly downplays the role of ideas,
values, beliefs, and political culture in explaining the creation and durability of governing
coalitions”, advancing the theory with that regard.
Harvey Molotch's "city as a growth machine" thesis remains one of the most influential
approaches to the analysis of urban politics and local economic development in the United
States. However, as the nature and context of urban politics have evolved over the past several
decades since the theories’ inception, many scholars have continued to advance the theory by
applying it to various settings and related dynamics, both inside and outside the U.S., thereby
revealing both its’ further value in addition to its’ limitations. As Molotch states, "The growth
machine idea makes a substantive argument about the empirical substance of U.S. urban regimes.
It asserts that virtually every city (and state) government is a growth machine and long has been.
It asserts that this puts localities in chronic competition with one another in ways that harm the
vast majority of their citizens as well as their environments. It anticipates an ideological structure
that naturalizes growth goals as a background assumption of civic life. In a social science realm
where successful empirical generalizations have been few, the growth machine idea robustly and
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usefully describes reality." (Jonas and Wilson, 1999, p. 249). However, within the body of
literature reviewed, very little material was evidenced that described advocacy coalition
formation or mobilization in relation to growth machine pursuits. Growth machines are more
commonly associated with contemporary public-private partnership discussions, the relationship
of which is a proposed topic for further research recommended at the conclusion of this paper.
Within the dynamics described above detailing this case, multiple contemporary theories
appear to be of influence, including Stone’s Urban Regime Theory, Molotch’s Urban Growth
Machine, Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), McBeth’s Narrative Policy
Framework (NPF), and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), developed by paleontologists
Eldrige and Gould.
Policy Theories
In reviewing the literature in search of applicable established theories affecting the
NOFA coalition dynamic, the most prominent one exhibited appears to be the Advocacy
Coalition Framework (ACF), supported in part through Narrative Policy Frameworks (NPF).
Other applicable related theories explored in the review include the Punctuated Equilibrium
Theory (PET), Multiple Stream Analysis (MSA) Theory, and, from a broader perspective, Urban
Regime Theory.
Developed over the past two decades, a comprehensive theoretical construct established
to better understand and analyze complex policy dynamics is the Advocacy Coalition Framework
and associated Advocacy Coalition Theory. As described by prominent ACF advocates,
Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, and Weible (Sabatier, 2014), the ACF focuses on identifying
the shared ideologies of the belief subsystems and relationships of the actors involved within a
particular coalition. The literature suggests that the ACF focuses on myriad of topics from the
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organizational structure and stability (or instability) of coalitions, their core actors, supporting
belief systems, and overall dynamics of their formation, sustainment, and decay over the
lifecycle of their existence. Within the framework of the ACF, a core focus of analysis is on
policy evolution in the context of the belief systems. The ACF offers four distinct conceptual
pathways to policy change: (1) external source; (2) internal events; (3) policy-oriented learning;
and (4) negotiated agreement between previously warring parties. Of the four, the first pathway,
external source, is very similar to a major “punctuation” in Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
(PET) in that it serves as a forcing function for a significant policy shift. The latter key factor is
very much akin to the policy entrepreneurs designated with the Multiple Streams Analysis
(MSA), exploiting the event-produced MSA “policy window”. These external events are also a
central element and requirement of both the PET and MSA concepts and theories. These
external events, such as natural or man-made disasters, increase the likelihood of major policy
change but require several enabling factors such as the mobilization of advocacy coalitions,
utilizing compelling narratives to garner overwhelming political support to attract attention.
One can begin to see the parallels between the ACF tenets and the formation of NOFA in
response to multiple BRAC attacks culminating with the 2005 BRAC decision to close the NSA
(a secondary external event). An important consideration within this synthesis of
complementary theories is the direct impact Hurricane Katrina had on the coalition’s ability to
garner significant public support, and, more importantly, its use in appealing to a whole new set
of powerful actors (with resources) owing to the national attention received by the disaster.
Figure 1 illustrates these key points and relationships as applied to the Federal City project.
Furthermore, several other notable scholars are cited with work advancing the ACF to include
Hank Jenkins-Smith, Daniel Nohrstedt, Christopher Weible, and Kuhika Gupta, to name but a
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few. This review has examined the literature published and debated today concerning the ACF
and its unending applications to today’s contemporary policy issues. While numerous analyses
have been conducted by scholars and academics worldwide ranging in topics from health care
policies to environmental policies, very little evidence was found during this literature review
applying the ACF to land use, urban (re)development, or community-oriented economic policies.
The Narrative Policy Framework, or NPF, also has a complementary supporting role to
the ACF, especially in the context of associated narratives accompanying the rhetoric of the
primary actors and their represented groups. Within the overarching framework of the individual
advocacy coalitions, focused narratives are developed to describe the issue or problem seeking
address. Although considered somewhat pejorative, the term “propaganda” comes to mind to
describe these compelling narratives, although I prefer to use the phrase “strategic
communication” (a core element within Department of Defense military and political strategies).
To further inform the relationship, Sabatier reveals “Advocacy coalitions engage in narrative
strategies in an attempt to successfully influence the public’s and decision-makers’ policy
preferences” (Sabatier, 2014).
Within the NPF, four policy narrative core elements are used to organize and define the
particular context of the issue – the policy setting or “stage”, the characters or actors (e.g.,
heroes, villains, and/or victims), the plot of the story, and lastly, the “moral of the story”.
Additional description of the NPF include its core assumptions: social construction (i.e., the
“meaning” assigned by humans to the policy); bounded relativity (i.e., the boundaries of the
particular belief system); a simultaneous operation at three levels (individual/micro, group/meso,
and institutional/macro); and the homo narrans model of the individual (i.e., how individuals
absorb and process information) (Sabatier, 2014).
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Additionally, NPF also has a place in a supporting role within the ACF in its ability to
perform additional qualitative analysis of associated narratives accompanying the rhetoric of the
primary actors and their represented groups. Sabatier, along with NPF colleagues Mark McBeth,
Michael Jones, and Elizabeth Shanahan (Sabatier, 2014), define numerous policy narrative
strategies which include scope of conflict, causal mechanisms, and devil/angel shift. However,
while the ACF and NPF complement one another, there is also occasion whereby they limit one
another. The NPF utilizes socially constructed realities rooted in belief systems to generate
narratives. Consequently, these narrative realities, however, are limited to qualitative inquiry
and associated data (mostly at the meso-level) which is not always synchronized with the
collaborative “themes” of coalitions within a particular framework. In other words, the power of
the ACF is its ability to create a powerful lobby through shared belief systems, often the result of
compromise amongst members. Associated subordinate policy narratives may not play neatly
into this larger framework, thereby limiting the strategic effects.
The literature also reveals numerous on-going studies relating to the ACF. For example,
Peter John purports to further the ACF by reaffirming and expanding its core causal processes by
synthesizing Evolutionary Theory into its tenets, thereby uncovering processes not normally
observed by political scientists (John, 2003). Additionally, Kegler, Rigler, and Honeycut (2010)
discuss the related Community Coalition Action Theory, describing factors and characteristics
associated with coalition formation through the lenses of: history of collaboration; community
politics and history; community norms and values; community demographics and economics;
and lastly, physical geography. They conclude that a history of collaboration and geography
greatly influenced coalition formation, while demography and economic factors influenced
coalition membership. Furthermore, the influence of community politics history, and beliefs also
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contributed to coalition membership (Kegler, 2010). Additionally, Jonathan Pierce examined the
stability of advocacy coalitions over time and concluded that belief systems were an essential
element of a coalition’s stability. Further, he states that new components of policy core beliefs
emerge over time, evolving the coalition in response (Pierce, 2011).
The Multiple Streams Approach, or MSA, is a popular framework that attempts to
understand the dynamics of how government policies are created under ambiguous conditions.
Through the identification and analysis of three core streams related to a particular paradigm –
problem streams, policy streams, and politics streams – the creation of policy windows occur,
enabling the opportunity for policy change on a system level through the manipulation of policy
entrepreneurs. The aforementioned five structural elements constitute the interaction of the
Multiple Streams Framework.
The problem stream constitutes various contemporary issues and/or conditions that
policymakers and lobbyists want addressed. Examples span across the full spectrum of the
political landscape, from environmental disaster recovery to inflation to budget crises. Focusing
events such highly publicized events by the media (e.g., terrorist attacks, trade union strikes, etc.)
serve to draw public attention to these problems. The policy stream includes the conglomeration
of shared ideas, concepts, ideologies, or concerns throughout various organizational networks of
proponents involved with the particular problem. This commonality bridges the disparate
communities (e.g., academics, bureaucrats, politicians, technical specialists, etc.) and varies in
depth and resolve depending upon the particular problem faced, both technically and temporally.
The politics stream consists of three supporting elements - the national mood, individual lobbies,
and individual government position transition/turnover. According to Nikolaos Zahariadis in his
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essay on MSA, “of the three elements in the political stream, the combination of the national
mood and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on agenda” (Sabatier, 34).
Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, as these first three elements converge during focusing
events, policy windows are created within the particular political stream. As an example, tragic
events such as an offshore oil spill an oil rig explosion will immediately bring national attention
to the petroleum exploration and development debate. Lastly, the policy entrepreneurs are
poised to exploit the situation once a window is created, furthering their individual or group’s
goals or objectives.
The strengths of MSA include its universal applicability and its synergistic effect of
coordinating the efforts of varied organizations with common or shared beliefs towards changing
system policy. The weaknesses include its reliance on (unpredictable) external focusing events
in order to move forward with any specific agenda; an unraveling of the sub-element networks
due to changes in the actors involved (e.g., contributing organizations, policy entrepreneurs); and
unresolvable system-level problems (e.g., the gun control versus gun rights debate) . Zahariadis
concludes “MSA subscribes to the notion that institutions make things possible, but people make
things happen” and “…institutions matter, but their importance is tempered by individuals,
timing, and context” (Sabatier, 46).
Lastly, Stone (2002) introduces the term polis, or the embodiment of the core elements of
politics writ large. In her description of her concept of policy analysis, she relates the policy
elements of Goals (equity, efficiency, security, and liberty), Problems (symbols, numbers,
causes, interests, and decisions), and Solutions (inducements, rules, facts, rights, and powers) to
the polis, further defining the complex relationships and overall political dynamic. The polis will
be of interest to this research study, owing to the nature of the politics and policies involved with
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the Federal City campaign.

Figure 1. Policy theory interaction graph

This research study will determine which theoretical frameworks had the greatest impact
towards the Federal City advocacy coalition; how and to what extent these theories were
synthesized together; how this synthesis successfully achieved a modification to the BRAC
Commission’s decision to maintain the Marines (MARFORRES) aboard the former NSA; and,
lastly, the impact (if any) derived from Katrina on the decision to approve the Federal City
project. The resultant conclusions will advance the literature through a better intellectual
understanding of the relationships between contributing theories in the context of growth
machine constructs.
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Base Closure Policy
Since the Federal City project was the consequence or solution to a BRAC decision, an
exploration of existing literature related to the subject is essential to understanding this case. The
literature review included an examination of the published works related to federal military base
closure policies and associated processes. Of note, dozens of Department of Defense,
Department of the Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps official documents and guidelines were
published in response to BRAC efforts that describe the extremely complex DOD global basing
architecture. Furthermore, dozens of formal reports to Congress published by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) were identified and reviewed for relevance. Of note, several were
highly critical of the BRAC selection process and questioned the accuracy of data reported by
the services in response to BRAC closure candidacy.
Further, the GAO and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) have published dozens
of reports related to BRAC. These comprehensive reports range in topics from Defense
infrastructure land use by service; socioeconomic impacts; employment impacts and changes at
the state and community level; base closure economic recovery, property transfer, and
environmental cleanup, and periodic status updates regarding implementation of previous 1998,
1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 BRAC legislation. As an example of one GAO study, the authors
examined has used its land use authority in relation to BRAC; the reasons why DOD land,
facilities, and land appear underutilized beyond BRAC efforts; and the current service policies
and procedures in place that define responses to other federal entities requests to relocate to
DOD installations beyond BRAC decisions. Many of the conclusions offered by these reports
indicate a common theme of overly complicated policies and legislation that impede or restrict
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inter-Departmental (Dept. of Agriculture, Dept. of Homeland Defense, etc.) land use.
Furthermore, common conclusions of BRAC analyses reveal dramatic under-forecasting of the
costs of executing individual BRAC actions, and a preponderance of cost overruns related to
these actions.
Beyond the GAO and CRS studies, some literature exists authored by scholars and
academics that analyze base closure prior to BRAC. For instance, Catherine Hill measured the
success of the redevelopment effort of the Truman Annex Naval Station in Key West, FL. After
a comprehensive case study of the base closure, she offers several policy recommendations for
communities impacted by closures, focusing on developing specific planning expertise within
local government and creating more effective venues for public participation (Hill, 2000).
Similarly, other authors offer different perspectives relating to base closures and their impact on
affected communities. Ted Bradshaw suggests that purported “catastrophic” stories of
communities devastated by the loss of an adjacent military installation are mostly gross
exaggerations. Through a case study of the closure of Castle Air Force Base in Arwater, CA,
125 miles southeast of San Francisco, Bradshaw offers numerous mitigation strategies and
actions that lessen the impact of the base closure on the local communities. Most involve the
shifting of services off-base to the private sector (e.g., military retirees in the area shop at
community grocery stores vice the base Commissary). Similarly, other scholars have conducted
detailed studies measuring the economic effects of military base closures through analysis of
nation-wide employment statistics against military base closures. Conclusions generally reveal
that employment costs are primarily associated with the direct job loss attributed to military
transfers out of the affected region, with little per capita income tied to base closures (Hooker
and Knetter, 2001). Each of these works provides informative details related to their individual
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case studies, and taken together, illustrate a common theme - each base closure scenario is
different. While similarities may exist in some situations, it is difficult to draw any correlations
of any type of significance without additional detailed research.
Several other scholarly works have been published over the past two decades detailing
the characteristics and conduct of the BRAC process. Specifically, Sorenson (1999) describes a
detailed account of the early BRAC rounds of from a policy formulation and political
perspective. He offers significant insight into the details surrounding the history and conduct of
the base closure dynamic through illustration of hundreds of examples of both successful and
unsuccessful political BRAC defenses against attack. The author suggests three theoretical
approaches to public decision making in the context of the BRAC dynamic: constituency
service, bureaucratic politics, and learning over time. These three approaches serve as models to
guide his study and analysis of the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds. Sorenson also suggests
that the Constituency Service Model predicts that elected representatives act or make decisions
to protect their individual district’s interests because their constituents vote on how well their
elected officials have provided benefits for them. These efforts, in the context of BRAC, take
the form of active political maneuvering to delay or prevent closure, to seek possible base remissioning, appealing for reconsideration, or challenging data used by either the military services
or the BRAC Commission. He further suggests that these efforts may be limited to purely
symbolic “gestures” portrayed in the face of a hopeless battle to save a targeted base for closure
(Sorenson, 1999). The author also concludes from his study that members of Congress often
fought quite hard to protect military bases and activities in their district, but that political
“penalties” from their constituents were minimal at best for failures to prevent closures.
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The Bureaucratic Politics Model refers to how organizations draw upon their own
parochial goals to influence their positions on broad national issues. Sorenson suggests that, for
the military, bureaucratic behavior is reflected most aptly when the services organize and plan to
sustain or defend their portion of the finite defense resources. In the case of BRAC, Sorenson
concluded that while there was clear evidence of bureaucratic politics behavior displayed by the
services, there was also evidence to the contrary in that the services viewed base closure in the
nation’s best interests and did little to oppose it (albeit a significant attempt to shape it).
The Learning Over Time model, as applied to BRAC, suggests that with each successive
BRAC round, lessons learned were applied to improve both the decision-making process in order
to de-politicize the effort. However, Sorenson suggests that learning over time is about personal
and organizational survival and growth, with the latter self-interest driving all forms of behavior.
The BRAC process was intended to alleviate the problem of the bloated infrastructure
remaining from a Cold War defense posture. However, the constraints imposed upon the
services by Congress through the natural constituency service model hampered the ability to
appropriately shape the BRAC downsizing effort. Similarly, bureaucratic politics was in pure
conflict with the constituency service in that each is shaped by different philosophies of
behavior. The lessons learned by all principle actors were marked by improved tactics,
strategies, and gamesmanship in the pursuit of optimal parochial goals: protection of base
infrastructure by state for politicians and elimination of excess capacity and redundancy (and
associated costs) for the services. Compromise and tradeoffs were the ultimate result.
Beyond Sorenson’s detailed explanation of the BRAC process from a policy perspective,
the literature discloses dozens of varied case studies of specific BRAC actions from other
perspectives such as political governance and economic. As an example, Weber and Goddeeris
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(2007) use the Fort Ord Army Base, Monterey Bay Peninsula, CA, as an illustrative example of
how local adjacent cities and townships impacted by the base closure organized to form the statesanctioned Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) to create a base re-development plan. Through
creative financing involving both public sources of revenue (TIF) and private investment,
numerous improvements were made to portions of the former base that includes mixed use
residential development, hotels, commercial use, and recreational space. However, the authors
also describe the base redevelopment challenges due to the complications arising from
disposition of public land and associated transfer of property rights, especially when plagued
with environmental clean-up challenges.
Summary
Reflecting upon the literature reviewed in the unique combination of separate fields of
study presented, gaps reveal themselves. While scholarly work has been conducted in the varied
contemporary theories discussed, little has been discovered as it relates to the realm of land
redevelopment, specifically in the context of BRAC. Conversely, much literature has been
published in relation to post-BRAC redevelopment projects, mostly in the form of articles and
journal publications describing individual “success” stories. However, the latter topic has yet to
reveal much information related to the dynamics of advocacy coalitions formed to prosecute the
former. In other words, the gap revealed through this literature review is most evidenced by the
lack of knowledge related to the efficacy of coalitions formed to prosecute post-BRAC land
redevelopment projects, particularly in a proposed venue such as that illustrated through the New
Orleans Federal City project.
Naval Support Activity New Orleans has been an integral part of the Algiers community
and the New Orleans metropolitan region for close to a century, not only economically, but
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culturally as well. Prior to its closure, the collaborative efforts of a great many rival political
groups championed by the nonprofit, NOFA, secured the long-term solvency of the area by
convincing the Secretary of the Navy to allow the Marines to stay aboard the new Federal City
complex. This collaborative effort formed the framework from which the advocacy coalition in
essence was born. Subsequent expansion into a PPP revealed the continued utility of the
coalition, but also the trials of sustaining the coalition, whose separate belief systems began to
conflict once the major victory was achieved. As mentioned earlier, this research is intended to
better understand the 10-year life cycle of the advocacy coalition as it relates to the success (and
failure) of the Federal City project. Gained insight into the dynamic will serve to lessen the gaps
presented.
Prior to discussing the details surrounding the research design and associated data
collection/analysis methodology (Chapter 4), a detailed account related to scene-setting is
required to firmly establish the context of the New Orleans Federal City project. The following
chapter will be devoted towards that aim.
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CHAPTER 3
SETTING
Opening Vignette
Through the early morning nautical twilight, the young female Marine Staff Sergeant drives her
eight-year-old Honda sedan along the erratic patchwork of potholed New Orleans West Bank
roads to get to work. Having to live aboard the Naval Air Station/Joint Reserve Base at Belle
Chasse was a mixed blessing for her and her young family. Despite the surprising pleasure she
has experienced with the New Orleans culture and the warmth of the local population she has
interacted with, she remains guarded about her situation. Fortunately for her, and for the
hundreds of fellow enlisted Marines stationed in New Orleans, Belle Chasse had sufficient base
housing capacity to accommodate her and her two school-aged children, ages 9 and 14.
Another benefit to living aboard Belle Chasse was the relatively new Belle Chasse Academy
elementary school that her youngest child currently attends. Alternatives to living on base for
young servicemen and women have been less than ideal, owing to the well-documented
Louisiana substandard public schools and associated issues relating to poor quality of life (e.g.,
crime, high car insurance rates, etc.). The base offers some relief, but is quite isolated deep
inside Plaquemines Parish. The Staff Sergeant’s 15-mile commute normally takes her between
25-30 minutes, depending on the time of day and her luck in hitting the 12 traffic lights between
home and work. Nonetheless, she is grateful that her family lives in a safe environment, and she
is equally grateful with the safety of her work environment aboard the Marine Corps Support
Facility, guarded by dozens of heavily armed Marine Corps Police. In between these two points,
however, causes her slight concern. As she nears the former Naval Support Activity while
following General Meyers Drive, she observes the degraded neighborhoods, littered with the
occasional shuttered house or business – remnants of Katrina’s effect in addition to decades of
owner apathy and neglect.
Approaching a stale green stop light a quarter-mile ahead, she quickly realizes that she’ll be
forced to stop at the impending red. Over the past
year, her vigilance has become second nature, and
she unwittingly scans the immediate area for
threats. Seeing none, her thoughts again wander to
the sadness associated with the forsaken area that
is surrounding her. However, viewing the seeming
health of the Community College and adjacent
Middle School up ahead restores her sense of
optimism in the local neighborhood’s struggle for
restoration. Moments later she finds herself again
on the move, past the collection of academic
Figure 2. Federal City entrance sign along
facilities, and approaching the entrance to Federal
General Meyers Blvd
City – marked with a rather large custom brass and
metal sign. A small cynical smile emerges on her
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face, owing to the nature of the false expectations that the sign in actuality represents. “What a
joke” she mumbles to herself, and she turns right onto the former 100-year old Navy Base, fully
aware of the sights she will soon bear witness to.
As she passes the empty shell of a guard shack, immediately she can visualize the pattern of a
former military base, albeit fenceless now. Resident throughout the vast green space defining
the area, she observes the abandoned family housing office ahead, the abandoned 7-Day Store
on the left on Constellation Drive, and further ahead, the multitude of abandoned enlisted
barracks and adjacent Liberty Club. Rounding the corner onto Hebert Drive, she views the
beautiful sequence of white, single-family housing, once reserved for senior military officers
during the Base’s heyday, and now occupied by various federal and uniformed employees. The
housing, managed in part by the Algiers Development District (ADD) and in part by Patrician
Management, is aesthetically pleasing from the outside but is in a continuing state of
degradation due to poor maintenance. Nonetheless, it stands in stark visual contrast to the
multitude of abandoned buildings surrounding the mini-neighborhood. She wonders what it
would be like to live there – in beautiful, 3000 square foot Victorian-style homes within a 5minute walk to work. But then she is again reminded of the “ghetto” only a half dozen blocks
away and is comforted by the security she is afforded back at Belle Chasse.
On the left she gauges the status of the construction of the new Ochsner outdoor pool project,
initiated over a year ago. She wonders to herself how the former YMCA manages to stay in
business, owing to the nature of the demographics surrounding the area. She dismisses the
thought quickly, assuming that someone smarter than her made the decision to recently invest in
this dying semblance of a development project. A co-worker that had been with MARFORRES
for years had once mentioned to her that the original NSA base gymnasium was managed by the
YMCA on behalf of ADD in anticipation of the Federal City prophesy generating thousands of
potential patrons. Another expectation undelivered she was told.
Onward past the pool, she glances upwards at the ever-present symbol of the former Navy base –
the 120-foot, 500,000 gallon faded red,
white, and blue water tower, stenciled
with large N-A-V-Y letters on its face.
She understands that it hasn’t been
operational in years, and wonders
again why it hasn’t been torn down yet.
As a proud Marine, she feels somewhat
annoyed that the tower has been
allowed to stand – a stark reminder to
the once robust presence of the U. S.
Navy in New Orleans. The same Navy,
as she understands it, completely
abandoned New Orleans after
Katrina…while her beloved Marine
Figure 3. Photograph of the Navy water tower behind
Corps fought alongside New Orleans to shuttered buildings aboard the former Naval Support Activity
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rebuild the community and the city. Briefly, her chest swells with pride at the sentiment. Again,
the Staff Sergeant contemplates for a moment the waste associated with the empty, unused,
dilapidated structures and grounds that once defined the former bustling Naval Support Activity.
Having been aboard the Command for over a year now, she understands the story about the
BRAC closure of the NSA, but doesn’t understand why the former base has been allowed to
remain in such a state of eternal degradation since it was supposed to transition to this utopian
campus-style Federal City model. She thinks to herself “surely somebody messed this one up.”
She feels sad as well for the local community that was led to believe that the Federal City project
was supposed to bring thousands of jobs to the area and resurrect the neighborhood to a state of
prosperity. “Not quite” she admits.
Continuing on her brief journey, she passes the new 1200-space, 4-story modern parking garage.
What unnerves her most about this daily sight is the plethora of empty retail office and work
spaces on the first floor (over 23,000 square feet), originally designed for a multitude of
restaurants and shops to support the thousands or patrons working and living within Federal
City. Only the corner Subway sandwich shop, a hair salon, and the Navy Federal Credit Union
stand guard as the sole retail tribute to the false prophesy. A short hundred feet beyond the
garage emerges the beautifully designed three-year old New Orleans Military and Maritime
Academy charter school. The classic brick restored historical building serves as the secondary
school to the Belle Chasse Academy feeder, offering a robust high school curriculum to its
current 640+ students. The Staff Sergeant’s 14-yr old son, a new freshman, has been thrilled
with the school – impressed with the state-of-the-art science laboratories, maritime-related
classes, and physical fitness programs. However, she, as a mother, is most comforted by the
competence of the academic staff, as well as the professionalism and dedication of the integrated
military leadership (all former Marine officers and SNCOs). She wishes her son well as she
drops him off for the day, and cuts behind the school onto Heerman Drive, the eastern perimeter
of the Marine Corps Support
Facility. Along this road she
views the abandoned (and
overgrown) 6-story H-100
building which housed the
former Navy PX, Medical
Clinic, and BEQ…yet another
scene of wanton waste. She
has heard stories that the
building still contains the
Navy furniture, to include
linens and even television
sets. Rounding the corner
onto Opelousas and
immediately into the front
gate, she is met by two
Military Policemen, one
Figure 4. The New Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters
civilian and one Marine, who
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smartly check her ID and vehicle credentials before allowing her entrance. With all in order,
she clears the guard post and maneuvers carefully past the vehicular barricades. At that point
the massive MARFORRES Headquarters building comes into full view, with all of its 150 million
dollar magnificence in full glory. The HQ is a complete state-of-the-art, modern 411,000 square
foot 4-story facility, complemented with vast continuous landscaped beds of shrubs and trees.
The front of the building, she observes, reveals a manicured parade ground surrounded by a
rubber running track. Dozens of her fellow Marines are already heavily engaged with their
morning physical training activities. She realizes she is late and hastens her movement to the
small parking area to the rear of the building. Looking past the fenceline as she parks her car,
she notices the poor condition of the adjacent local housing. “Fort Apache,” she has heard time
and time again in reference to the Marine Corps Support Facility – a beacon of hope in a
wilderness of despair. Despite the splendor of the Headquarters building, along with all of its
creature comforts and security within the fenceline, she wonders why the Marines fought so hard
for the new HQ at Federal City. She imagines, however, that the view would be much different
had the Federal City vision materialized as advertised. Unfortunately, for her and the rest of the
military employees stationed in New Orleans, this is as good as it’s going to get. She doubts that
any improvements will ever be made and that she simply has to bide her time until her tour of
duty is up and she can get orders out of the area. Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, heck, even
Okinawa would be better for her family than the West Bank of New Orleans. “Military service is
about sacrifice” she reminds herself as she swipes her ID to enter the building.

This brief vignette illustrates a very common sentiment felt by the majority of the
military personnel stationed in New Orleans (Aquino, 2016), especially for the hundreds of
enlisted personnel living in the local area dependent upon both public and military infrastructure
for support. The story also is intended to frame the context of this Chapter so that the themes and
findings presented from the research make sense to the reader. Of note, the quality of life issues
experienced by the military here have been well documented over recent decades and remain
very much in effect still today, despite numerous improvement efforts and initiatives by both
civic and military leadership to abate them. What complicates the matter is that the Federal City
project was supposed to alleviate the numerous quality of life stresses imposed on the local
military community. And, as is evidenced through the Staff Sergeant’s personal expressions
within the story, the prophesy has failed to achieve the advertised results in the context of the
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commercial/retail development phase of the project. However, before an examination into what
the research revealed can occur, more context must be provided relating to the Federal City
project and, more importantly, to the advocacy coalition that formed to prosecute it.
The coalition, as loosely described in the Introduction section of this paper, was an
exceptionally complex organization made up of numerous public, private, and non-profit groups
in addition to a plethora of independent actors. This coalition displayed different characteristics
and behavior throughout its life cycle, the latter of which we’ve broken down into four
distinctive phases: formation, mobilization, sustainment, and fragmentation. This phased
approach to understanding the life cycle of this advocacy coalition is modeled from the widely
accepted systems approach to understanding phenomena in various fields within both the
physical and social sciences. It is arguable that it is equally applicable to understanding the
dynamic of our advocacy coalition. To that end, a description of the broad chronology of events
from beginning to end must be made within the framework of the four phases just described (see
Appendix A for a consolidate chronology). But even before that, a better description must be
made of the Federal City vision in its initial scope, along with a more detailed description of the
actors and stakeholders that participated. This preparatory explanation will be administrative in
nature and will not offer any type of analysis, conclusion, nor judgment, and will simply lay out
the facts and events as they occurred. Specific themes and findings will be fully explored in the
second half of this chapter.
Military History of New Orleans
The history between the U.S. Marine Corps and the city of New Orleans has been woven
together from the earliest stages of this nation’s development. As it still remains today, the
Mississippi River’s importance as an artery of commerce and transportation has placed the
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Crescent City in both the crosshairs of war from the Revolution through the Civil War and as a
strategic economic gateway to the American continent. Owing to this fact, Marines and Sailors
have played vital roles in the battles to control and protect the mighty river over the centuries.
Subsequent to those early conflicts, the strong maritime traditions and industrial infrastructure of
New Orleans continued to mark the city’s importance to the naval services well into the 20th
century and beyond.
Revolutionary era
In 1778, a company of Continental Marines embarked aboard the armed boat Rattletrap
departed Fort Pitt, PA and sailed down the Ohio River enroute to New Orleans. Under the
command of Captain James Willing, they
were successful in weakening the British hold
on the waterway through raiding British
Loyalist plantations along the shore of Lake
Pontchartrain (USMC: A complete history.
Marine Corps Association, 2002) and
Figure 5. Painting portraying Continental Marines ashore
along Lake Pontchartrain during the late 1700s

patrolling the southern portions of the

Mississippi River and its adjacent waterways. Taking advantage of Spanish neutrality, the
Marines were allowed to maintain a barracks in the city to support their temporary occupation
and ongoing operations to disrupt British forces. Later, Captain Willing was replaced by
Lieutenant Daniel Longstreet who continued to operate along the lower Mississippi for years and
joined Spanish efforts to harass the British. Upon France’s regained control of the region 20
years later and subsequent transfer of the Louisiana Purchase to the United States in 1803,
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Captain Daniel Carmick was directed to take a detachment of Marines to New Orleans and
establish a formal barracks there in 1806 (Kummer).
War of 1812 era
During the War of 1812, Major Carmick’s Marines helped repel the British amphibious
expedition against New Orleans. Under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson, one of
Carmick’s Lieutenants, Francois De Bellevue, and 66 Marines supported a night attack on
December 23, 1814 by protecting
Jackson’s artillery emplaced along
the Levee Road towards the British
encampment. Following that battle,
the Marines continued to protect the
artillery emplacements along the
Rodriguez Canal, which
commanded the road leading into

Figure 6. Painting reflecting Marines repelling the British assault during
the Battle for Chalmette during the War of 1812

the city (Kummer). Subsequently,
during the ensuing days (even though the war had officially ended unbeknownst to New
Orleans), the Marines aided in repelling British assaults, culminating in the infamous battle
against the British 93rd Regiment Highlanders in Chalmette on January 8, 1815, whereby the
British were violently beaten back, the latter suffering thousands of casualties (Hoffman). Major
Carmick, who died almost two years later from wounds suffered during the battle, is currently
buried at St. Louis Cemetery No. 2 in New Orleans (Purpura). Aside from the visible presence
of U.S. Marines in New Orleans during the previous several decades, the actions and valor of the
Marines in the defense of New Orleans against the British would become a fundamental tenet of
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the bond between the Marines and the citizenry of New Orleans. In fact, a 1920 Marine Corps
Gazette article pointed out that Congress designated New Orleans as the largest post in the
Marine Corps during Carmick’s era, naming him “Commandant of a Separate Post” (Deckert).
Civil War era
Further towards the center of New Orleans and beyond the exploits of Jackson and his
Marine detachment at Chalmette, the Navy and Marine Corps began to establish a more
deliberate presence shortly after the territory’s transfer to the United States. However, a naval
presence didn’t truly emerge until 1849 when the U.S. Navy acquired property on the West Bank
adjacent to the Lebeuf Plantation. With the intent of establishing a navy yard and supply depot,
the Algiers site did not materialize prior to the Civil War. During the Civil War, the
Confederacy created the Confederate States Marine Corps, instilling many U.S. Marines to
defect to the new agency. The Crescent City was a focus for the recruiting effort owing to the
large population and maritime tradition, and served as a vital source of not only manpower but
supplies as well. In April of 1862, U.S. Marines served under Commodore Farragut’s squadron
as it forced its way up the Mississippi and past Confederate defenses at Fort Jackson and the St.
Philip to capture New Orleans. After the battle afloat, the embarked Marines were the first
Federal troops to enter the city following its surrender and, on April 29, 1862, Captain John
Broom and 250 Marines secured the U.S. Customs House and raised the American flag over the
city (Kummer). The Marines were again viewed as liberators.
Late Nineteenth Century
As mentioned previously, the navy yard across the river at Algiers sat largely vacant
during the war, but shortly thereafter in the 1870s, the Navy anchored Monitor-class
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gunboats at the site pending demilitarization and subsequent sale at auction beginning in 1880.
The undeveloped land remained dormant until the 1890s, when the expansion of dry docking and
shipbuilding at Algiers began to enable the navy yard to take shape. Combined with New
Orleans’ extensive rail system and terminals, the navy yard matured quickly (Kummer). By
1894, additional land was
purchased by the Navy to
further expand the naval dry
dock operations. Between 1899
and 1902, two new steel floating
dry docks were built for the
Navy in Sparrow’s Point, MD.
Figure 7. VFD-2 Dry Dock in operation in Algiers

The first of these behemoths,
YFD-2, with an 18,000 ton

lifting capacity, was towed to the Naval Station in Algiers, LA where it was kept in intermittent
service for many years for the Navy until it was relocated to Pearl Harbor in 1940 (and
subsequently sunk during the Japanese surprise attack on December 7, 1941). With the dry
dock’s arrival in New Orleans in November of 1901, the Naval Station New Orleans was
officially opened following a very dramatic commissioning ceremony, presided by the then
Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Deckert). Upon successful demonstration of
the dry dock’s operation to Congress, additional funds were appropriated shortly thereafter to
allow for an expansion of the naval station downstream (Kummer).
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World War I era
In April of 1917, after maintaining a policy of non-intervention since 1914, the United
States became embroiled in World War I. Regiments were immediately raised including several
in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Supplying these new regiments increased the duties of
the district Quartermaster for the Gulf Coast area. Due to this increase in military preparation,
New Orleans was in the running to be selected as an army supply depot serving the Gulf States
region. As the army was being greatly enlarged during wartime, the choice of New Orleans as a
depot would supply the army forming from Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, East Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. At the time, the nearest supply depots were St.
Louis, Philadelphia, and San
Antonio. An additional argument
made for New Orleans aside from
the inherent excellent ocean, river,
and rail transportation, was that the
city was already a main market for
most of the supplies that the army
purchased. At the time, the New
Orleans site was considered “one of

Figure 8. Port of Embarkation along the East Bank

the best strategic locations on the Western Continent” according to an article in The American
Architect in 1919. Three factors contributed to this claim: (1) it is at the terminus of the
navigable water courses and railroads of the Mississippi Valley and many ship lines of both the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans; (2) it is secluded from military attack; and (3) it was at a location
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equidistant between points of origin or raw materials and the destination of manufactured
products (NPS).
By August of 1917, the army had authorized the large supply base to be built in New
Orleans, which would materially supply over 30,000 troops each at Camp Bureaugard in
Alexandria, LA and Camp Shelby in Hattiesburg, MS. The location of the facility was on the
East Bank of the Mississippi River, east of the French Quarter and directly across the river from
the recently established Algiers naval station. By the late stages of WWI, New Orleans joined
Boston, Brooklyn, Charleston, and Philadelphia as one of the five main Army supply bases
(NPS). New Orleans was touted as having design features used in the world’s greatest ports such
as multi-story warehouse units, and multiple deck connecting bridges between wharfhouses and
adjacent warehouse operations. Each of the three six story buildings contained over one-half
million square feet of floor space and was supported by 15 freight and 3 passenger elevators
(NPS).
As it relates to the naval services, the Marine Corps’ scope and end strength was greatly
expanded in preparation for WWI employment, emerging well beyond their original Naval
Militia heritage. On August 29, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Naval
Appropriations Act into law, creating the Marine Corps Reserve, which added more than 7,000
Marines to the fight (Centennial Exhibit). Additionally, and as would become important decades
later as it relates to New Orleans, the Marine Corps Reserve was further expanded on July 1,
1925 as well, following its original establishment in 1916 (PA Unit 4-1). Locally, the 310th
Company of New Orleans was formed in 1925 under a provisional battalion of the Fleet Marine
Corps Reserve (FMCR) (PA Unit 4-1). In May of 1930, the establishment of the 1st Battalion,
22d Reserve Marines (1/22) was authorized in New Orleans, forming around the nucleus of the
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310th. This new battalion, which consisted of four Companies, was renamed the 10th Battalion,
FMCR in 1936 as part of a restructuring effort for the entire Marine Corps Reserve (PA Unit 41).
World War II Era
In the years after WWI, much of the warehouse space of the New Orleans Army Supply
Base was leased to private companies, and this public-private usage was touted as a viable
alternative utilization of the property while not in full military service. The privatized warehouse
space was used for years in the storage and distribution of various agricultural commodities to
include coffee, sisal, cotton, and tobacco. Across
the river, the old Naval Station reopened at the
outset of World War II as a naval repair base,
serving host to the 8th Naval District. While many
Marines returned with the reopening of the base, it
was the development of amphibious landing craft
in New Orleans that played the most important
role for Marine Corps history in the city during
that time. During the interwar period, the Marine
Corps desperately attempted to develop a viable
landing craft for their amphibious capability,
ultimately adopting the former Eureka bayou craft
Figure 9. Higgins boats staged on Bayou St. John

from its creator Andrew Higgins. The famous

shallow draft, wide bow “Higgins Boat” soon became the hallmark for the Marine Corps’
amphibious operations during the Pacific island-hopping campaign of WWII, with thousands of
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the LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) produced by Higgins Industries along the canals
of New Orleans and tested in Lake Pontchartrain (Kummer). Furthermore, to meet the
significant manpower requirements of the war, the Marine Corps greatly expanded to a record
485,000 personnel, with the Reserves constituting 70 percent of the fighting force (Centennial
Exhibit).
Additionally, with the onset of WWII, the Army Supply Base on the East Bank of the
river reverted to the U.S. War Department and became a major deployment hub for servicemen
and materiel heading overseas, with thousands of sailors meeting their ships there before going
to war. New Orleans was one of ten principle army ports during the war, and was ranked
roughly seventh in total passengers processed, from a list that included Boston, New York, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. For native New Orleanians of that generation, the Base was
simply known as the New Orleans Port of Embarkation. From 1941 to 1945, the East Bank
facility embarked 166,696 passengers and 7,240,687 tons of cargo in support of the war, which
was under the control of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps.
Following the war, and of significant interest for the Marine history enthusiasts, then
Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller, seeking a post-war regiment, was assigned the New Orleans
Reserve District at the Algiers base in 1946. “Puller built his district until he had doubled the
number of reservists, wangled barracks and training areas for them – and in his 2-year tour
reached a peak of 6 battalions and in addition some 8,000 unattached men, a record for the
country. He soon commanded a quarter of the Organized Marine Reserves in the Nation” (PA
Unit 4-1). The relationship between the city of New Orleans and the Marine Corps once again
strengthened.
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Marine aviation was also very active in New Orleans during the war, with an aviation
unit assigned to the Naval Air Station New Orleans on the shores of Lake Pontchartrain, on the
site of the current University of New Orleans main campus (Kummer, Widmer). Following the

Figure 10. Map of the New Orleans Lakefront (1940s)

war, the Naval Air Station became home to Marine Fighter Squadron 143, the “Ragin’ Cajuns,”
one of 24 Marine Reserve Training squadrons (Kummer). However, the significant urban
expansion of New Orleans during the 1950s forced the relocation of the aviation facilities to a
new air station located at Belle Chasse, LA, 15 miles to the south on the West Bank of the river.
Korean War era
During the Korean War, the majority of the Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized and
deployed to theater in support of the First Marine Division, to include Marines from New
Orleans. “The deployment of the Marine Reserve was pivotal to the Inchon Landing, the battles
at the Chosin Reservoir, and along critical campaigns of the 38th Parallel separating North and
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South Korea” (Centennial Exhibit). Additionally, during that timeframe, the 8th Marine Corps
Reserve District, formerly of Pensacola, FL, relocated from the Algiers Naval Station to the U.S.
Customs House in downtown New Orleans, the same site where the Marines raised the flag
during the Civil War. In 1953, the Southern Recruiting Division, formerly of Dallas, TX,
combined with the 8th Reserve District to form the 8th Marine Corps Reserve and Recruiting
District. By 1960, 26 organized Marine reserve units from Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas with a strength of 224 officers and 3,986 enlisted men fell under the
District headquartered in New Orleans (PA Unit 4-1).
In 1962, the Marine Corps Reserve reorganized both its ground and aviation units to form
a division-wing team concept. From that came the reactivation of the 4th Marine Division,
located in Southern California, and the creation of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (4th MAW). 4th
MAW would be joined with the Marine Air Reserve Training Command (MARTCOM),
established in 1946, and located at the Glenview Naval Air Station in Glenview, IL (PA Unit 41). Consequently, relieved of Marine Corps Reserve responsibilities, the 8th Marine Corps
Reserve and Recruiting District was redesignated in 1964 as simply the 8th Marine Corps District
(Kummer).
Following the armistice which was signed on July 27, 1953 through 1955, the Army
Supply Depot structures on the East Bank were still recognized as the Port of Embarkation. In
1955, however, they became known for a short time as the New Orleans Army Terminal but, in
1965, the name changed again to the New Orleans Army Base. In 1966, the Navy acquired the
base from the Army and, together with the Algiers Station across the river, was renamed the
Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans.
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Post-Vietnam era
In late 1972, the 8th Marine Corps District relocated its headquarters from the Customs
House to the West Bank portion of the NSA. During the 1970s, the Marine Corps Reserve began
consolidating its headquarters elements aboard the East Bank NSA facilities (i.e., the Port of
Embarkation). In June of 1974, the 4th MAW/MARTCOM headquarters relocated to the NSA
on the East Bank (The Reserve Marine). A few years later in April of 1977, the 4th Marine
Division ceremonially marched the division battle colors from Camp Pendleton, CA all the way
to the Crescent City as it permanently transferred the Command to the NSA, joining its sister
aviation headquarters element. Two years later, 4th MAW disbanded the MARTCOM
organization and mirrored its organization with the active duty Marine wings. During that era,
the Navy established three major commands on the East Bank as well: Naval Reserve Force
(later Navy Reserve Forces Command), Naval Air Force Reserve, and the Naval Reserve
Personnel Center. Concurrent with this naval consolidation of headquarters, on July 3, 1975 the
former Army depot buildings were dedicated as the F. Edward Hebert Defense Complex, named
after the long-serving New Orleans congressman who was once chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, and who played a key role in enabling the relocation of the Navy and
Marine Corps commands to New Orleans.
Following participation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the
Marine Corps reorganized its senior Fleet Marine Force commands for its active forces and
consolidated all of its Reserve commands in 1992 under a single command, Marine Reserve
Forces (MARRESFOR). MARRESFOR consisted of 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft
Wing, and the recently created 4th Force Service Support Group (FSSG). One year later,
MARRESFOR was again redesignated as Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), to remain on
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par with Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC),
all 3-star (Lieutenant General) commands. Throughout the 1990s through to the present, New
Orleans has hosted MARFORRES along with its Major Subordinate Commands, providing
command & control of the entire 38,000 member Marine Corps Reserve distributed throughout
the nation.
Post 9/11 era
After the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, the Marine Corps Reserve, along with
the other military services within the Department of Defense, responded with significant reserve
mobilizations in support of the Global War on Terrorism over the ensuing decade. Through its
headquarters in New Orleans, MARFORRES coordinated and executed mass mobilizations of
Reserve forces for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. To that end, over
20,000 reservists were activated in early 2003 with the majority of which deploying overseas in
support of the U.S. Marine assault on Baghdad in March of that year. Following that success,
MARFORRES continued to activate and deploy approximately 6000 reservists annually to Iraq
as rotational forces under the operational control of U.S. Central Command (Pratt).
Hurricane Katrina
Just days after the BRAC 2005 Commission reversed its decision to realign
MARFORRES to Belle Chasse, Hurricane Katrina struck its devastating blow to the region. In
the days leading up to the carnage, the order was given to evacuate all military personnel from
the NSA to coincide with the city’s evacuation. The Marines scattered to temporary alternate
headquarters in Ft. Worth, TX, Kansas City, MO, Atlanta, GA, and Albany, GA; while the Navy
displaced the majority of their personnel to Norfolk, VA, and Millington, TN. On Monday,
August 29, after Katrina made landfall, President Bush issued a federal declaration of
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emergency, and on Tuesday, August 30, Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-K) was officially
activated. That evening, in response to levee breaches and subsequent flooding in New Orleans,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary declared Katrina an Incident of National
Significance. By Wednesday, August 31, significant DOD medical airlift operations from the
affected area were underway, which included significant contributions from the U.S. Air Force,
the Louisiana National Guard, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, the amphibious assault
ship USS Bataan arrived off New Orleans, providing valuable resources and aid. On Thursday,
September 1, the 82nd Airborne Division and 1st Cavalry Division were placed on alert. The
5,200 troops from these units began deploying on September 3 and arrived in the New Orleans
area on September 5. By September 6, a second amphibious assault ship, the USS Iwo Jima and
the aircraft carrier USS Truman had also arrived (CRS). By September 7, 2005 more than
45,000 National Guardsmen and 18,000 active duty troops were participating in the relief effort
in New Orleans and along the U.S. Gulf Coast, working in partnership with the Federal
Emergency
Management Agency
and other federal
entities. Within the
JTF, in excess of
2,500 Marines were
organized under
Marine Force Katrina
(MARFOR-K),
Figure 11. Marine AAV in Lower Ninth Ward during Katrina response

which consisted of
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both active and reserve elements to include portions of the 11th and 31st Marine Expeditionary
Units (MEUs), a detachment from Marine Aircraft Group-42 out of Atlanta, GA, and a
detachment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles from 4th AA Battalion out of Gulfport (see photo).
MARFOR-K and the JTF operated for several weeks to aid in the response and recovery of the
thousands of victims of the worst natural disaster in U.S. history (HQMC PP&O Brief).
Following the nation’s response and upon declaration by the Governor of Louisiana that
the region was safe to inhabit, the 1200+ Marines, Sailors, Federal employees, and their families
of MARFORRES began a deliberate re-population to the New Orleans region beginning in
October of 2005 through the end of the year, with hundreds of families returning to devastated
homes. The 400 or so personnel of NAVRESFOR returned home during early 2006 while the
entire Navy Personnel Center remained in Tennessee, never returning, owing to the BRAC
decision to realign them there. The effects of Katrina have forever etched scars upon the citizens
of the Southeastern Louisiana and coastal Mississippi communities, both civilian and military
alike. Suffering through tragic events such as natural disasters forges bonds amongst victims –
bonds that transcend social class, ethnicity, and profession. The act of rebuilding following
tragic events furthers this bond, and extends it to include the community itself and the land upon
which it resides. Fortunately, both the East and West Bank portions of the NSA received
minimal damage, owing to the fact that they occupied relative high ground and avoided the direct
impacts of flooding.
New Orleans has also been home to numerous other DOD and DHS activities beyond
those described so far. Of these, Jackson Barracks, located one mile downriver from New
Orleans, and the Coast Guard’s regional presence, are worthy of mention.
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Jackson Barracks
After the War of 1812, the U.S. Congress, realizing that coastal cities were not
adequately defended, prescribed the Federal Fortifications Act in July 1832 (Geaux Guard
website). This Act provided funds for the acquisition of lands and the construction of barracks to
house U.S. Troops. Between 1832 and
1836, the “New Orleans Barracks”,
located today in the Lower Ninth Ward,
was constructed to house four infantry
companies. Of historical interest, Ulysses
S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, George B.
McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart, and P. G. T.

Figure 12. Jackson Barracks (late 1800s)

Beauregard were all stationed at the Barracks, although not at the same time (Wikipedia).
During the Mexican–American War (1846-1848), the New Orleans Barracks was chosen as a
post for transiting. In 1849, additional property was purchased expanding the Barracks north of
Saint Claude Avenue to allow for the construction of a new Public Service Hospital for veterans
in the country, which remained operational until 1888 when it was demolished. In 1861, as
Louisiana seceded from the United States, Confederate forces took control of the Barracks and
held it for less than a year until 1862 when it was liberated by Federal forces. On July 7, 1866,
the barracks was renamed “Jackson Barracks” after the colonial who led the Battle of New
Orleans, Andrew Jackson (MyNewOrleans.com). During World War I, the Barracks was used as
a muster station for troops deploying for war from the nearby port. Following World War I, the
property was declared “excess” by the Federal Government and given to the State of Louisiana.
The Louisiana Adjutant General, Major General Raymond Fleming, established Jackson
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Barracks as the home of the Louisiana National Guard, transforming the post from an infantry
post to a Cavalry and artillery post. Shortly thereafter during the Great Depression, Louisiana
Governor Huey P. Long, Jr. used his political ties in Washington, D.C. to acquire federal funding
for numerous Louisiana State public works projects, one of which was an extensive renovation
of Jackson Barracks. When the United States entered World War II, the Federal Government
took control of the Barracks for use in support of the Army Port of Embarkation shortly upriver.
At the conclusion of World War II, the barracks was returned to the State of Louisiana for use as
the Louisiana National Guard Headquarters, where it has remained in service through the
present.
United States Coast Guard
The Coast Guard has had a presence in the Gulf of Mexico and Midwestern regions of the
United States for nearly two centuries. “In the Gulf area, the Coast Guard's history ranges from
the Revenue Marine Service Cutter LOUISIANA driving the British away from the Mississippi
River levee area during the War of 1812, to the Coast Guard patrolling the Gulf for German UBoats during World War II. In the Midwest, Coast Guard history includes establishing aids to
navigation in the early 1900s, as well as marine safety missions and flood response. This
Midwestern region, formerly known as the Second Coast Guard District, merged with the Eighth
Coast Guard District in May 1996, creating the present expansive Eighth Coast Guard District
boundaries" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dot/district8.htm). The Eight
District, commanded by a two-star Rear Admiral, is located in New Orleans and “covers all or
part of 26 states throughout the Gulf Coast and heartland of America. It stretches from the
Appalachian Mountains and Chattahoochee River in the east, to the Rocky Mountains in the
west, and from the border between the U.S. and Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian
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border in North Dakota. Part of the Department of Homeland Security, the men and women of
the Eighth District are vital in protecting the 900 miles of coastline and 10,300 miles of inland
navigable waterways located in their area of responsibility"
(http://www.uscg.mil/d8/d8facts.asp).
The history of the Coast Guard’s presence in New Orleans begins with the establishment
of the Lighthouse Service's New Orleans Depot in 1934, along what was to become the present
day Industrial Canal lock. In 1939, the Lighthouse Service was integrated into the Coast Guard,
and in 1949, that facility was officially designated a Coast Guard Base. On July 1, 1987, the base
was redesignated as Support Center New
Orleans, and then on May 29, 1996, it
became the Integrated Support Command
New Orleans (ISC). In 2003, the Naval
Engineering Support Unit (NESU) and
Electronics Engineering Support Unit
(ESU) were placed under the authority of

Figure 13. USCG Base New Orleans HQ

the ISC. In August 2005, Hurricane
Katrina severely damaged the site and forced the ISC and its tenants to relocate. Two of the
original buildings from the 1934 New Orleans Depot remain on the site in what was the ISC
Industrial Division portion of the base. In September 2006, the ISC moved to its new base as a
tenet of NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans East and, in April 2010,
occupied its new facility, renamed Base New Orleans. This 86,000 square foot, 89 million dollar
facility sits on 26-acres and represents the largest single facility contract in Coast Guard history.
Base New Orleans is responsible for financial, personnel, work-life, housing, industrial, facilities
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engineering, and medical and dental support to the more than 900 personnel assigned to the
region’s various units (uscg.mil). In addition to this new facility in New Orleans East, the Coast
Guard also recently constructed a 45,000 square foot new headquarters building adjacent to the
Federal City site on the West Bank, housing the 300 Guardsmen of the New Orleans Sector of
the Eighth District (nolafederalcity.com). This recent multi-million dollar investment by the
Coast Guard into their New Orleans sites is clear testimony to their strategic view of the region’s
ongoing importance.
Additionally, Coast Guard Cutters have been homeported in New Orleans as well for
over a century, providing protection and freedom of movement for the region’s waterways for
the commerce so vital to this nation’s prosperity. On a community level, Cutters are still
engrained in the fabric of the city today as demonstrated through the annual Carnival celebration:
According to Rex historian, Dr. Stephen Hales, "Rex's identity [as the King of Carnival] is
revealed to the membership in a meeting on the Saturday before Mardi Gras, with a public
announcement to follow. On the Monday before Mardi Gras (commonly referred to as "Lundi
Gras"), Rex arrives by Coast Guard Cutter at the foot of Poydras Street."
(http://www.allaboutmardigras.com/Features/New_Orleans_Stories/krewe)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Since 1803, the Corps of Engineers has provided the people of southern Louisiana with
navigation improvements, flood control and, in recent decades, comprehensive environmental
stewardship. Beginning in the early 1800s, the Corps enabled the region’s enhanced flatboat and
steamboat trade throughout the plentiful Mississippi River Basin. After a century of steady
expansion of the region’s commerce through major efforts in levee construction and associated
waterway projects, the Corps assumed a far-larger role in flood control following the Great
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Flood of 1927. Significant capital civil engineering projects such as the Bonnet Carre Spillway
and the Morganza Floodway kept the Mississippi River on course and enabled critical protection
for the millions of residents in the flood plain downriver.
(http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About/History.aspx)
The dual threats of hurricane destruction and coastal erosion have become the mainstays
for the Corps’ efforts in recent
years for Louisiana.

Their

current mission is to advance
the Nation’s interests by
delivering vital engineering
services for flood, hurricane
and storm damage risk
reduction; navigation;
ecosystem stewardship;
emergency operations; and

Figure 14. Bonne Carre Spillway in operation

support to National Security (www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About/Mission). The USACE’s current
wide-ranging projects mitigate the challenges associated with protecting the region, facilitating
navigation along the Mississippi River, and simultaneously working to protect and restore the
fragile and disappearing ecosystem that houses the water resources of the region.
Regarding flood control, the greater New Orleans area faces a triple threat when it comes
to sources of flood risk: the Mississippi River, rain, and hurricane storm surge. In addition to the
Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System, they have implemented a number of
critical flood control projects. As mentioned as an example, the Bonnet Carrè Spillway, located
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28 miles above New Orleans, is the southernmost floodway in the Mississippi River &
Tributaries system. Located on the east bank in St. Charles Parish and constructed following the
great flood of 1927, it can divert a portion of the river's floodwaters via Lake Pontchartrain into
the Gulf of Mexico, thus allowing high water to bypass New Orleans and other nearby river
communities.
The Corps also promotes navigation and facilitates waterborne commerce along the lower
Mississippi River for America’s largest-tonnage port complex. They maintain 2,800 miles of
navigable waterways along the Mississippi, including 400 miles of deep-draft channel, to include
12 navigation locks serving these waterways (http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About). The
Corps remains a vital component in sustaining the southern Louisiana ecosystem, protecting the
city of New Orleans and its residents, in addition to enabling one of the nation’s most vital
avenues for global commerce to continue to thrive.
As illustrated, over two centuries of direct contact between varied military forces and the
local New Orleans populace have created a society with a shared heritage and integrated culture.
Gaining an appreciation of the significant effects the U.S. military forces have had on the region,
over the centuries and remaining today, is essential to understanding the society that has emerged
in the New Orleans region. The City of New Orleans is inextricably linked to its past, to the
military that has helped forge it, and that currently contributes greatly to its modernity.
The Federal City Project
The approximately 179-acre Federal City project was conceived to be a post-modern,
urbanist, public/private partnership model for a new type of military installation. The intent was
not to follow the historic traditional military base closure model of ceding parcels off to local
government, other Federal agencies, commercial activities, or any combination thereof. To the
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contrary, the advocacy coalition envisioned a completely reorganized quasi-installation which
incorporated anchor federal agency tenants in a campus-style setting, completely integrated with
mixed-use commercial activities and residential housing. This new commercial center was
purported to reinvigorate the decaying area of Algiers through this symbiotic model that

Figure 15. Artist's rendition of the proposed Federal City town center

would provide thousands of civil and military jobs and an enormous infusion of working capital
through the federal government in addition to commercial revenues. Federal City was also
designed to re-connect the adjacent lower-income neighborhoods into the seamless transition
into a plethora of mixed-income housing on campus. Additionally, a charter high school was
planned for within Federal City for military families as a continuation for the elementary
education at Belle Chasse Academy. At the heart of Federal City is the 30-acre secure
compound, which hosts the brand new State of Louisiana funded $150M, 411,000 square foot
Headquarters for the Marine Forces Reserve. While branded as Marine Corps Support
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Figure 16. Map describing the Federal City complex in Algiers

Facility New Orleans, the compound is actually under lease to the Algiers Development District
and is available for continued development. However, the Department of the Navy still retains
the ability to refuse undesired prospective tenants. The secure compound was designed to
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provide space for any other federal agencies that required traditional anti-terrorism and force
protection capabilities.
According to the original vision, adjacent to the secure compound was supposed to be
1,400 new homes, numerous retail activities and other support-type venues that would service
the planned 10,000 person Federal City workforce in the completely redeveloped Algiers
community. According to the original Master Plan developed by Duany Plater Zyberk, “Federal
City offers a National Model for the future configuration and operation of small to mid-sized
Department of Defense (DOD) installations…the goal of Federal City is to create state-of-the-art
facilities that will attract thousands of federal and private sector workers during the next fifteen
years. The construction of new facilities at Federal City will provide its tenants with energy and
maintenance efficient facilities and the latest hurricane and flood protection factors and
standards” (DPZ, 2010).
The project was designed to be executed in two distinct phases. Phase I included the
construction of the secure compound encompassing the MARFORRES headquarters building.
Owing to the BRAC law, construction needed to be complete by September 15, 2011 – the
established closure date for Naval Support Activity New Orleans. The MARFORRES buildings
were actually completed over two months ahead of schedule which allowed the Marines to
vacate their former office spaces on the East Bank campus of the NSA before the base closed.
Phase I also included four joint quality of life facilities (the fitness center, the childcare center, a
hotel that could be used as transient lodging for the Marines, and an approximately 400-seat
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auditorium), as well as a grocery store, a library, and the New Orleans Military and Maritime
Academy (NOMMA) high school.
A second component of Phase I included the construction of numerous streets in support
of the Master Plan, one of which would run along the levee reconnecting the surrounding
neighborhoods with the river. The road had previously been cut off for over a hundred years due
to the military base. These street improvements were designed to facilitate further development
of the commercial operations to the town center. According to the Master Plan, retailers targeted
for this component included a bank, multiple restaurants, a drug store, a coffee shop, and a dry
cleaning facility. Construction of the residential housing units was to occur as well during this
period.
Phase II was more loosely defined and was expected to commence approximately five
years after the Phase I groundbreaking which occurred on Sept 30, 2008, the last possible day for
the project to physically initiate before the BRAC legislative deadline. Phase II, which did not
ultimately occur, was envisioned to proceed on the momentum of the Phase I commercial
development aspect of the Master Plan. Phase III was even less defined and served as a marker
for any remaining components of the plan yet unrealized. The entire project was projected to
take 15 years to complete, or by September, 2023. As this paper will reveal, the collapse of the
Federal City coalition ceased all hope of the physical realization of the original vision.
The Actors
The following several pages provide an overview of the principle agencies involved with
the Federal City project, to include the role they played, and the key players that executed that
role. Collectively, the group forms the advocacy coalition; the magnitude and level of

53

involvement varied by phase as circumstances dictated the evolving power struggle amongst the
group.
New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA)
As mentioned, The New Orleans Federal Alliance was originally chartered by the State,
specifically Governor Blanco, to develop the concept of Federal City in order to attempt to
prevent the complete closure of the NSA New Orleans due to the threat of BRAC (Mize,
Dempsey, Braithwaite). NOFA’s early success in swaying the BRAC Commission to modify the
DOD recommendation was pivotal in the context of the project moving forward. However, as
the project matured well into the sustainment phase, NOFA’s role shifted significantly as ADD’s
power and control of the coalition emerged. The NOFA Board consisted of numerous local
military, civic, and private industry leaders to include Major General David Mize (USMC,
Retired), First Lieutenant Bill Ryan (USMC, Retired), Councilmember Jackie Clarkson, Colonel
Dell Dempsey (USMC, Retired), Mr. Bob Farnsworth, the late Mr. Ron Gardner, Ms. Norma
Grace, and Ms. Carroll Suggs. NOFA’s internal support staff included Mr. Louis Sandoz and Mr.
Christian Brierre. Consultants secured by NOFA throughout the project’s life included Marek
Izydorczyk, Bill Robinson, and their legal team from Adams and Reese LLP, led by Mr. Lee
Reid.
Algiers Development District (ADD)
The Algiers Development District, was initially created to coordinate the redevelopment
of the 15th Ward of Orleans Parish. ADD was in a supporting role during the early phases of the
project, with minimal involvement until well into the sustainment phase. However, the
unplanned effects of the last-minute decision by the Governor to allow ADD to serve as the
Navy Lease signatory vice NOFA thrust ADD into a significantly more visible role of
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controlling the conduct of the Federal City project. The ADD Board varied in composition
throughout the coalition’s life cycle, but consisted of the following personnel during the early
parts of the Federal City project, circa 2008: Chairman Jeff Arnold, Assessor Tom Arnold,
Councilman James Carter, Senator David Heitmeier, Senator Derrick Shepherd, House Speaker
James Tucker, and Rev. Arthur Wardsworth. When ADD was reestablished in 2003, Ms. Jackie
Clarkson was a member of the Board. By 2011, membership had changed slightly with the
addition of Mr. Tyrone Casby, Councilmember Kristin Palmer, and Judy Reese Morse. By 2015,
Mr. Joe Toomy, Mr. Jim Henderson, and Mr. Paul Collins were Board members. Additional key
ADD advisors included the Jones Walker law firm, led by Mr. Fred Chevalier, and Scott Zander;
attorney Mr. Ken Pickering; the ADD accountant Mr. Sean Bruno; and the ADD Executive
Director, Ms. Kathy Lynn Honaker. Within ADD, Jeff Arnold’s role was the most profound and
had the greatest impact on ADD’s impact to the coalition solvency.
State and City Legislators
Louisiana State and City Legislators played a vital role in the project during the
formation and mobilization phases of the coalition, but their presence waned as the project
evolved to the latter stages. Key personnel that participated in the initial Federal City planning
efforts include Governor Kathleen Blanco, Mayor Ray Nagin, U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, U.S.
Senator David Vitter, and U.S. Congressman William Jefferson. Follow-on participants included
Governor Bobby Jindal, and Mayor Mitch Landrieu, as successors to their respective public
posts. At the heart of the Federal City project was the relocation of the Marine Forces Reserve
headquarters from the NSA East Bank to a new home on the former NSA West Bank property.
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Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)
The MARFORRES leadership played a vital role in the development of the new facility’s
design requirements, and was instrumental in negotiating with NOFA, Headquarters Marine
Corps, the BRAC Program Office, and the Department of the Navy for the Lease provisions.
Key representatives of the Marine Forces Reserve headquarters included Lieutenant General
Jack Bergmann (USMC), Executive Director Bob Braithwaite (Colonel USMC, Retired),
Colonels Russ Dumas and Bill Davis (Assistant Chief of Staff for Facilities), Deputy Assistant
Chief of Staff for Facilities Mr. Ed Maguire (USMC Retired), Mr. Howard Myrick, and Deputy
Counsel Mr. Ron Bald (USCG Retired). Key contractor personnel that supported the move to
Federal City included Ms. Amy Carbonette, Ms. Leslie Thompson, and Mr. Bay Ames. Of these
personnel, Col Bill Davis’ contribution was invaluable.
Naval Support Activity (NSA) New Orleans
The Naval Support Activity’s role was exceptionally complex during the project, owing
to the fact that they were tasked, by BRAC law, to relocate current tenant units and support
activities, plan for the shutdown of the base, at the same time as the developer (HRI/ECC) and
their construction team (Woodward Design & Build) were aggressively executing Phase I of the
Federal City project. As these traditional base activities (e.g., the Commissary, Post Exchange
(PX), Housing Office, etc.) relocated to NAS/JRB Belle Chasse, the NSA leadership was
responsible for continuation of services to their military family population. NSA New Orleans
key stakeholders included Navy CAPT Dozier and CAPT Brian Harrison (NSA Commanding
Officers), and CAPT Bill Garrett (NSA Executive Officer).
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Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
From Headquarters Marine Corps, participants primarily involved were within the
Installations & Logistics (I&L) department. Specifically, the BRAC cell that was created to
manage and collect the service-wide data calls for submission to the Department of the Navy’s
BRAC Program Management Office. HQMC I&L stakeholders included Mr. Paul Hubble,
Major General Eugene E. Payne, and their contracted support, Mike Tilghman. HQMC’s role
during the Navy Lease negotiations was to represent the best interests of MARFORRES in the
context of securing the appropriate headquarters building and ancillary facility design for the
new Marine Corps Support Facility secure compound. HQMC worked daily with the
MARFORRES Facility Department as the Marine Corps portion of the Federal City plan
matured.
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
The Secretary of the Navy’s Office played a minor but critical role in the Federal City
project’s evolution. As will be discussed later in the paper, the SECNAV himself, the Honorable
Donald Winter, initiated a dialogue with the Governor of Louisiana in order to clear a
negotiation roadblock regarding the Navy Lease. Within the SECNAV office, Mr. Howard
Snow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations & Facilities, was instrumental in
working with HQMC, NOFA, and MARFORRES to reconcile the Lease provisions to a
successful outcome.
BRAC Project Management Office (PMO)
The BRAC Project Management Office negotiated the lease with ADD, signed the lease,
then negotiated and coordinated the fee simple transfer in accordance with the FY-13 NDAA.
Mr. Greg Preston served as the Real Estate Contracting Officer who had the authority to enter
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into the lease and the transfer. He was supported by lawyers from DASN (EI&I), Mr. Ralph
Lombardo; HQMC, Mr. Steve Wenderoth; and MARFORRES. Other supporting members
within the BRAC PMO included Mr. Jimmy Anderson, Mr. Bill Robinson, and Ms. Thuane
Fielding.
HRI/ECC, LLC
HRI/ECC, LLC, selected as the Master Developer for the Federal City project, merged
the capabilities and experience of the New Orleans developer, HRI, with ECC’s recent expertise
with Hurricane Katrina recovery work and federal program management experience. This
partnership was anticipated to create a synergy, along with NOFA’s vision and leadership, to
successfully execute the Federal City development effort. Key members of HRI/ECC include
Eddie Boettner, the HRI Chief Administrative Officer, Todd Riche, Ken Milvid, and Wayne
Clement. The primary ECC Development Project Manager was Todd Riche. HRI/ECC’s New
Orleans-based general contractor for architectural design and construction was Woodward
Design & Build, which included Bob Lipscomb. The assigned Louisiana state monitor was
CSRS, Inc of Baton Rouge, from which Casey Anderson served as the primary quality control
agent.
Louisiana Economic Development (LED)
The State of Louisiana’s Economic Development Department provided the actual $150M
in funding for the Federal City project as promised by the Governor. LED ceded direct oversight
of the funding execution to CSRS, but maintained overall responsibility for the money to be
spent appropriately. LED expressed the desire to turn over the entire project to local
administration. Key LED players included Secretary Stephen Moret and Mr. Paul Sawyer.
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Joint Development Committee (JDC)
Towards the end of the coalition’s life cycle, a Joint Development Committee was
formed in 2013 in consequence of a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) signed on October
10, 2012 by NOFA and ADD. The CEA was a solution to the stagnant law suits between NOFA
and HRI/ECC, emanating from an impasse in the interpretation of certain financial provisions
associated with the Master Lease and other legal documents. The JDC essentially subordinated
NOFA’s role in the context of the stalled Federal City project to one of JDC membership. The
JDC consists of seven members – three appointed by ADD, 3 appointed by NOFA with one of
those being approved by the Mayor of New Orleans, and one from Greater New Orleans, Inc.
Original JDC membership included Jeff Arnold, Kristin Palmer, Rick Legendre, Bill Oliver,
Amy Quirk, Bob Farnsworth, and Norma Grace. The following year, Ron Gardner replaced
Norma Grace and, in 2015, Tyrone Casby replaced Kristin Palmer; Bill Detweiler replaced Amy
Quirk; and Jackie Clarkson replaced Ron Gardner. Finally, in 2016 Gary Carter replaced Jeff
Arnold and Ed Markle replaced Tyrone Casby. The JDC essentially serves as the successor to
the ADD-NOFA coalition core and is the organization that currently serves as the arbiter for the
New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers project (the successor to the failed Federal City
project).
The aforementioned actors, while not all inclusive, represent the bulk of the players that
effected the conduct of the prosecution of the original Federal City project in its entirety – from
inception to stagnation, and ultimately to its possible rebirth and rebranding as the Riverside at
Historic Algiers. With that, more information will now be presented that illustrates the
coalition’s phased evolution in the context of the Federal City project’s execution.

59

Coalition Phases and Chronology of Key Events
Formation Phase (2003 – May 2005)
The formation phase, in the context of the advocacy coalition, begins in the early 2000s
as several prominent local civic, business, and military leaders collaborated to develop a viable
defense to the forthcoming BRAC 2005 initiative. Having survived the four previous
Congressionally-mandated BRAC actions of 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Naval Support
Activity was still quite vulnerable to closure owing to the Navy’s recent strategic realignment
efforts and DOD budget cuts (Cotton, Garrett). This group of leaders, championed most vocally
by retired Marine MajGen David Mize, grew naturally from the traditional Mayor’s Military
Advisory Council, a formal organization chartered to enhance communications between the City
government and local military organizations in an effort to improve the quality of life for
servicemen and women stationed in the New Orleans area (Mize).
As it became apparent prior to the announcement of the initial Department of Defense
BRAC Report in May of 2005 that the New Orleans NSA would be targeted for closure and its
tenant organizations relocated, this loose coalition tightened significantly and became anchored
with the creation of the New Orleans Federal Alliance (NOFA) in 2004 (nolafederalcity.com).
The primary argument to the dissolution of the NSA was the establishment of the visionary
Federal City concept in its stead. As mentioned earlier, NOFA is a 501 (c) (3) non-profit
organization chartered to spearhead the Federal City development effort. The original
organization of NOFA included retired senior military leaders, the State of Louisiana Economic
Development Office, and numerous other private sector professionals (nolafederalcity.com).
During this timeframe of preparation for BRAC defense, NOFA coordinated extensively with
City and State government officials, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), the Navy’s BRAC
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Program Management Office (PMO), in addition to the NSA New Orleans and NAS/JRB Belle
Chasse military leadership, in addition to the major tenant Commands aboard each installation
(Mize, Dempsey, Braithwaite).
Additionally, during this timeframe the Algiers Development District (ADD) was
reformed on July 1, 2003 to serve as a local redevelopment authority and a special taxing district
for all territory within the fifteenth ward of Orleans Parish (RS 33:2740.27). On September 4,
2003, ADD was authorized as the sole entity to execute the Algiers Economic Development
Fund, revenues of which were collected through the Orleans Parish Tax Increment Fund (TIF)
activities (City Ordnance 021283). The formation phase ends with NOFA, the City and State
government, postured to respond to a potential BRAC assault on the New Orleans NSA.
Mobilization Phase (May 13, 2005 – Sept 2005)
The mobilization phase begins with the publication and announcement of the initial DOD
BRAC Report on May 13, 2005. NOFA’s preparatory actions during the previous phase were
subsequently put into action, which included an aggressive lobby through the State Legislators to
suggest the Federal City option as a viable alternate to a complete base closure. To that end, the
BRAC Commission conducted a regional hearing in New Orleans on July 22, 2005, and received
testimony from the Louisiana delegates in addition to the capstone speech from General Mize
regarding Federal City (BRAC testimony, 2005).
Following a comprehensive review of the proposal, the BRAC Commission modified the
BRAC language during their closed deliberation on August 24, 2005 and agreed to the Federal
City option, subject to certain provisions. After several weeks of Congressional and White
House review, the final BRAC recommendations were approved by the President on September
15, 2005, authorizing the Federal City plan. The mobilization phase ends with this successful
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adjustment to the BRAC law, as approved by the President. Within this phase, on August 29,
2005, Hurricane Katrina imposed its will on the New Orleans region, creating epic carnage and
destruction.
Sustainment Phase (Sept 2005 – Nov 2011)
The sustainment phase began shrouded in the wake of the devastation of Hurricane
Katrina. The fact that the BRAC Commission reversed its decision to fully close NSA New
Orleans and opt for the State-funded Federal City recapitalization project just days before
Katrina was a testament to its viability. However, Katrina’s impact to the project was
significant, as will be explained further in the findings later in the chapter. The project stalled
somewhat during the year following Katrina, as the region and its citizens struggled to rebuild.
With significant national support towards the New Orleans rebuilding effort, the Federal City
project was reinvigorated and quickly garnered support at all levels (e.g., community, City, State,
Federal) to proceed. For the bulk of 2006 and 2007, significant efforts were made by NOFA,
HQMC I&L, the DON BRAC PMO, and MARFORRES in the development of a negotiated
lease agreement for Phase I of the Federal City project. During February of 2008, NOFA
submitted their proposed business and lease plan to the Department of the Navy, prompting
further negotiation between stakeholders as each side fought for their respective interests. During
April of 2008, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor conducted a review of ADD’s role in Federal
City (at ADD’s request) and issued an Advisory Services Report on April 23, 2008.
Concurrently, after months of standstill, the lease agreement was finally brokered
following an in-person dialogue between SECNAV and the Governor of Louisiana. On
September 30, 2008 the 75-year real estate lease was signed by DON and ADD, the latter acting
as the assigned agent for the State of Louisiana. Of note, in April of 2008, ADD’s power and
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authorities were modified by the State Legislature following the audit, enabling ADD to serve as
the signatory of the lease (vice NOFA which was the originally intended signatory). Additionally
on September 30, 2008, the Sublease of the property was signed by ADD to NOFA, and the
subsequent Master Sublease was then signed between NOFA to the developer, HRI/ECC. Of
note, these lease signatory actions, and the associated groundbreaking action, occurred on the
very last day of the Congressionally mandated deadline.
During March of 2009, the headquarters for the U.S. Naval Reserve Forces
(NAVRESFOR) relocated to Norfolk, Virginia in accordance with the BRAC legislation.
During 2009 through the summer of 2011, Phase I of the Federal City project was in full
construction, with the main effort being the new secure compound which housed the new
MARFORRES headquarters facility, along with the adjacent parking garage and retail spaces.
Woodward Design & Build were the contractors executing the construction. During this chaotic
time period of construction, the NSA leadership was heavily involved with preparing to turnover
and close the base. Many existing buildings and roads needed to be demolished to make way for
the new facilities.
On August 12, 2010, NOFA published its official Master Plan, developed by a multitude
of contributors to include HRI/ECC and DPZ. This Master Plan retained the majority of the
original Federal City visionary tenets that were promoted during the past several years of
advertising campaign. Shortly thereafter, several milestones for the Parking Garage were met to
include the signing of the Parking Garage Development Agreement on August 31, 2010; the TriParty Parking Garage Management Agreement on January 31, 2011; and the Parking Garage Use
Agreement on July 14, 2011. Concurrent to the latter, the Marines vacated the East Bank
facilities of the NSA and relocated to new completed MARFORRES headquarters within Federal
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City during June and July of 2011. On September 15, 2011, all remaining DON property on the
West Bank was released to ADD in accordance with the lease stipulations. That same day, the
NSA officially closed after its 110-year military occupation.
Of later importance, on January 7, 2011 the Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) provided for the authorization of a Fee Simple Transfer of the bulk
of the leased land to the State of Louisiana. Of note, the secure compound, the Public Private
Venture (PPV) housing on the former NSA, and the historic LeBeuf Planation Housing (a.k.a.
Quarters A), were retained as U.S. Navy property. The secure compound (with the exception of
the four new buildings owned by the Marine Corps) remained under lease to ADD. The PPV
housing remained under lease to Patrician Management. Quarters “A” remained under the
ownership of the Marine Corps.
The sustainment phase contained the majority of the legal and physical actions associated
with the detailed development and execution of the initial components of the Federal City
project.
Fragmentation Phase (Nov 2011 – Mar 2014)
While tensions between NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC had been mounting for some time
over interpretation of their respective authorities related to the various agreements (official and
unofficial), I argue that the fragmentation phase begins with the NOFA’s filing of a lawsuit
against HRI/ECC on Nov 23, 2011 and the latter’s countersuit shortly thereafter. Following
close to a year of legal battles in and out of court, the two parties settled out of court and
summarily ended their relationship (Orleans Parish Civil Court No. 2011-11992). Concurrently,
the relationship between ADD and NOFA continued to sour culminating with a compromised
Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) between the two parties on October 10, 2012. The

64

CEA essentially redefined NOFA’s role as the primary lead for the Federal City project and
subordinated their contribution to basic membership in the newly sanctioned Joint Development
Committee (JDC), established formally also on that day. As the remaining ancillary Federal City
projects beyond the secure compound came to a close (e.g., NOMMA), the development stalled
completely and remains that way through today.
This phase also saw the actual execution of the FY11 NDAA Fee Simple Transfer from
DON to ADD on May 21, 2013, furthering ADD’s control over resources. Shortly thereafter, the
secure compound was formally accepted by DON on Jul 30, 2013. Finally, ADD terminated the
sublease with NOFA and, by law, the sublease between NOFA and HRI/ECC on March 18,
2014.
Now that the detailed context relating to the Federal City project, its supporting advocacy
coalition’s principle actors, and the chronology of key events have been articulated within the
phased framework of the life cycle, the research design and data collection methodology can
explained in the forthcoming chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
The nature of the study purpose and associated research questions posed drove the
decision to utilize the qualitative case study as the preferred design method for several reasons.
According to Creswell (2013), case study research involves the detailed study of a case within a
real-life setting or contemporary context. Furthermore, due to the complexity of the
characteristics associated within a study of an organization such as NOFA and its partners,
multiple sources of information were required within the defined (bounded) timeframe and
scope. Creswell (2013) further offers that the defining features of a case study includes: (1) the
analysis of a specific group, organization, or partnership; (2) at a specific place and time; (3)
with the intent to illustrate and understand a unique intrinsic case; (4) through the collection of
multiple forms of qualitative data; and (5) utilizing specific data analysis tools, to (6) produce a
detailed report of findings of themes, issues, patterns, or explanations.
This method best addressed the research questions by specifically bounding the case to
the formative years of NOFA and the coalition (~2003), throughout its mobilization and
sustainment periods, to its ultimate denouement following the coalition’s fragmentation, signed
Cooperative Endeavor Agreement, and associated establishment of the replacement governance
body, the Joint Development Committee, in 2013. In order to capture and understand the
dynamics of the case, specific qualitative data sources were required which included in-depth
interviews with key coalition actors and a multitude of federal, state, and local documents and
reports.

66

Case Study Considerations
In this particular research design, the case study was the best methodology to use as the
solution to answering the research questions, as the case study strengths outweighed its inherent
limitations. Further, according to Creswell (2013, 2014) and Yin (203), the case study offers a
means of investigating complex social dynamics consisting of multiple variables of potential
importance in understanding the overarching phenomenon. Because the Federal City project was
anchored in a real-life situation and produced a rich and holistic account of a very unique
phenomenon, this study offered insights and identified unanticipated underlying meanings that
served to inform the scholarly literature.
Furthermore, according to Stake (2005), due to its strengths, the case study is considered
a particularly appropriate design for applied fields of study such as education, social work,
administration, and health. To that end, in the context of this case study research involving
political power evolution of a coalition, the processes, problems, and programs that were
examined brought about an understanding that, if accepted, could affect and perhaps even
improve practice. Lastly, Yin (2003) states that “case studies are the preferred strategy when
“how” or “why” questions are being posed…and when the focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). The “how” and “why” questions
were addressed most aptly in the conduct of this research, as articulated in the latter chapters of
this paper.
However, according to Creswell (2013), several intrinsic challenges also exist within
qualitative case study research and development. First, the case selected may be too broad or too
narrow in scope for appropriate analysis. The researcher must decide which bounded system
(described within certain parameters) to study, understanding that there most likely are numerous
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perspectives to select from. Second, the researcher must decide whether to study a single case or
multiple cases, and know that the latter runs the risk of diluting the overall analysis. Lastly,
selecting the case requires a determination of a specific rationale for the associated purposeful
sampling strategy for selecting the case and for accumulating relevant information. Not having
enough information to present an in-depth picture of the case jeopardizes the value of the study
significantly.
Additionally, the special features of case study research that provide the rationale for its
selection also present certain other limitations in it usage. Although rich, thick description and
analysis of a phenomenon may be desired, a researcher may not have the time or money to
devote to such an undertaking. And assuming time is available to produce a worthy case study,
the product may be too lengthy, too detailed, or too involved for busy policy makers and
practitioners to read and use. The amount of description, analysis, or summary material is up to
the investigator. The researcher also must decide. "1. How much to make the report a story; 2.
How much to compare with other cases; 3. How much to formalize generalizations or leave such
generalizing to readers; 4. How much description of the researcher to include in the report; and,
5. Whether or not and how much to protect anonymity" (Stake, 2005, p. 460).
Lastly, Yin (2003) points out three related critiques of the case study strategy: (1) lack of rigor
on the part of the researcher, (2) provision of little foundation for scientific generalization, and
(3) that they take too long and produce massive, unreadable documents and reports.
To address the weaknesses specific to this research design, the use of a data collection
matrix that specifies the amount and depth of information to be collected mitigated detail gaps in
knowledge. Further, specific attention was given to appropriately bounding the case in scope,
place, and time. Also, the selection of a single case (e.g., the New Orleans Federal City project)
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versus attempting to utilize a multiple case study design allowed for sufficient depth and
relevance of data collection. Lastly, in addition to the above, tightly defining the research
questions focused on producing well-supported articulated patterns or explanations significantly
mitigated the weaknesses.
While other qualitative approaches such as narrative research or phenomenology could
have been used to study the unique dynamics of NOFA and the Federal City project, I think that
the case study’s benefits greatly outweighed its risks. Reinforcing this conclusion, Zonabend
(1992) also suggests that case studies are the preferred means to acquire an understanding of the
views of the actors involved in a particular situation.
Qualitative Data Collection
In addressing the research questions, the collection of relevant, comprehensive,
qualitative data was paramount to this study. Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) identify as least six
sources of evidence in case studies that includes: documents, archival records, interviews, direct
observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts. For the purposes of this study, open
source public information was available through various federal, state, city, and local
government websites for acquiring substantial qualitative record data. Of these, the principle
sources included the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Defense (DOD),
Department of the Navy (DON), Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), BRAC Project
Management Office (PMO) Commission, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USCOE), and various
State of Louisiana, City of New Orleans, and local community agencies. Public information
included investigative reports, records, minutes, archival material, photographs, video,
transcripts, correspondence, and other related documentation available that was relevant to the
study. Further, due to my current position as a federal civil service employee within the
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Department of Defense, specifically within the U.S. Marine Corps, I had access to information
and documentation not normally afforded the academic researcher.
The core of the qualitative data collected, however, was through 20 specific semistructured personal interviews of selected key personnel from NOFA, ADD, the City of New
Orleans, the State of Louisiana, and the Department of the Navy, to include several organizations
within the U.S. Marine Corps. A complete listing of interviewed personnel is depicted in
Appendix B (Participant Profile). The initial focus was on those personnel capable (and willing)
to provide detailed information relating to NOFA, BRAC, and the Federal City project. The
intended candidates were those with personal experience with both the BRAC process,
specifically the decision to close the NSA; in addition to those intimately involved with the
advocacy coalition (NOFA) and the Federal City campaign, from both a public and private
perspective. All interviews included core interview questions, as listed in Appendix C, followed
by additional questions tailored to the individual’s specific role and experiences with the
coalition and the Federal City project.
Other data included was the researcher’s personal observations of the Federal City project
in addition to the adjacent Algiers community. Although current (i.e, 2015) data collected is
outside of the prescribed bounds of this case study, certain element proved useful in comparison
to in-bound historical records. Similarly, historical photographs of the local Algiers community
was another source of data collected. Several photographs served to underscore verbal and
written descriptions, which added a depth of understanding as well as complementing critical
coded data, summarized in themes and incorporated into the body of the study.
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Data Organization
All data collected was appropriately labeled, categorized, and filed in a dissertation
database (actually a spreadsheet but functioning as a database) created utilizing Microsoft Excel.
The database served as a master index for cross-referencing all collected qualitative information.
Within the file, separate tabs were created for different sources of information. The bulk of the
collected data was from the interviews, with a separate tab for each respondent containing the
coded data for each. A “roll-up” of all individual coded data was created to enable subsequent
analysis. Figure XX below depicts a screenshot of the “BB” Tab which contains all coded data
for the respondent Bob Braithwaite. This database proved exceptionally useful in collecting,
categorizing, coding, and analyzing the qualitative data used in this research study.

Figure 17. Example of Coding Matrix from Coding Database

Validity
Creswell (2013) suggests eight strategies for qualitative research validity. Of these, this
study focused primarily on three: triangulation through utilization of other sources of data than
interviews; peer review to ensure data accuracy; and member-checking, reviewing certain data
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points with participants. Multiple sources of data were used to corroborate developed themes,
such as reconciling documented testimony with information captured during the information
process. For example, the BRAC Commission testimony of General Mize on July 22, 2005 was
compared to his transcript from his December 15, 2015 interview for validation and accuracy.
Examples of other sources of data used for validation included the published minutes from the
ADD (and later JDC) board meetings, excerpts from the NOFA/HRI law suit filings, and
redundant published works. Additionally, the sheer number of participants (20) in the study
allowed for an abundance of material for complementary and mutually supporting data for theme
development.
To ensure the highest possible accuracy of captured interview data, all completed
transcriptions were electronically reviewed by the respondents themselves. This additional
activity allowed for not only a high degree of data precision, but also promoted trust and
confidence with the respondents by providing them an opportunity to physically review their
individual transcript. Furthermore, the electronic transcripts were used to construct the follow-on
coding database through the cut/paste functions of the supporting software application,
preventing inadvertent translation errors in copying source data. Lastly, select portions of the
draft findings, analysis, and conclusion chapters were reviewed by varied colleagues for content
accuracy and reliability. These colleagues have extensive knowledge of the dynamics of the
Federal City case and provided verification of facts as they were presented in the paper. Further,
oversight of the development of this research paper was provided by the dissertation committee,
ensuring a high level of accountability of supporting material as it was used to construct the
findings and conclusions.
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Reliability
Additionally, Creswell’s (2013, 2014) reliability checks include maintaining detailed
field notes, using a high-quality medium for recording and transcribing the tape; and including
the “trivial, but often crucial, pauses and overlaps” (p. 253). During the four-month interview
process of this study, comprehensive handwritten notes were used to capture interview highlights
and key points made by respondents. Also, all interviews were conducted utilizing a Sony ICDPX440 Stereo IC Digital Recorder, which physically includes a USB for ease of mp3 audio file
transfer to hosting computers. All interviews and their respective audio files were organized,
stored, and managed in specific electronic folders for follow-on transcription. All transcriptions
were conducted by a paid qualified court reporter utilizing state-of-the-art transcription tools and
methods, to include multiple passes for validation of transcript accuracy. During the coding
phase, relevant data was highlighted and subsequently hand-coded into the margins of each
transcript for follow-on use in the construction of the coding database as mentioned previously.
Babbie (2014) also suggests several methods for ensuring reliability: (1) redundant
subsamples of survey respondents to verify information; (2) replication of sampled coding by an
independent agent; and (3) clarity, specificity, training, and practice. All three of Babbie’s
suggestions were integrated into the study. The collective attention to detail and commitment to
data accuracy and reliability enabled complete confidence in the development of the paper’s
findings and conclusions.
Ethics
Additionally, elements of fundamental ethics were included in the study. Creswell
(2013) offers several types of ethical considerations, the following of which was used in this
research:
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Sought and received IRB approval.



Gained permission from study participants and acquired signed consent forms.



Identified a research problem that would benefit participants.



Disclosed the purpose of the study to participants.



Avoided deceiving and exploiting participants.



Respected the privacy and anonymity of participants through the sealing of the paper.



Communicated in clear, straightforward, appropriate language.

Babbie (2013) offers a similar listing of ethical standards to follow in Chapter 3 of his
book. Periodic review of these key points throughout the study in addition to occasional ethicsrelated discussions with my dissertation committee ensured complete compliance at all times and
prevented any inadvertent violations.
Role of the Researcher
As a retired U.S. Marine commissioned officer and current federal civil servant employed
by the Marine Corps, my career has spanned 30 years of service, both in uniform and out. Half
of this career has been spent at the Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters in New Orleans, at
facilities aboard the former Naval Support Activity on the East Bank and then at the new Federal
City complex. Having spent so much time in New Orleans in the employ if the military provides
me an exceptional insight into the perspective of the serviceman stationed in New Orleans, but
also a notable bias to the same. Arriving in the area in 2001, my presence enabled me “insider”
access to the evolving dynamics of the impact of 9/11, the BRAC 2005 process, and the Federal
City campaign from a ground floor perspective. Having a personal appreciation for the unique
culture of New Orleans coupled with the insight of the Marine Corps ideology and related
philosophies, motivated me to select the Federal City project as the topic for my dissertation
research. Knowing many of the key players personally and actually living through the entire
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Federal City campaign from inception to failure further drove me to want to understand what
happened here, but more specifically how and why. Beyond the stated research questions, I have
observed significant emotional controversy associated with the enduring nature of the Marine
Corps’ presence in New Orleans from the perspective of the Marines stationed here. I wanted to
understand why, and, more importantly, the dynamics of the relationship between the military
and the City of New Orleans from a cultural and political perspective.
Consequently, my personal experiences and knowledge of the Marine Corps required a
conscious effort to remain the neutral researcher while collecting and analyzing data related to
this study. I attempted to be objective wherever possible, but recognize that the validity of the
findings may be slightly biased towards that of the Marine perspective. Notwithstanding that
point, significant effort was applied to mitigating this bias as described earlier in this chapter.
Data Analysis
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim and were accompanied by
researcher field notes taken during the sessions and upon subsequent reflection. This data, along
with all the other collected information, was coded in accordance with the prescribed coding
index, developed by the researcher (as reflected in Chapter 8). Creswell (2013) describes the
process of coding as “aggregating the text or visual data into smaller categories of information,
seeking evidence for the code from different databases being used in the study, and then
assigning a label to the code” (p. 184). Three types of codes were utilized in this study: (1)
Deductive Codes—codes that are predetermined and emanate from the literature, (2) Inductive
Codes—codes that emerge from the study’s collected data, and (3) In Vivo Codes—a word or
short phrase from the actual language found in the qualitative data record. Creswell (2014)
suggests the use of a qualitative codebook, or a table that contains the indexed list of
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predetermined (and emergent) codes used in the study. As mentioned previously, this coding
schema is described and illustrated in the beginning of Chapter 8. As the collected data was
summarily coded, themes were developed that illustrated patterns and relationships relevant to
the research questions. Similarly, the resulting codes, themes, and chronology were depicted
against the prevailing policy theories presented earlier to better understand any relationships
(direct and indirect) of the complex dynamic of the Federal City project. The charts and graphs
associated with this policy theory analysis will be presented in the latter chapters of this study.
Figure XX below illustrates the policy interaction matrix utilized in this analysis.
.
Theory Interaction Matrix
Coalition Stage
Theory

Theory Characteristics

F o rm a t io n

2003

2004

M o biliza t io n

2005

S us t a inm e nt

2006

2007

2008

F ra gm e nt a t io n

2009

2 0 10

2 0 11

2 0 12

2 0 13

2 0 14

- Actors enga gi ng i n pol i ti cs to tra ns l a te
thei r bel i efs i nto a cti on

ACF

Advocacy
Coalition
Framework

Joint Development
Committee

- Ma i n focus i s the s ubs ys tem

New Orleans Federal Alliance
- Focus i s on how the coa l i ti on i nterprets
a nd res ponds to events a s externa l or
i nterna l s hock
- Intera cti ons between wi de group of
a ctors i n a pol i cy communi ty to refi ne
s ol uti on

MSA

Multiple
Streams
Analysis

- pol i cy entrepreneurs s ea rchi ng for ri ght
ti me to propos e s ol uti ons

Katrina

ADD Takeover

- Focus i ng events s hi ft a ttenti on to the
probl em
- Mea s ures how na rra ti ves effect
pol i cyma ki ng
- Setti ng, cha ra cters , pl ot, a nd mora l

NPF

Narrative Policy
- Si tua ted wi thi n the meso l evel of
Framework s ubs ys tems

"Save The Base"

"New Orleans
Riverside at Historic
Algiers"

"Rebuild New Orleans"

- Context i mporta nt
- Events trea ted a s focus i ng events
- Subs ys tems a re a s ource of s ta bi l i ty,
power, a nd pol i cy conti nui ty for l ong
peri ods

PET

Punctuated
Equilibrium
Theory

- Ins ta bi l i ty a nd ma jor cha nge born from
i ntera cti ons between pol i cy s ubs ys tems
a nd ma cro-pol i ti ca l s ys tem

Return to normal political
subsystem

Katrina

- Unpredi cta bl e
- Ma jor events a s ca ta l ys ts

GM

Urban Growth
Machine

- Coa l i ti ons of l a nd-ba s ed el i tes , ti ed to
the economi c pos s i bi l i ti es of pl a ce,
dri ve urba n pol i ti cs i n thei r ques t to
expa nd the l oca l economy a nd
a ccumul a te wea l th

Project delays due to
Katrina

Phase I Construction

- Pl a ces l oca l i ti es i n chroni c competi ti on
wi th one a nother; a t thei r own ri s k

Figure 18. Theory Interaction Matrix
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Re-attempt to develop
Federal City (Phase II)

Coding and Theme Discussion
The below chart illustrates the code/theme distribution of the collected interview data,

THEME/CODING DISTRIBUTION
Subsystems

Behavior

Narratives

Legal

Views

15%

18%

22%

26%

19%

Figure 19. Theme/Coding Distribution Chart

along with their respective percentages. The themes display a relatively equal distribution of
coded data, with the exception of the Demonstrated Behavior theme, which shows a slight
deviation from the mean of 20%, or approximately 6% more volume. Respondents spent a
notable amount of time characterizing actors and their associated behavior.
For the first theme, New Orleans Governing Subsystems, the data clearly identifies
“NOLA Military History”, “Culture of NOLA”, and “Local Politics” as the three most common
codes present. However, only the latter code surfaced independently during the interviews,
owing to the nature of the questions posed to the respondents (e.g., “can you please comment on
the culture of New Orleans”). Military Quality of Life (QOL) was the second most common
code (subject) present in the data beyond Local Politics.
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The data categorized within the Demonstrated Behavior theme revealed an expected high
volume of comment related to NOFA, General David Mize, ADD, and HRI/ECC, the primary
actors within the coalition. However, what was unexpected was the high degree of discussion
related to the Navy’s behavior observed through the case study.
The third theme, Narrative Shift, revealed a collection of codes related to observed
overarching storylines in motion during various times throughout the case study period. Of note,
the Federal City Vision, Katrina, and the Navy Leaving dominated the coding volume, although
Save the Base, Rebuild New Orleans, and BRAC carried significant weight. As will be discussed
in the forthcoming subchapter, a sequence in narrative shift will be argued.
THEMES
New Orleans Governing
Subsystems
Numerous underlying
subsystems were prevalent
during the case study
parameters which appeared to
greatly influence both actor
behavior and project outcome.
They varied by phase and
intensity.

Demonstrated Behavior

Narrative Shift

Distinctly different individual
Throughout the phases of the
actor/group characteristics,
coalition's life cycle, narratives
motivations, and actions were appear to evolve over time; this
reported throughout the
alters the dynamics of actor
coalition's life cycle. All actor
behavior and the project's
behavior can (will) be classified
developmental progress.
as a combination of four
behavioral tendencies: Idealistic,
Cunning, Opportunistic, and
Altruistic. Certain catalysts
across the phases influenced
changes in behavior.

Legal Negotiations, Conflict,
and Resolution

Views of Success and
Failure

Distinct legal interactions
amongst select factions had
profound effects upon both the
coalition's solvency and the
project's viability.

Differing perspectives of success
and/or failure were observed at
different levels and at different
times.

Codes:

Codes:

Codes:

Codes:

Codes:

NOLA Military History (37)
Culture of NOLA (35)
Local Politics (30)
Military QOL (19)
Economics (7)
Ideology (5)

NOFA (53)
MGen David Mize (35)
Navy (33)
ADD (29)
HRI/ECC (20)
Marines (15)
Governor/State (11)
Mayor/City (8)
Lawyers (8)
JDC (6)
Jeff Arnold (5)
BRAC PMO (3)
Jackie Clarkson (2)

Federal City vision (38)
Navy leaving (36)
Katrina (35)
Save the Base (20)
BRAC (20)
Rebuild New Orleans (13)
Master Plan (7)
NOLA as a Navy Town (4)

Navy Lease (60)
Coalition Conflict (43)
NOFA vs ADD (27)
Developer Selection (8)
BRAC language (8)
Law suits (8)
Coop Endeav Agree/JDC (8)
NDAA/Fee Simple Xfer (7)
NOFA vs HRI (3)
Master Plan (2)

Lessons Learned (51)
Critique (46)
Marine View (14)
Future Risk (13)
Metaphors (13)
Algiers Community (9)
Federal Government (7)
City of New Orleans (5)
Symbology (2)
Developer (2)

Figure 20. Theme and Code Table

Legal Negotiations, Conflict, and Resolution highlight the Navy Lease negotiations, the
BRAC testimony and language, and the conflict amongst the coalition partners – particularly
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between ADD and HRI - as the primary most voluminous coded data within this theme. Lastly,
Views of Success and Failure offers significant commentary related to a critique of the project
and the coalition’s internal dynamics. The majority of the coded data in this category presents a
declaration of project failure as the most common code. Lastly, Views of Success and Failure
capture significant testimonial related to overarching opinions of respondents regarding the
project. The phrase Lessons Learned was used to collate specific observed takeaways that serve
as prescriptive guidelines for complex projects such as this one. Significant commentary and
critique was also grouped into this theme, which will be covered in the forthcoming Findings
subchapters.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS
Overview
As the reader may have inferred by now, this is a classic tale of the universal struggle
over control of land and resources. As described in the previous chapter, what was discovered
through research and data analysis were five principle themes, each of which will be covered
individually in the following pages in the form of Findings. First, it was determined that
numerous underlying subsystems were prevalent during the case study parameters which
appeared to influence both actor behavior and project outcome, varying by phase and intensity.
Second, it was observed that different individual actor/group characteristics, motivations, and
actions were reported throughout the coalition's life cycle. All actor behavior was subsequently
classified as a combination of four behavioral tendencies: Idealistic, Cunning, Opportunistic, and
Altruistic. Certain catalysts across the phases influenced changes in behavior. Third, throughout
the phases of the coalition's life cycle, overarching narratives appear to evolve over time; this
alters the dynamics of actor behavior and the project's developmental progress. Fourth, distinct
legal interactions amongst select factions had profound effects upon both the coalition's solvency
and the project's viability. And lastly, differing perspectives of success and/or failure were
observed at different levels and at different times.
Taken together, the five subchapters portray a complicated and emotionally charged case,
rooted in history and ripe for detailed analysis. As can be inferred from the brief overview
above, the findings have an inherent “flow” to them in the order in which they are presented.
Consequently, the subsystems that govern New Orleans society will be explored first.
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CHAPTER 5A
GOVERNING SUBSYSTEMS
Introduction
The research revealed several observations regarding New Orleans as viewed through its
myriad of governing subsystems that appear to influence societal activity, particularly as it
relates to the Federal City project and the coalition charged to bring it to fruition. As illustrated
through the description of the city’s deep history, these subsystems are found to be rooted deeply
into the fabric of the city’s culture, shaped by over 240 years of military integration, in peacetime
and war, during periods of prosperity, through natural disasters, and their aftermath.
Furthermore, the direct contact between varied military forces and the local New Orleans
populace have created a society with a shared heritage and culture, but one with differing
institutional values.
Military integration
The visibility and overt activity of the military in this region has ebbed and flowed
throughout history; a social integration exists that has been cemented into the day-to-day
functionality of certain portions of New Orleans society. Interviews with high-ranking military
personnel reinforce this claim. LtGen Richard Mills, a former Marine Commander who was
stationed in New Orleans, states:
“I think this assignment here is probably unique among Marine Corps flag officer
assignments because I think, in regards to the city of New Orleans, so much of what you
do…the personal and the professional…are intertwined” (Mills, 2015).
Additionally, a retired Marine Lt Colonel who also was stationed here for many years comments:
“I mean, the city itself, you know… it was a symbiotic relationship…that was always a
point of pride. And the military contributed and was supported very positively by the
people and the political class of New Orleans” (Quinton, 2015).
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The visibility of the relationship between the Marines and the city of New Orleans significantly
was enhanced during the early 1990s when MARRESFOR/MARFORRES was created, and
Major (and then Lieutenant) General Livingston was appointed as the Commanding General.
“He [Maj Gen Livingston] always wanted to stay in New Orleans too. You know, that
was his predisposition...And that basically anchored us here...at that point in time, then
Marine Forces Reserve headquarters was synonymous with New Orleans. I mean, the
relationship was definitely cemented and solidified” (Quinton, 2015).
LtGen Livingston, a Medal of Honor recipient from his actions during the Vietnam War, was
assimilated immediately into the New Orleans social and political stratum upon his arrival – a
position from which he took advantage of in securing a more visible presence for the Marines in
town. His actions shaped many of the enduring relationships that are present today with the
Mayor’s office, civic, and business leaders, in addition to galvanizing the retired military
community in the region. In short, his national status as a recognized war hero propelled the
Marine Corps’ notoriety in town to one of popularity, in contrast to the Navy’s waning (soon to
be gone) presence. For example, his utilization of the Marine Forces Reserve marching band,
along with other instruments of publicity such as color guards and Toys For Tots events, greatly
reinforced this popularity to the citizens of New Orleans. Livingston’s successors – especially
David Mize – would continue to expand on the foothold established, culminating with the
Federal City saga, and beyond.
Importance of History
Numerous references to history were made by several respondents in the context of the
enduring relationship between the City of New Orleans and the military. Gregg Habel, a retired
Marine Colonel and current Executive Director of MARFORRES, states:
“For the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps has felt a loyalty to the city…I certainly think
the Marine Corps as an institution values its history and its tradition more so than the
other services. So we had a strong history here, you know, dating all the way back to the
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War of 1812…the very large garrison that was stationed here. So I think there was a
desire on the part of the Marine Corps to continue to honor that history, that tradition, that
relationship” (Habel, 2015).
Ron Bald, a retired New Orleans U.S. Coast Guard Commander and Deputy Counsel for
MARFORRES, supports this theme. He states:
“…there's so much history that people here do not want to lose, whereas in other places
they want… I've seen where they want to get rid of the history” (Bald, 2015).
Furthermore, LtGens Bergman (also a former Commander of MARFORRES) and Mills offer
more commentary regarding the subject:
“Well, any group who walks around in their War of 1812 costumes as often as they can
goes without saying that there is a long history and a proud history of being tied to the
military” (Bergman, 2015).
“I think the city has a sense of history and a sense of how the military plays into that
history, and unlike most American cities it appreciates that… and I think that’s a lot of
where we get the spirit of welcoming us, embracing us, and working with us because they
really do appreciate it, where I really do think some of the other cities have forgotten
that” (Mills, 2015).
The history of the military’s integration into the New Orleans culture has been evidenced
over two centuries. With the expansion of the Marine Corps Reserve headquarters role in New
Orleans along with its accompanying senior-level brass, the military’s influence and visibility
was greatly enhanced over the past two decades. At a time when the Navy was “looking for the
door”, the Marines were “digging in”, whether each recognized it or not at the time.
In order to better understand the relationship between the military and the region, the
origins of the New Orleans culture is examined, as will be articulated in the next section. The
research revealed that the local culture influenced the conduct of the coalition in the context of
the project’s planning, execution, and ultimate demise.
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Cultural background
Louisiana, and specifically New Orleans, has a very unique culture, formed from a
multitude of sources over centuries, but based mostly upon its French ancestry. The bulk of this
ancestry in southern Louisiana is a result of the migration of thousands of French settlers from an
area called Acadia, in what is presently Nova Scotia. During the early 1600s, colonists from
France were among the first Europeans to settle in North America. Following England’s
possession of Nova Scotia in 1713, many attempts to convert the French inhabitants into English
subjects were made, often meeting with violent resistance. Consequently, thousands of French
Acadians were deported in 1755, many of which eventually migrating to Louisiana. By the early
1800s, thousands had made their way to Louisiana, settling along the southern parishes of the
Mississippi River delta and New Orleans. “These immigrants brought with them a history and
view of government unlike those of the landed gentry in the northern part of the state” (Parent,
2004).
This French heritage was revealed in several interviews in the context of describing the
New Orleans culture. According to SES Gregg Habel:
“Well first and foremost, the mélange, the mixture of people that live here…French at
one point was the official language of this city and still has a place. I think that makes it
more European than any other city in the U.S….the system of French laws that are here,
the language, I don't think you will find any other city in the country that has as strong a
language – foreign language influence. And that appeals to me” (Habel, 2015).
Colonel Bubba Deckert, a retired Marine and multi-generational descendent of New Orleans
heritage, articulates his thoughts regarding the French heritage:
“New Orleans is arguably less French than it ever has been as far as blood and ethnicity
and more French than it ever was in its attitude of rules are for other people. We have all
the same rules that everybody else has. We just don't really follow them. And we have
an unwritten concept here that doesn't work in other places. It's called…there's good
corruption and bad corruption” (Deckert, 2015).
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Additionally, a comparison of New Orleans to other locations was made by a gentleman
of Cuban descent that developed the Master Plan for Federal City:
“New Orleans was kind of the jewel city of the Caribbean. It was a Caribbean city and it
was the best of the Caribbean cities and when you compared it against the efficiency and
the level of government and stuff like that with other Caribbean cities, it was near the top
of the list. But it was a Caribbean city and that's how it developed initially” (Mize, 2015)
In this context, New Orleans was considered a vital node in the regional trade routes along with
the other main cities of Cuba and the Caribbean during the 1800s and beyond, and as such,
received (and provided) a significant diffusion from (and to) other cultures. The many
characteristics that could be used to describe the New Orleans culture are all deeply rooted in the
depth and breadth of its historical origins as described so far. The research validated a very
interesting relationship, as the below figure illustrates through a simple tree metaphor, between a
society’s history, culture, subsystems, ideology, philosophy, and values/beliefs.

Figure 21. Tree Analogy

On a community level, differences within the New Orleans culture also exist not only
between neighborhoods separating class and ethnic distinctions (e.g., Metairie versus Bywater,
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Uptown versus Mid-City, etc.), but also on a broader level such as East Bank versus West Bank
cultural differences. Bill Garrett, a retired Navy Captain who served as the NSA New Orleans
Executive Officer prior to its closure (and current employee of ADD), explains this point:
“Completely different cultures on the East and West bank. Well the East bank is more
driven to the City of New Orleans, French Quarter, that kind of food and music and
culture and activities that you see in downtown New Orleans and the Quarter. On the
West bank, you know, you’re driven to Algiers which is a much smaller community in
this area, but historic Algiers has been around, you know, since the 1500s. So it’s a very
old community. So centered around historic Algiers point as opposed to the Quarter
which is completely different demographic. Different style of culture…” (Garrett, 2015).
Importance of Social Background
Anyone who is from New Orleans or has lived there for a substantial period of time takes
for granted many of the unique social architectural “protocols” that guide much of the personal
interaction and behavior. Colonel Deckert again offers his insight:
“So you’ve been in New Orleans long enough to know that you do what your family did
whether you like it or not and you go to school where your father went. So my dad and
his family all grew up in the 9th Ward so they went to Holy Cross. So even though I grew
up out by the lake, I went to Holy Cross which is now out by my house” (Deckert, 2015).
Relatedly, Dell Dempsey, a retired Marine Colonel and former member of LED and NOFA,
states her thoughts on the subject:
“If you didn’t go to Jesuit, then maybe I don’t need to help you out. I remember we were
in a meeting once with some engineering outfit. They were going to put in a bid and we
were meeting with them. And the guy gets in the room with Mize and me and I think Bill
Ryan. And the first question out of his mouth to Dave is, so where did you go to school?
And Dave goes, well I went to the Naval Academy. No, no, high school. Where did you
go to high school?” (Dempsey, 2015).
Colonel Dempsey also provides a related point captured during her interview that describes
social boundaries created generations ago that left their mark on the present day laydown of New
Orleans:
“You can see that evidenced by the fact that the whole garden district was developed by
the Americans that came later because the French Quarter wouldn’t – the old city
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wouldn’t have anything to do with them. And I truly, truly think that if you really look
back at history that that is absolutely at the base of why everything is so
closed...insulated” (Dempsey, 2015).
The complex social subsystem of New Orleans plays an important role in the local cultural
dynamic, as evidenced by multiple respondents.
Legal Subsystem
Within the New Orleans culture, a dominant subsystem involves the unique application
of State law, especially within the business world, as compared to the rest of the nation. Colonel
Deckert, also a practicing Louisiana attorney, offers a very detailed explanation in layman’s
terms:
“The concept of, oh, our law is so different here. It’s because of the Napoleonic code.
We have about as much Napoleonic code left in Louisiana code as there is Napoleon left.
But every law school outside Louisiana… every lawyer that goes to a law school outside
Louisiana only knows one thing about Louisiana. They spent three years being explained
a concept of law and then having the following phrase added at the end: “except in
Louisiana”. So they have got it engrained in their head that it’s just so different. It’s not.
As a Louisiana lawyer, it’s not” (Deckert, 2015).
Deckert further explains the process by which a legal challenge is logically resolved locally as
compared to the rest of the nation and the world:
“Mentally how you get there may be different, but you get to the same place. But the
mental process by which we get there is the way the rest of the world does it. It’s just
because France has a civil code, Spain has a civil code, Germany has a civil code,
Switzerland has a civil code, and Mexico has a civil code. Everybody but the United
States. So it’s the United States that’s the odd man out. Everybody is not like the United
States. The United States is the one that’s different. And New Orleans in particular,
Louisiana in general, but New Orleans in particular ain’t like the rest of the United States
and that’s why it’s a little bit – foreigners have an easier time fitting into the culture often
than other Americans do because of that” (Deckert, 2015).
“But you’re always going to the same place within the law. It’s just one group is always
taught to go to the left and the other group is taught to go to the right. Nothing more than
that” (Deckert, 2015).
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This explanation illuminates how the legal subsystem furthers the distinctiveness of the New
Orleans culture.
Business Subsystem
Relatedly, the societal mechanics of conducting business within New Orleans also
appears unique. Colonel Deckert’s candid explanation:
“When people from other places come down here and they try and do things – they have
been successful wherever they were and they try and do things down here and they are
stymied at every turn. And you hear it from folks who are new New Orleanians all the
time. You can’t do business in New Orleans. If you’re not on the inside, you can’t get
anything done. And those statements are both true and false… You figure you should be
able to just follow the rules, except when you come here and then you have to act more
like you went to a different country” (Deckert, 2015).
“How you do stuff in New Orleans. If you want a permit, you can go down and apply or
you can go and talk to the guy who is there and give him two tickets to the circus that's in
town and ask him to get what you want. Is it right? You can argue that. Does it work?
That's the way it kind of works” (Deckert, 2015).
Both the legal and business subsystems described above were less prominent during the
interviews, but are considered foundational in understanding the primacy of the political
subsystem of New Orleans – arguably at the heart of the New Orleans culture that drove
coalition behavior.
Political Subsystem
The research revealed that the political culture of New Orleans is also unique, not only to
the region but to the nation as a whole. According to a local Pulitzer-prize winning journalist:
“Louisiana is our most exotic state. It is religious and roguish, a place populated by
Cajuns, Creoles, Christian Conservatives, rednecks, African Americans, and the white
working-class New Orleanians. While northern Louisiana is mostly Protestant and
conservative, southern Louisiana, settled by French Catholics, is noted for its love of
good food, good music, and good times. Laissez les Bons Temps Rouler – Let the Good
Times Roll – is the unofficial motto. It is notably poor in the realm of political ethics”
(Bridges, 2001).
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Politics played a very important role in the conduct of the coalition’s solvency throughout
its entire existence, but especially during the mobilization and fragmentation phases. The
discussion of the political subsystem will begin at the State level and develop further through the
city to the coalition level.
State Politics
As Parent asserts, Louisiana, shaped by early immigration patterns, is an ideologically
divided State, with the northern and central portions, which includes the capital of Baton Rouge,
is culturally different than the southern portion, which includes New Orleans and the southern
parishes. As he states, “North Louisiana most readily and vividly fits the standard of southern
culture. From politics to food, north Louisiana seems more like a southern state than does the
French coast. It is more chicken-fried steak and barbeque than jambalaya and etouffee.”
Conversely, “the social and cultural liberalism of south Louisiana is most visibly reflected in
alcohol and gambling issues but clearly extends to racial issues as well. It is not the food or the
music. It is an extremely different cultural heritage” (Parent, 56).
According to one of the respondents who happened to serve in a key post within the
State’s Economic Development department:
“I think at the state level, this is a state divided against itself…north Louisiana hates
south Louisiana. Everybody in the north cannot stand New Orleans, but everybody
knows New Orleans is feeder for the rest of the state. So that's a big problem when it
comes to Baton Rouge politics. And you can see it when you go to these committee
hearings and watch who testifies for what and how the money kind of flows. And I think
those two things are just really, really big. And I think that at the time of Katrina, there
was just so much public corruption here” (Dempsey, 2015).
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New Orleans Politics
The political dynamic of New Orleans captured in the interviews can best be described as
a throwback to the earlier days of urban political bosses and political machines that once
dominated the business landscape. As Colonel Dempsey explains:
“Well it's a city that resists change unlike any other place I have ever been. As was
witnessed by all the people that wanted to move in here and do great real-estate
development projects after the storm and they couldn't make it through the bureaucracy
of the city. And I think it is -- the political machine in New Orleans” (Dempsey, 2015).
Corruption
One cannot mention the phrase “New Orleans politics” in conversation without thoughts
of corruption entering the equation. Unfortunately for the citizens of southern Louisiana,
political corruption is not just buried in its colorful past, highlighted by the infamous stories of
Huey Long, Edwin Edwards, and David Duke. Contemporary times have also born witness to
the continuation of Louisiana’s politically corrupt culture, as illustrated through the indictments
(and convictions) of former Mayor Ray Nagin and Representative William Jefferson. “Although
the political reputation of Louisiana is certainly a reputation for corruption, corruption is only
part of a much broader pattern of peculiarity. The constitutions, the governor’s office, the
legislature, the courts, the voting system, and even the local governments are immersed in a
common political culture that has shaped and defined them. Viewed more broadly, the political
culture of Louisiana is a culture of volatility, instability, and constant competition” (Parent,
2004). Not surprisingly, the notion of corruption surfaced on numerous occasions during the
interviews in the context of characterizing New Orleans politics. General David Mize offers:
“Well New Orleans is a unique city. Now not to say it doesn’t have some of the political
challenges and corruptions as any other city does, but it’s a little different. And part of
my characterization of New Orleans is it’s the best of the best and the worst of the worst”
(Mize, 2015).
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“New Orleans has some characteristics of a third-world city that most of our other
American cities don’t have. That has some good things and some bad things. One of the
things that I think is tremendous about New Orleans, it has a great sense of family. You
know, families are close knit and stick together… But the downside of that is you get so
enamored with your families that in the political and business world, you know, that’s
your primary. So you’ll take your family or extended family or whatnot right after
corruption or whatnot. And suddenly that’s not so bad because you are just taking care of
your family. And so that has offered up over the years a lot more of an acceptance of this
lower level graft and corruption type thing” (Mize, 2015).
Colonel Dempsey offers additional points:
“But here’s one thing about this culture that I think is very germane to why they are
corrupt: they didn’t ask to be part of the United States. They got sold into it. And when
that happened – when that Louisiana Purchase happened in 1803, these people down here
just circled the wagons” (Dempsey, 2015).
“The only place where there is more public corruption than in New Orleans is
Washington, D.C” (Dempsey, 2015).
Patronage
The concept of patronage was also quite common a reference during the interviews,
especially in the context of contemporary generally accepted local politics. Colonel Deckert
attempts to clarify the dynamic and offer an explanation as to its origins:
“The neighborhoody aspect of New Orleans by default if not design creates teams. Those
teams extend into political life. So always teams. And you always had your elected
officials at whatever level. So it is wrong for an elected official to take a bribe and do X,
Y, and Z; particularly if it's for somebody outside the neighborhood. However, nobody
thinks it's wrong for their elected official to get them out of a speeding ticket or get the
sidewalk in front of their house fixed. Everywhere else it would be, you know, you talk
to the appropriate agency and the agency comes out and does it because that's what the
agency does” (Deckert, 2015).
“Here, very much more patronage...Which goes back to a European concept of having a
patron or patron who looks out for the little people who you in turn vote for and do all
that sort of stuff” (Deckert, 2015).
“[As an example of patronage…] I worked on the Jeff Arnold campaign. I need the
sidewalk fixed in front of my house. I call Jeff Arnold, the sidewalk gets fixed in front of
my house. We call that working. That's the way it works. Other people would call the
Department of Streets and then wonder why it takes six months for them to come out.
The guy across the street calls some dude he knows and it's fixed” (Deckert, 2015).
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Coalition Politics
Having a better understanding now of how deep the political subsystem pervaded the
qualitative data, it is of no surprise that politics was the most common topic brought up during
the interviews, and by all respondents despite their differing perspectives. Politics was the one
common thread throughout examination of all other contributing subsystems. Without focusing
on the individual behavior of the various actors (covered in the next chapter), the following
personal accounts illustrate how deeply politics were rooted in the political dynamics of the
coalition. Greg Preston, the Navy PMO representative from Philadelphia, provides comment
relating to the subject from his observations:
“The local politics were tremendous. Jeff Arnold and, you know, with the local
government there; that played a huge role” (Preston, 2015).
Kristen Palmer, former New Orleans Councilperson, provides her opinion:
“How many politicians have you heard say it's because of them that we have Federal
City? Every single one. Jackie, Jim, Jeff. I mean, just all of them” (Palmer, 2015).
“I think it is very rare that you find people in office that are visionaries that have -- you
have lots of visionaries, but visionaries that have the ability to produce” (Palmer, 2015).
Eddie Boetner, the Chief Administrative Officer for HRI/ECC, also states his opinion relating to
local politics in the context of the Federal City project:
“It all went sideways once the politicians got involved” (Boettner, 2015).
“In Algiers, you had politicians vying for the same vote” (Boettner, 2015).
“Elected officials couldn’t get out of their own way” (Boettner, 2015).
Colonel Deckert tries to explain the political dynamic from his perspective:
“So this is a new housing development that just appeared, yet they're not my constituents;
yet they are my constituents; yet they're not my constituents. They may ask me for
services but yet they don't vote for me. They may ask me for services but they don't pay
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taxes. You've got businesses here that you're keeping the sales taxes on I'm not getting.
I've got to provide for the roads and the police and everything else and I'm not getting any
juice out of this squeeze? Of course there is going to be a conflict with that” (Deckert,
2015).
Paul Purpura, a journalist working for the New Orleans Times-Picayune covering the military
desk for years, comments on his observed tension within the coalition:
“So there was a lot of friction between Jeff Arnold and City Hall. And I think Federal
City was another piece of that too because you see Jeff Arnold was pushing to take over”
(Purpura, 2015).
Bob Braithwaite, a retired Marine Colonel and former SES Executive Director of
MARFORRES, describes the pejorative nature of local politicians in the context of the Federal
City project:
“...everybody in New Orleans was content to let NOFA run with this ball until NOFA
was approaching the goal line, and then all of sudden people woke up to the fact that
“wow, there's a lot of money involved here,” “there's a lot of money involved with
NOFA”…and when the politicians in New Orleans, as they always do, start smelling
money they want to be involved” (Braithwaite, 2015).
Ron Bald echoes the sentiment:
“General Mize was always concerned that the politicians would screw it up…always
concerned about that… he mentioned that when they went out for bids for the initial
developer he had claimed he had people come to him and say they were not going to go
to New Orleans because we didn’t want to deal with politics, and the briberies, and the
payoffs, and everything else. As the project began to evolve Mize I think got more and
more concerned that the politicians were trying to get their piece of everything and he
became much more defensive against the politicians (Bald, 2015).
Lastly, Admiral John Cotton, former Commander of the Naval Reserve Force (NAVRESFOR),
offers an explanation of the local politics associated with the project:
“So they had some key individuals doing that stuff. So it really comes down to the
people, their personalities, and what committees they're on and then what friends they
make. And the definition of politics is compromise. And what deals they made with
others to compromise on other issues to get funding. Okay. So could some strong
politician from the past get a couple hundred million dollars -- I'm making this up -appropriated to throw toward a federal city and then we would build it and they would
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come, right? Well sometimes they would only come if they were directed” (Cotton,
2015).
Taken collectively, the overarching tone of the respondents when speaking of local politics was
one of negativity and contempt. Local politics, and local politicians, represented the dominant
subsystem associated with the Federal City project and with the coalition’s solvency.
Structural Subsystem (Quality of Life)
In contrast to the negativity attendant to the political perspective of New Orleans, all
respondents universally appreciated the positive aspects of the New Orleans culture from a social
perspective. Mr. Habel offers his personal view:
“I pretty much fell in love with the city at that time. On a personal level, I have a very
personal connection in the city in the sense that I very much like the culture here and the
– and that goes beyond just the food and music. That applies to the people and the
historical nature of the city which I think is unrivaled anywhere in the country” (Habel,
2015).
Similarly, Ron Bald states:
“New Orleans has always seemed like a neighborhood…even if it is in downtown at the
central business district that there is a friendly neighborhood feel to this” (Bald, 2015).
“It’s not like that anywhere else that I have been. Everywhere else it is just stay to
yourself, don’t care about anybody, be independent, put your head down, walk away, and
here it’s exactly the opposite. People come and ask if they can help you… people want
you to be part of their community; they like it when you volunteer for stuff; they want
you to be part of their kid’s lives, in part of their lives” (Bald, 2015).
LtGen Rich Mills reinforces this sentiment:
“I think others who come here and are stationed here – I count myself among them – they
fall in love with the city…they fall in love with the way of life…they fall in love with the
culture…they fall in love with the lifestyle…the “joie de vivre”, the joy of life, the
“laissez les bons temps rouler”, all that kind of thing. And so I think it’s…its attractive”
(Mills, 2015).
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New Orleans Considered a Hardship Tour for the Military
Notwithstanding the general warmth exhibited above, there is another side to the story.
For decades, the military stationed in New Orleans have shared mixed feeling about the tour of
duty there. New Orleans’ reputation as a cultural icon for good times and good food is difficult
to mimic elsewhere within the nation. However, despite these characteristics which enable a top
tourist destination city, lies significant Quality of Life (QOL) issues that have plagued military
families for years. These QOL issues include the city’s high crime rate, poor quality public
schools, expensive car insurance rates, intemperate climate, and poor state of infrastructure.
Many respondents described this pattern in regards to the military and New Orleans as a tour of
duty. Habel offers:
“My opinion, it has been problematic for both services getting people to come be
stationed here. And that is mostly tied to two issues: significant violent crime rate…the
other is the school system...which is one of the lowest quality public school systems in
the country” (Habel, 2015).
“We realize though that a really nice building in itself does not make a quality of life
aspect of encouraging people to take orders and come down here. But it is a large part of
it” (Habel, 2015).
“I think the original plan…was that you would have other federal organizations that
wanted to live here. And that by the nature of having several organizations here, you
would improve security; you would be able to influence the quality of the schools around
here” (Habel, 2015).
General Mize, a staunch advocate for military families stationed in New Orleans, states:
“I thought the quality of life was so bad down here and we needed to do something for
the folks that were assigned down here” (Mize, 2015).
Long-time New Orleans resident Purpura reaffirms this sentiment:
“The cost of living, apartments for your lower enlisted folks; schools, education, you
know. All these things that were ailing that hurt the New Orleans area as a duty station.
New Orleans is okay as long as you don't have kids” (Purpura, 2015).
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“I live in the city and I put my kids through Catholic schools. I'm not going to send them
to the public schools here” (Purpura, 2015).
In fact, for the Full Time Support (FTS) servicemen within the Marine Corps Active Reserve
(AR) Program and the Navy’s Training for Active Reserve (TAR) Program, service in New
Orleans at one of the Reserve headquarters was (is) considered mandatory for career
advancement. Bill Garrett states:
“So it wasn't seen as the most desirable place to be on active duty for somebody that's,
you know, you would rather be at the Pentagon. You know, if you're going to be on a
major staff, you know, the joke that I used to have is, well, if I'm stationed in New
Orleans, there are going to be my brown heel marks drug all the way up I-10 (Garrett,
2015).
Admiral Cotton comments on the career implications related to New Orleans as a duty station:
“I'll just say this -- in the Naval Reserve, if you didn't, as an FTS, go to New Orleans, you
didn't get promoted. And so at your peril, you stayed with the fleet in San Diego or
Norfolk and did fleet business or did the centers or the regions or whatever else. If you
didn't come to New Orleans, you weren't making O-6 maybe; certainly not flag” (Cotton,
2015).
“And I remember sitting on selection boards of guys that were, you know, top gun
graduates; big ship drivers. And we can't make them admiral because they didn't have a
New Orleans tour. And I'm saying, what a culture we've built as a result of this” (Cotton,
2015).
“And so I thought looking at the New Orleans area, if you take all those billets and put
them in San Diego, Norfolk, D.C., Millington and align them with the Navy, you would
get people to live there a little longer or be less afraid of moving there again so you might
improve the quality of life for those sailors if we align it to the fleet concentration areas”
(Cotton, 2015).
Financial Ability to Mitigate
The research revealed that the ability to either accept or mitigate QOL issues is primarily
conditional upon possessing the financial means to do so:



Choosing to live in safer neighborhoods in order to avoid crime areas, but is often
much more costly.
Choosing to enroll children in private schools to avoid poor-performing public
schools, but is often very costly.
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Northshore communities are generally safer and have good public schools but are
generally more costly and require an extended commute time (hour+).

Residents with financial means choose to live in neighborhoods on either the Southshore that
offer security (e.g., Metairie, Uptown, Garden District, Lakefront, English Turn, etc.) or in
communities on the Northshore (e.g., Slidell, Mandeville, Covington, Madisonville). Most
Southshore residents with school-age children that can afford it often place their children in
private schools (e.g., Holy Cross, Jesuit, Brother Martin, etc.). Most residents in this category on
the Northshore utilize public schools within the St. Tammany Parish system, which has
consistently ranked top in the State for education. Residents without financial means are forced
to accept the risks associated with a degraded QOL in order to live within their individual means.
Transient personnel (e.g., the military), follow the same pattern. However, the military
has the additional option of securing government-provided family housing (at the cost of their
Housing Allowance) aboard NAS/JRB Belle Chasse and, on a limited basis, PPV housing aboard
Federal City. The military choosing to live on the South shore, regardless of financial means,
has the opportunity to place their children into the K-8 grade Belle Chasse Academy and the 912 grade NOMMA at Federal City. Military families with financial means, consisting mostly of
the officers and senior enlisted personnel, share the same housing opportunities as traditional
New Orleans area residents. However, military families without financial means, which consists
mostly of the junior enlisted personnel, are similarly limited in their options alike New Orleans
residents. However, the QOL issues described earlier are very prominent in the areas of the
West Bank that surround both NAS/JRB Belle Chasse and Federal City in addition to many
Orleans Parish communities on the East Bank.
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GIS Map Discussion
To support the explanation offered above, several maps were created utilizing Geospatial
Information System tools, specifically ESRI’s ArcGIS software. The collected was a March
2016 pull of all Marines that were stationed with MARFORRES and its subordinate commands
as of 2015. The 716 addresses used were plotted in four distinct categories to illustrate any
residence patterns: Junior enlisted (E1-E4); Sergeants (E5s); Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
(SNCOs, E6-E9); and Commissioned Officers (W1-O6). Each plot utilized a heat map schema
in order to show concentrations of residences throughout the region.
Beginning with the junior enlisted personnel (26%), the map reveals that the vast
majority of the young Marines live aboard JRB/NAS Belle Chasse in either the family housing
or in the bachelor barracks. Very little option exists for this low income group beyond the
resources provided by the DOD installation and the limited infrastructure of Plaquemines Parish.
The second map portrays the E5 Sergeants, accounting for about 21% of the population plotted.
As can be inferred, this category begins to expand beyond the confines of the base support
system and into the adjacent neighborhoods on the West Bank portions of Orleans Parish and
even into select communities on the East Bank and into Slidell on the Northshore. The third
category of servicemen, the SNCOs (33%), continues this residence expansion further away from
the bases and into the heart of New Orleans, Metairie, and the Northshore communities. Lastly,
the officers provide the greater expansion, heavily populating the nicer neighborhoods
throughout Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Tammany Parishes. Their physical residential presence on
the Northshore is notable, as is the high density aboard the single-family homes aboard Federal
City, Old Algiers, English Turn and the many Uptown neighborhoods.
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To reinforce the point made earlier concerning financial means and its relationship to
housing location, the following information is presented relating to earned income of the military
groups characterized. The average yearly income, which includes Basic Pay, Military Housing
Allowance, and Basic Allowance for Subsistence, is as follows: For the E-4 Corporal with 4
years of service and a family, his annual income before taxes is $48,300. An E-5 Sergeant with
8 years of service and a family earns about $57,500 annually. A Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) with 16
years of service and a family earns over $75,600, while a 22-year Master Gunnery Sergeant (E9) makes over $98,000 a year. The officer corps earns slightly more salary: a Captain (O-3) with
dependents and 8 years of service earns $93,336 annually; a Major with 14 years of service and a
family, $114,240; while a 22-year Colonel with dependents draws a solid $150,000 per year.
There is a stark contrast in salary between the young enlisted family and the middle-aged
Colonel’s family. This dramatic difference in financial means enables significant lifestyle
options and opportunities for those senior in rank and time in service. While these options to
mitigate the quality of life issues described exist for some, however, they don’t exist for nearly
half of the military personnel stationed in New Orleans. While none of this information is
considered groundbreaking, it describes a very important structural issue for the military,
especially in the context of the Marine Corps’ decision to remain in New Orleans and take stock
in the Federal City prophesy to alleviate the QOL burden for its young Marines.
As illustrated in the preceding charts, the settlement patterns for the uniformed personnel
have an explainable logic, as articulated in the narrative offered. However, it was also noted that
all of the Marine General Officers and civilian Select Executive Service (SES) interviewed
universally considered New Orleans a wonderful place to live, despite the quality of life issues
plaguing the younger Marines and Sailors. This is most likely attributable to the fact that their
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individual financial means allows them to embrace a social and economic lifestyle that avoids
the unpleasantries endured by the young troops. As Marine LtGen Rich Mills states:
“But its a unique city…I can’t think of any other city that I’ve been stationed in…that has
such a love and respect and inclusiveness for their Marines…and all the military” (Mills,
2015).
“I think it’s just coming down here, appreciating the lifestyle, and for once you’re really
integrated into the civilian world and the civilian culture; and so you stay when you
retire…because, unlike say Camp Lejeune North Carolina, where its very insular and
very Marine-ish, here you live in this city, you live in a very civic society, you live in a
very cultured society, you live in one that appreciates a lot of fun…and so I think that is
part of it” (Mills, 2015).
However, the sole Navy Admiral interviewed, John Cotton, had a slightly different opinion,
although he personally never lived in New Orleans nor was he culturally assimilated as was his
Marine brethren:
“Do I like New Orleans? Yeah. Would I go down there tomorrow and party with you
guys? Sure. Would I want to move my family down there and live there? I wouldn't”
(Cotton, 2015).
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Figure 22. Heat Map Portraying E1-E4 Residences
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Figure 22. Heat Map Portraying E-5 Residences
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Figure 23. Heat Map Portraying E-6 through E-9 Residences
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Figure 24. Heat Map Portraying Officer Residences
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Summary
Having now a better understanding of the prevailing New Orleans subsystems to include
their origins, the interviews revealed certain aspects that appeared to govern the coalition
dynamic at different times during the varied phases, especially during the mobilization and
fragmentation phases. Specifically, ideologies associated with local politics within the
uniqueness of the New Orleans culture had the most influence on behavior. This includes the
generally accepted patterns of political graft and patronage (just outside the shadow of outright
corruption); the unique architecture and application of New Orleans law in opposition to
generally accepted legal practices throughout the rest of the nation; and the unwritten procedures
for conducting business in New Orleans. Conversely, the interviews also revealed that the social
subsystem is remarkably well lauded by all respondents, owing to the historically friendly,
sincere, and welcoming indigenous populace.
It was also observed that permanent residents of the region, whether born locally or
naturalized, perceive New Orleans very differently from transient residents, such as uniformed
personnel ordered to local military commands for duty. Those that chose New Orleans as their
home on a more enduring basis adopted a much more optimistic attitude towards the pejorative
structural and cultural aspects described above, focusing instead on the common positive social
attributes that the area provides. In other words, folks that choose to sink roots locally find ways
to embrace the positive aspects (social), while either mitigating or ignoring the negative aspects
(politics, QOL, corruption, etc.). Of note, the principle actors from the local region involved
with the coalition were primarily permanent residents. The pro-Federal City coalition,
championed by NOFA, attempted to mitigate the QOL issues for the transient military
servicemen through the visionary Federal City concept, which purported to enable the creation of
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a wholesome work-live-play environment from the transformed downtrodden Algiers
community. However, the pervasive subsystems that drove constructive behavior during the
early phases of the coalition were also the same pervasive subsystems that drove destructive
behavior in the latter phases.
The following statement by Colonel Deckert summarizes the discussion related to the
New Orleans governing subsystems:
“So I would say to your question, [NOLA culture is] different than the rest of the United
States, but a lot more like the rest of the world” (Deckert, 2015).
This theme describes the cultural foundation for a coalition brought together with a common
goal, but with each component possessing differing ideologies and motivations. The next
subchapter, entitled Demonstrated Behavior, will be explored in detail in the forthcoming pages.
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CHAPTER 5B
DEMONSTRATED BEHAVIOR
Introduction
This chapter will explore the established patterns of demonstrated behavior of the
principle actors, as captured through the multitude of comprehensive interviews and other related
qualitative data. Stemming from the findings discovered during the preceding chapter related to
the New Orleans governing subsystems, it was observed that certain behavior and
characterization appeared rooted in certain ideologies and beliefs related to the unique culture of
New Orleans. Specifically, local politicians exhibited behavior commensurate with the cultural
indicators associated with the traditional political climate described in the previous chapter. In
reference to a holistic viewpoint of the Federal City debacle from a senior executive, “To me it
was New Orleans politics to the “T”…to the “T”” (Braithwaite, 2015). Similarly, the developers
likewise exhibited behavior seemingly appropriate for the business-oriented faction within the
coalition: “So there was a continuous pressure from the developers to make money. They're
capitalists. I understand that” (Davis, 2015). And as for NOFA, the non-profit champion of the
Federal City campaign, their idealistic ideology drove idealistic behavior, as the following
comment describes: “But all the people on the nonprofit NOFA board always had great
intentions. And they never looked at it from the standpoint of they were going to make any
money off of it. They were just going to do what was right” (Ryan, 2015).
This chapter will delve deeper into actor behavior, to include qualifying their individual
or group motivations and agendas (i.e., what were they trying to do and why?), their
characterization by the accounts of others (i.e., how were they perceived?), and the consequences
or effects on the project and/or the coalition’s solvency (i.e., what impact did their actions
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have?). An examination of the three larger factions will be examined first (e.g., NOFA, ADD,
and HRI/ECC), followed by a discussion of the military elements in their respective roles. The
latter part of the chapter will summarize the behavioral characterization and attempt to show
what occurred over the course of the coalition’s life cycle. However, a brief anthropological
review of cultural relativism must be made to establish the context of the history and culture
related findings from the previous chapter.
Cultural Relativism Discussion
Of the numerous contemporary anthropological theories related to the explanation of
culture, one could argue that Franz Boas and his study of cultural relativism, or historical
particularism, most aptly applies to the circumstances of this study. He postulated that cultures
can only be understood with reference to their particular historical development. Boas believed
that cultural customs had to be studied through three perspectives: environmental conditions,
psychological factors, and (most importantly) historical connections. Consequently, cultural
relativism holds that each culture and its cultural practices should be understood in context, that
is, in terms of the institutions, ideas, values, and practices that comprise the whole of the culture.
Further, the theory maintains that cultures and cultural practices should not be judged through
the values and standards of another culture. Similarly, Alfred Kroeber also shared Boas’ beliefs
and believed that culture is learned, shared, patterned, and meaningful. Culture is a pattern that
transcends and controls individuals and plays a powerful determining role in individual behavior
(Moore, 2012; Harris, 1999).
Consequently, in understanding the demonstrated behavior of the different actors and
groups in this paper, appreciation for the historical significance of the New Orleans culture as
revealed in its governing subsystems must be made, specifically as it applies to the influence of
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the local military presence for centuries. Subsequently, these seeming “clashes” of values or
beliefs should not be judged in absolute terms, but rather considered a natural product of the
individual cultural background of each actor. In other words, New Orleans politicians view the
world differently than U.S. Marine Generals, who view the world differently than business-savvy
developers. Conflict should not only have been expected, it should be seen as inevitable.
Actor Characterization and Behavior
NOFA as idealistic
To begin, it would be appropriate to examine NOFA first, owing to the fact that this
organization lies at the both the heart of the Federal City initiative as well as the core of the
coalition forged to bring it to fruition. NOFA’s overarching behavior can best be categorized as
nothing short of idealistic, with all collected evidence establishing this fact beyond little doubt.
From the beginning during the pre-formation phase days of the Mayor’s Military Advisory
Committee through the post-fragmentation phase days of NOFA’s fall from power, the behavior
demonstrated by NOFA has been true to their cause – the retention of the U.S. Marine Corps in
New Orleans through the visionary Federal City project.
Motivation/Agenda
Major General Mize, the principle architect and proponent of NOFA, describes the initial
efforts to form the organization and why:
“Then I set up the New Orleans Federal Alliance, you know, N-O-F-A. And so I got
people to, you know, on a volunteer basis to sit on the board. And the idea was to give us
people that actually had credibility and experience in the military and then development
and banking and that kind of stuff. So I handpicked people that I knew from past and
current things that had -- so we would have a group that would actually know something
about development and who had no skin in the game other than trying to -- because they
had the interest of New Orleans there so that nobody would be trying to get any money
out of it or pushing it some way or another, et cetera” (Mize, 2015).
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Comments from others that were close to the project’s initial design describe NOFA’s
original scope for the Federal City plan:
“I think NOFA’s role was to serve as the operations manager for federal city, to be the
recruiter, to do the marketing, to run the daily tasks, to be the heartbeat of federal city.
They would run it, they’d get the people here, they’d figure out who should be here,
they’d run the master plan which they developed… the original master plan was
developed by folks NOFA hired, and he would be the King or Czar or…Overlord
…overlord of Federal City. That was going to be NOFA’s role as a non-profit…entity”
(Bald, 2015).
“They were the driving force from the earliest days to make this happen, the NOFA staff.
General Mize was very astute at getting the right people on his board to give him the
horsepower to make these things happen” (Garrett, 2015).
“But I'm convinced NOFA, that committee, they thought they would forevermore run
Federal City” (Braithwaite, 2015).
It has been established through the interviews that NOFA, from the project’s inception,
was under the impression that they would be the organization that would control the complete
destiny of the project beyond completion.
Characterization
Significant comments related to the characterization of NOFA’s behavior was collected
through the interviews; the majority of which was positive and reinforcing of their stated intent.
According to former MARFORRES Executive Director Bob Braithwaite:
“By the time I got there NOFA and the BRAC process had started and they were already
kinda set up and running…and General Mize was clearly the lead sled dog on that
operation, with [Councilperson] Jackie [Clarkson] in the background providing a lot of
support” (Braithwaite, 2015).
Councilperson Palmer offers commentary:
“And so you have a lot of people with government backgrounds on the NOFA board and
then you also had some pretty big players from, like, corporations. That's kind of like,
you know, they want to get things done. And sometimes people view the public process
as messy, which it is. It's so messy. But you kind of have to do it, you know” (Palmer,
2015).

110

“Because you've got quality people in NOFA...I trust them. They already have track
records” (Palmer, 2015).
Times-Picayune journalist Paul Purpura reinforces the point:
“You get NOFA, you get a nonprofit with people with some expertise in doing things;
People who have a track record of building things and making projects happen were
involved in it” (Purpura, 2015).
However, a critique of NOFA was also revealed during the research that suggested that,
in spite of their overall idealistic ideology, the organization may have been ill-equipped for the
challenges to be faced during the execution of the Federal City project. This theme will present
itself further once conflict with ADD and HRI/ECC arises years later. As Marine LtGen Jack
Bergmann offers:
“As I look at the people who were on it, not a bad person in the bunch. Just because they
are good people doesn't mean they are the right people to be in that group” (Bergman,
2015).
Consequences
During the subsequent prosecution of the Federal City plan, the interviews revealed
varied and insightful critique related to NOFA’s behavior. The main theme observed was that
their idealistic characterization and associated behavior eventually failed to dominate the
coalition’s dynamic once resources were provided to ADD, forever changing the power
distribution within the group. Without the essential skills nor the authorities to compete against
battle-hardened politicians and developers, NOFA became quite vulnerable. Retired Navy
Captain Bill Garrett states:
“Their perspective was this is our project. We are responsible for this. This is our vision.
We're the ones that had the vision. HRI, we've selected you as our developer. HRI/ECC
we've select you as our developer. Duany, we've hired you to be the designer” (Garrett,
2015).
Bob Braithwaite offers his view:
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“I think NOFA definitely thought they had the charter to do that…that they would
forevermore be the people running Federal City. That turned out not to be true”
(Braithwaite, 2015).
LtGen Bergmann provides ample reinforcing commentary:
“So this is gamesmanship going back to why I said idealistic. Idealistic folks don't
employ a lot of gamesmanship. And life is all about gamesmanship. It is. So if you are
going to get into the game, if you really -- don't put an idealist in charge” (Bergman,
2015).
“But an entity like NOFA will form for all the right reasons. And because of why it
forms, it is vulnerable” (Bergman, 2015).
“And in NOFA's case, idealism falls by the wayside first. That's the way it is. And the
NOFA did not have the stomach or the -- it did not have the right personalities onboard to
make it the fortress that it needed to be to balance the competing interests of HRI and
ADD and all the other things” (Bergman, 2015).
“The grit to coalition, the personalities, the group -- it didn't have the players. Think of
any team. It didn't have the players it needed to withstand and to be successful against
the competition which those other two would have to be considered the competition”
(Bergman, 2015).
Colonel Bubba Deckert offers his opinion:
“But the cats that were at the top of that thing weren't day-to-day guys. They weren't
people who knew how to work that day-to-day stuff. They were all just pie in the sky
kind of thing. And when it got down to the literal implementation, they didn't know how
to do it and it all fell apart. Law suits went flying every which way. And then they end
up being on the outs. And then end up being on the outs because they kind of got past the
part where they were really value added” (Deckert, 2015).
And lastly, from within NOFA, Bill Ryan describes the end:
“Anyway, so I went down in flames and I was out. And Mize was out. We fired Mize”
(Ryan, 2015).
“The money all went away. And we had an audit. We had an auditing firm to make sure
all the money was accounted for. And then they created -- the ADD created a board after
the dissolution of pretty much the Federal City board, they created a board called -- Joint
Development Committee” (Ryan, 2015).
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Dave Mize as NOFA’s protagonist
Motivation/Agenda
The following narratives describe General Mize’s initial motivation and agenda, in
addition to collected personal characterizations. The research revealed no pejorative information
whatsoever, beyond a sense of naïveté. General Mize first provides an explanation regarding his
personal motivation:
“I was...trying to improve the quality of life for military here in the New Orleans area,
which upon me coming and doing my kind of command evaluation, it was pretty
obviously not the quality of life for Marines and families and sailors -- it was not what we
wanted it to be. So I got involved in the community there fairly actively trying to make
some significant improvements in those areas” (Mize, 2015).
Purpura and Mike Tilghman (from HQMC), offer their respective comments relating to Mize:
“Part of what was happening back then and with the help of General Mize was to look at
ways of shoring up our military installations here. Federal City came out of that effort”
(Purpura, 2015).
“I think the big thing for the general, I think, was taking care of the Marines. I really
think that was a big thing. And I think an associated interest was taking care of his
adopted city, New Orleans” (Tilghman, 2015).
Characterization
Of note, all respondents described a very high level of respect for General Mize, both of
his character and through his demonstrated actions in pursuit of the Federal City vision. Varied
commentary from the respondents echo this characterization:
“He was optimistic to a fault. And I admire him. I admired him then; I still do” (Garrett,
2015).
“He was a master. He would do some fast talking. He was good at it” (Maguire, 2015).
“General Mize's having been on the mayor's military advisory committee, he had ins into
the city which allowed him access to different things that others probably didn't have”
(Bald, 2015).
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“So he is a guy that is a visionary kind of a guy. I think in his heart he thought this is
going to be a very good deal for MARFORRES. And I think today, it is. They have, I
would say, probably the best headquarters within the United States Marine Corps”
(Tilghman, 2015).
“I know he gets slammed sometimes, but I think there is a certain altruistic nature to the
vision that he has for New Orleans. He thought Federal City would be a smart idea”
(Tilghman, 2015).
“There were people that…were openly…[trying to] get Mize out of the way…there were
folks that came to the conclusion that NOFA had served its useful purpose. So it was
really a tough, tough dynamic” (Preston, 2015).
“Dave has a very pure Marine Corps ethos. But what you find out and what Dave
thought, we were all doing this for the greater good…And I think he purely, purely
believed that he could lead his master developer; that he could lead -- and he just wasn't
savvy enough” (Dempsey, 2015).
Although very little criticism was observed of his character, his business acumen was
critiqued by a few in the context of the project. According to Colonel Dempsey:
“Well they say that general officers make the worst CEOs in the country...Because they
just don't know how to play that game” (Dempsey, 2015).
Further commentary by LtGen Bergman related to General Officers reinforces this theme:
“I didn't find very many generals and admirals who I thought really had any sense of how
the business world really works” (Bergman, 2015).
Lastly, Bill Ryan of NOFA states:
“But he [Mize] never really had the background in terms of understanding the
construction and so on and so forth. But he was in charge of day in and day out, hands on,
which is something that he was not very familiar with” (Ryan, 2015).
“He retired here. He never really got into the political world. He never was a power
player. He was in the socio-economic but not political. In fact, he was on the outside of
the political” (Ryan, 2015).
Effects/Consequences
However, his personal characteristics, experience, and determination were the perfect
combination of traits to have during the first two phases of the coalition. The results were
universally recognized by all respondents:
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“Well he was able to convince the Louisiana delegation who actually had the horsepower
or the commission to say, hey, this is a great idea” (Garrett, 2015).
“He pulled it off. He was the puppet master in getting this” (Garrett, 2015).
“Dave Mize was the heavy lifter… he knew the buttons to push, and he got the allies he
needed, and I think he was key to making all this happen. I’m convinced there would be
no Federal City without Dave Mize…” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“He was a great man that did great things. But I think his perspective is different than
many other people’s perspectives. And to this day I think he would say that the
politicians screwed it up” (Bald, 2015).
However, towards the end of the coalition, it was clear that the same components that
enabled his success in the beginning were the same that caused his demise. According to Paul
Purpura:
“So to see how he was pushed aside by these public politicians, it's shameful. And to the
detriment of the whole project. It's exactly what he didn't want to see happen to the
project. The politicians took over. The politicians are blaming everybody else for why
this thing is dragged on” (Purpura, 2015).
ADD as cunning
As positive as the characterization of NOFA was, the majority of the comments
describing ADD were just the opposite. In fact, most of the respondents associated ADD with
the classic New Orleans political machine, with all of the negative traits that that reputation
conveys. What is most interesting is the fact that ADD was barely involved with the coalition’s
efforts for the first two phases, and didn’t truly engage until they were inadvertently brought into
the equation during the final stages of the Navy lease negotiations. Once the State of Louisiana
determined that ADD would be the signatory of the Navy lease for Federal City (as a
consequence of SECNAV refusing to allow NOFA to sign), everything changed – especially
ADD’s behavior. “The fuse was lit when ADD signed the lease” (Boettner, 2015).
Motivation/Agenda
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Varied commentary collected from the respondents:
“And they were just interested in making money off of it. So you have all these different
divergent interests and nobody, with the exception of NOFA I'll say, nobody had just the
Federal City's interest at heart” (Ryan, 2015).
“[Originally], ADD wanted nothing to do with the development or management of
Federal City. First of all, they saw some risk in the project here. And second of all, it
was a tremendous amount of work and they didn't have the staff and the people with the
expertise to do it” (Mize, 2015).
“They had public interest [ADD] because you are going to get a pot of money. They
don't want to spend the whole pot of money on the Marine Corps facility because they
got some other initiatives they want to -- So they started weaning it off. That's where the
food fight comes into play” (Maguire, 2015).
“It's all about the money” (Maguire, 2015).
“ADD wanted to control it. And they just thought there was a pile of gold. And it turned
out to be a pile of straw…” (Ryan, 2015).
“Now they are politicians though and they're thinking, you know, minimize what goes
into Federal City and kind of give off a little bit here, a little bit here, a little bit here
around the community and then that makes them look good and easy to get reelected”
(Mize, 2015).
Characterization
Similarly, most comments from various respondents related to the characterization of
ADD as an organization were not positive:
“And I'm not a real-estate developer, but we had that kind of expertise on that board. Do
you think they have any of that expertise on the ADD? Not any” (Dempsey).
“There was just no confidence. These people [ADD] have no expertise” (Purpura, 2015).
“…we never dealt with ADD…until it looked like “holy cow, there’s a lot of money
here” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“ADD is one of those entities that will always be reforming itself to be able to dip into
the public coffer and gain control” (Bergman, 2015).
Consequences
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“But from the moment ADD started to take over, until they took over, and since then, it
seems to me everything stopped. All the grand plans for shopping centers and all that
kind of stuff…nothing has really happened since ADD got more involved and then
became the lead” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“If ADD got involved sooner we’d have been in danger of being in a half-completed
building, people swirling over the checks from the State….thank goodness NOFA got us
past that point…before the food fights started” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“Once they smelled that money… and I'm not going to name any politician’s names
here…but right away that's when they got involved and wanted to take over, and in very
brutal fashion, in my mind, they took over…and that was the beginning of the end”
(Braithwaite, 2015).
Jeff Arnold as ADD’s protagonist (and NOFA’s antagonist)
And just as David Mize was viewed as the idealist (albeit naïve), Jeff Arnold was viewed
as the stereotypical New Orleans politician. In fact, most respondents associated Arnold as the
principle antagonist to NOFA’s efforts, and the main reason the project stalled and the coalition
fell apart.
Motivation/Agenda
According to retired Marine Colonel Terry Ebbert, NOFA member:
“It's because certain people [Arnold] want to retain power and they don't want to give that
power to a developer. They didn't want to give the power to NOFA” (Ebbert, 2015).
Characterization
Bill Ryan comments on Arnold:
“And Jeff Arnold was the self-perpetuating chairman of the ADD because he's a big
blustery son of a bitch. He's not that bad of a guy. Anyway, you had to understand him”
(Ryan, 2015).
Effects/Consequences
Dave Mize describes the consequences of Arnold’s influence:
“…now you suddenly have one of these great Louisiana patronage opportunities just put
right in front of them. So now then Jeff Arnold and the ADD crew says, ‘ah, this is our
chance to get back in it and take over’. So they then went on this very calculated long117

term campaign to get NOFA out of money and not meet their obligations to us to pay us
our money here, et cetera, and to get them back in control of the project…and they
eventually succeeded” (Mize).
“…and with the leverage that Jeff Arnold had, eventually we used up all our state money
first just like they asked us to and then we were telling him in letters and, you know, all
this -- we've got copies of the public record. Okay ADD, time for you to -- pony up.
And so Jeff said, ‘no, we're not going to give you any money’. And again, the idea was
he would run us out of business because he would dry us up. We would have no money
to do it, et cetera. And then ADD could take over. So that's what he did” (Mize, 2015).
Councilperson Palmer supports this characterization:
“And the pool took so long because I think, again, Jeff Arnold was using it as some kind
of political hostage to release funds. I'm serious. It's just crazy. Crazy, crazy, crazy. It's
sad” (Palmer, 2015).
Colonel Dempsey describes the consequences as it relates to General Mize:
“So when they [Jeff Arnold and ADD] cut him [David Mize] up into little pieces and then
just -- I mean, they had to sell their home. But nonetheless, he couldn't find enough work
around here to support it. So they had to sell their house and now they are living in a
little condo right off of St. Charles Avenue” (Dempsey, 2015).
Lastly, Purpura reinforce the theme:
“And people like Jeff Arnold push people like General Mize out, which was a shame too”
(Purpura, 2015).
HRI/ECC as opportunistic
If NOFA was labeled idealistic and ADD as cunning, HRI/ECC was characterized as the
greedy capitalist developer. Notwithstanding the traditional role of the developer – to develop
land for a profit – many associated HRI/ECC in a negative sense. Most recognize that they were
the “private” entity of the classic public-private-partnership, and that the Federal City project
was a profit-oriented venture. However, during the execution of the project, many respondents
felt that they exploited the vagueness of the lease documents and took advantage of the growing
rift between NOFA and ADD to default on their financial obligations. While this latter point
will be discussed in much greater detail in a follow-on chapter, their exhibited behavior can be
examined through the following captured characterization, all pejorative:
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Motivation/Agenda
“The developer, pushing as a developer would, to get the best deal to make the maximum
profit” (Deckert, 2015).
“HRI wanted everything. HRI wanted Quarters A. HRI wanted to manage Quarters A.
HRI wanted everything…HRI they're leaning in in the straps. They want it now. They
want it before we leave.” (Garrett, 2015).
“This area, I would suggest you went up in value because of the fact that it really didn't
suffer any flood damage. So they look at a place like this and what do developers do?
They talk negatively about it until they figure the price is at rock bottom. Once they got
it to where it's at rock bottom, then they do their deal and then they start talking
positively about it” (Bergman, 2015).
“They want to make money. They want to develop stuff. They want to move on fast
because they are losing money. Right now, they don't have any” (Maguire, 2015).
Characterization
“HRI was branded as the ‘greedy developers’" (Boettner, 2015).
“But the HRI leadership were the bulldogs. They kept pounding us, pounding us,
pounding us” (Garrett, 2015).
“It's business and those guys are good at it” (Bergman, 2015).
“And HRI/ECC, Prez is a slimy little weasel. And he's got a crowd of some of the
smartest, looniest in terms of the things they'll say and do for him. He's really good at
spending other people's money” (Dempsey, 2015).
“HRI is a company that doesn't have a heart or a soul. They just want to make money
however they can do it. And if they can find a way to renege or not do something that,
you know -- they're willing to do that” (Mize, 2015).
Effects/Consequences
“Everything the public sector wanted done was on HRI's back…” (Boettner, 2015).
“And so we ultimately went with Prez Kabacoff because he claimed that he knew more
about the GO-Zone tax credits, you know, the post-Katrina tax credits, and new-market
tax credits. He promised us that he was going to be our guy, you know, to get through
this. And so that is why we went with Prez. And he turned out to be nothing but trouble
every inch of the way. He was horrible” (Dempsey, 2015).
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“If you're a good developer, want to do it with somebody else's money. You get your
money out quickly so then everything else that comes is just gravy. And somehow you
want to keep this project alive long enough that people forget what happened in the initial
stages so if it does go south, you can redevelop it a few decades later and nobody
remembers that you developed it 40 or 50 years ago” (Bergman, 2015).
“So HRI also has the philosophy that they're never going to invest any of their money.
They will only invest somebody else's money. And so they got a commission for being
the developer off the 150 million dollars that came to them. So it was probably 12
million dollars or something for being the developer to oversee Woodward, which
Woodward didn't need any overseeing” (Mize, 2015).
“It was very frustrating for me to watch HRI. It was very, very frustrating to have
developers coming into my office I can't tell you how many times, especially these guys,
and not once would they talk about Federal City. All they wanted to talk about were the
developments they were doing on the Eastbank” (Palmer, 2015).
State and City Government as indifferent
While initially very involved during the formation and mobilization phases during the
BRAC Commission testimony, the State and City government did little to assuage the growing
rift between NOFA and ADD during the latter years of the sustainment phase and during the
fragmentation stage. Mayoral or Gubernatorial intervention could have easily mitigated the
growing dysfunction, but opted not to involve themselves for unknown reasons. The following
excerpts from the interviews reveal this pattern.
Motivation/Agenda
“I don’t think the State wanted to play…I really don't. The state…obviously saw
potential economic benefit…that was good, they didn’t want to see everybody leave…
because that would be bad for New Orleans…but I really don't think the State cared”
(Bald, 2015).
“I had gotten to know all the political figures here in my efforts to promote the military
and improve the quality of life. And I got asked to go see the mayor and he asked me if I
would take on the chairman of the military advisory committee. And he said what I
really want you to do in that job is I want you to save the bases because at this point -now this is late 2003 probably. Everybody knows the BRAC is coming. It's just a matter
of when. I was reluctant to do that because I knew once you got attached to the flypaper
it would be hard to ever get off” (Mize, 2015).
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Characterization
“Congressman Vitter was very enthusiastic and supportive. Senator Mary Landrieu was
slow at the beginning and then she came on pretty good. The governor was pretty good”
(Davis, 2015).
“We would invite the mayor to the ball every year, the Mayor would never show up.
Whether the mayor was deeply involved in what was going on with the military, I could
never tell you. But I do know that the mayor and on down was obviously involved in
keeping the military in New Orleans” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“But I definitely think the [city] administration doesn't give a shit about Algiers. The
administration probably should have gotten involved a lot more. But that administration
is very tight, you know. So he [the mayor] only lets four or five people do everything
and they just can't get it all done” (Palmer, 2015).
Effects/Consequences
“November/December of 2007. So you have strong political interests because both the
Louisiana senators, Senator Landrieu and Senator Vitter, are strong supporters of this as
you would figure. At this time, you had a governor changeover from Blanco to the new
governor, Jindal. And so there wasn't as much pressure from the governor's office…but
the real political pressure was being brought to bear by the senators” (Davis, 2015).
“And nobody had any structure or the state or the city other than getting updates and
stuff like that, they weren't interested and they didn't want to be involved in it any more
than that. Okay, you've got it. You go do it and tell us what you need and whatnot”
(Mize, 2015).
“Now we brought this up to the governor and the mayor and the business counsel and
everybody about what the guy was doing and, essentially, nobody was willing to step in.
And they all had their own agendas that they wanted to get through the state legislature
funding process and they didn't want Arnold and crew to buck anyone -- other priorities
that they had” (Mize, 2015).
“So when this thing really started getting bad, we said, okay, well we've got to get the
mayor involved. Well the mayor didn't -- he wasn't as interested in getting involved as
we thought he was or would be” (Dempsey, 2015).
“But when the governor or the mayor or nobody would support us, we eventually lost
with this cooperative endeavor agreement” (Mize, 2015).
“And the lack of leadership at the City level as it continued to battle back and forth with
the State never ever -- now this could have been a strategy at the governmental level or at
the elective level to just let it play out. Not do anything. You know, let's see who wins.
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I think that gives the city and state leadership too much credit for thought and strategy”
(Bergman, 2015).
The Navy versus Marine Ideology Dialectic
Before an examination of the behavior of the military is offered, a discussion of the
differing ideologies between the Navy and Marine Corps must be made. While both services are
sister components of the same Department of the Navy, each has a very unique culture and very
different ideologies and ethos. One could also argue that, in fact, all branches of the service have
their own unique institutional culture and heritage that separates one from the other. Anyone who
has served in the U.S. military can personally attest to this claim – it is an inherent point of pride

Figure 25. The Navy/Marine Ideology Dialectic

for most veterans and equally a part of their developed personal character. It is important that
this point is understood, in that the military ideology and culture plays a very important role in
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this coalition’s interaction, internally and externally, in addition to the way the Federal City
project was received by the Navy and the Marine Corps.
As the above chart illustrates, the Navy and Marine Corps institutionally views the world
differently. Neither aspect should be judged right or wrong, but considered simply different – a
consequence of centuries of existence and application, during wartime and (very limited) times
of peace. Boiled down to a simple dialectic, the Navy views land as a temporary place that they
must exist in until they can get back to the sea (which is the domain in which they fight).
Conversely, the Marines view the sea as a temporary place that they must exist in until they can
get back to land (which is the domain in which they fight). This dialectic, when applied to the
New Orleans Federal City proposal, offers a plausible explanation beyond the stated as to why
the Navy chose to leave, while the Marines chose to stay. Marines tend to become very attached
to territory they occupy or have fought for, whether that land be a base in the U.S. or a Forward
operating Base (FOB) in some Middle Eastern territory. Relatedly, there is an ideological reason
why the Marines are tasked with guarding the nation’s 125 embassies throughout the world and
not another uniformed served such as the U.S. Army. This concept, abstract as it may sound,
should be considered foundational while absorbing the details of the forthcoming sections
pertaining to Navy and Marine Corps demonstrated behavior.
The Navy as calculating
Motivation/Agenda
Significant data was collected through the interviews that describe the Navy’s position in regards
to New Orleans in general, and the Federal City project in particular. The Navy was relatively
open in their desire to leave the area. According to retired Marines Bergmann, Quinton,
Braithwaite, and Maguire:
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“There was a strong move at some of the highest levels to consolidate. And the Navy
was fully supportive because unlike New Orleans, places like San Diego, Jacksonville,
Norfolk are core Navy ports, core Navy installations…” (Bergman, 2015).
“…but even before Katrina, the Navy was still trying to pull ComNavResFor to Norfolk
to align with, you know, Fleet Forces Command” (Quinton, 2015).
“Why the Navy was so excited about getting out of New Orleans…we all know that have
lived in New Orleans that New Orleans has its issues… housing, schools, you name it…
it's not an easy area to get people to come to…attract them… but I think a lot of that
drove the Navy’s thinking that “hey, let's get somewhere easier to live and easier to
function” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“That decision to leave New Orleans was already made up in the Navy's mind. It was
just a question of when and how fast could they take advantage of -- BRAC and Katrina
as you named provided them two excellent opportunities” (Bergman, 2015).
“They were looking for the door. Even the recruiters were looking for the door after
Katrina because of the uncertainty of what was going to happen” (Maguire, 2015).
“Wash their hands [of the NSA]. [The Navy] could because it was millions of dollars of
demo or revitalization and that is huge…they did a fee simple transfer and they got rid of
all their problems” (Maguire, 2015).
Characterization
Despite their openness relating to their desire to leave New Orleans, most
characterization of the Navy remained negative. Colonel Dempsey states:
“So we make it through the 2005 BRAC rounds very successful. Everybody is happy but
the United States Navy. The Navy just -- they fought us every inch of the way on
everything” (Dempsey, 2015).
General Bergmann reinforces this claim:
“They moved their headquarters down here but they never really moved their senior
admiral down here. Their senior admiral always stayed in D.C. So they always had one
foot in the door and one foot out of the door” (Bergman, 2015).
“Well, the Navy had already made the decision to move out. But the way they did it -but again, just like when they came here in the first place, they came but they really didn't
move everything here. They always, again, had one foot onboard that vessel getting
ready to sail away” (Bergman, 2015).
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“I will tell it like it is, I don't see the Navy as ever fully committed to New Orleans”
(Bergman, 2015).
Consequences
Furthermore, General Bergman comments on the consequences of the Navy’s position:
“I've studied this a lot, so I don't say this lightly, they just quit replacing people here.
Some wanted PCS. They didn't PCS anybody in. You could see those offices in
601...Just slowly, slowly disappear” (Bergman, 2015).
Greg Preston, the Navy’s BRAC Project Manager, comments on the Navy’s position:
“…the Department of the Navy was not going to put money up to make it happen. Our
marching orders were pretty clear. We're going to do what's best for the federal
government… if the state of Louisiana had not come to the table with 150 million dollars,
this deal [Federal City] would not have happened” (Preston, 2015).
“We had the DASN at the time, which was Howard Snow, you know, we were giving
him bi-weekly updates and calling him directly after every meeting and things like that
because he was being hounded from the SecNav himself. So there were a lot of politics
internal to Navy there to the point where we actually had Secretary Winter meet with
Governor Jindal on two separate occasions to lay down, this is as far as we're going and
lay down the law…” (Preston, 2015).
“We had the pleasure of -- Secretary Winter personally being involved in a couple of
issues that we had to go directly to his office. That was -- there was only one other
project that I actually had to brief SecNav on that I have ever been in that office where
you actually personally brief SecNav. And that was kind of interesting” (Preston, 2015).
Bob Braithwaite provides an opinion related to Katrina’s influence on the Navy’s decision to
leave New Orleans:
“I think Katrina was just the final nail in the coffin…once that happened, any real
objection from up north kind of went way” (Braithwaite, 2015).
Retire Marine LtCol Ed Maguire (and Deputy AC/S Facilities, MARFORRES) offers:
“So I saw that the Navy was always going to leave. And they do that a lot. They leave
us holding the bag. This was a Navy base and we were tenants to a Navy base and they
didn't really share a lot before they pulled the trigger” (Maguire, 2015).
“When they left, we lost all touch with NavResFor which shares some of our reserve
centers. It made the ability to provide for the Marines at the Navy sites a little harder to

125

do because they were remote and out of the picture. But then that has kind of gone by the
wayside and we are having challenges now” (Maguire, 2015).
Kristen Palmer describes the consequences of the Navy’s decision to abandon the NSA:
“I brought independent contractors through to give us at least ideas of demolition of some
of these buildings [on the NSA] because I really felt that you just needed to show people
some kind of progress to get people to buy in. And these buildings still have furniture in
them. I mean, the federal government just left. It's horrible” (Palmer, 2015).
HQMC as altruistic/agnostic
Of the respondents that spoke of Headquarters Marine Corps in Washington D.C., the
general theme observed was that they describe them as far removed from the cultural and
political dynamics of the local New Orleans politics that dominated the Federal City dynamic.
Their position was one of following orders (from DON), being committed to New Orleans postKatrina, and taking care of the Marines on the ground there. The latter drove much of the
behavior from HQMC actors during the Navy lease negotiations and associated Federal City
MARFORRES Headquarters design. Regarding the Marine decision to stay in New Orleans
according to LtGen Bergman:
“[The Marines staying in New Orleans…] It's a political strategy. It's not a warfighting
strategy” (Bergman, 2015).
General Mize seconds this opinion:
So on the [Headquarters] Marine Corps side, again, I think the Marine Corps was okay to
stay there [in New Orleans], but they weren’t necessarily fighting for it” (Mize, 2015).
Retired Marine Colonel Shannon Shy, HQMC Counsel’s Office, provides a perspective from
Washington D.C.:
“The Assistant Commandant was our primary client on this one that we worked with
closely. He was like, ‘make sure the Marines are thought about here’, and then, yes, sir.
‘And if I said it once, I’ve said it 100 million times there, I’m looking out for the
Marines’” (Shy, 2015).
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“I will never forget that day we were sitting in that theater in that big building down in
New Orleans and they showed us the presentation and all the bells and whistles. And
Ralph and Paul are like, well, it’s legal. And I go – I knew that I only had one shot at it –
I said, I don’t like it. And I just started trying to think of different things I didn’t like
about it. And when I called back to D.C. to my leadership, they went high and to the
right. And I knew that I had put a good stake in the ground. So it all worked out after
that” (Shy, 2015).
Mike Tilghman from HQMC complements the theme:
“And it got to the point where the commandant himself, big guy, General Conway at the
time… went to see the Secretary of the Navy to make the strong case that we don’t want
to do Federal City. We want to go to Belle Chasse. And apparently the SecNav told the
commandant basically to shut up and sit down. You’re going to Federal City. And either
before that or prior – either prior to that or sometime after this supposed meeting, Vitter
and Landrieu, especially Landrieu I think, had called the SecNav and the commandant
over and basically run the riot act. He said if you want to ever see a military construction
project for the Marine Corps, you will support Federal City. So there was a lot of
politics” (Tilghman, 2015).
The Marines as loyal
The majority of respondents, albeit many of which were retired senior Marine officers,
commonly reflected the sentiment of the loyalty that the Marines demonstrated, through their
actions, to the City of New Orleans and their citizens. Prior to Katrina, the Marines in New
Orleans were generally indifferent to the decision to relocate to Belle Chasse, relocate to Federal
City, or move out of State to other location such as Norfolk or Kansas City. However, after
Katrina hit, the Marines behavior was observed to capture their unique ideology expressed earlier
regarding their loyalty to the area. Multiple Marine respondents provide their personal
comments:
“The Marines can move anywhere. They are expeditionary. But you know, there was -at that point in time, I mean, we had a commitment to New Orleans. I mean, there was a
bond, you know. There was a linkage that, you know, could not be broken” (Quinton,
2015).
“But up until the final grand compromise was worked out, we tried to be as neutral as we
could… once a decision was made then, yeah, we were all over it” (Braithwaite, 2015).
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“The only people that stayed [after Katrina] were the Marines. They were the only ones
in the BRAC process. So there was a variety of different ideas being batted around
within that thing that some of them just weren't acceptable” (Davis, 2015).
“I mean, at that point in time [post-Katrina], you know, if it wasn't for General Bergman's
commitment to New Orleans...And he was totally committed to New Orleans. If he
would have said, ‘it's easier for us right now to stay in Kansas City’…I think he probably
could have pushed it to keep MarForRes headquarters in Kansas City” (Quinton, 2015).
“I think the fact that we stayed and the fact that even after Katrina, even though the lure
of the new building obviously was pretty significant, but I think that also reflects
somewhat the Marines…why people admire us, why we really got a shot in the arm from
the locals, because they looked at us and said you guys hung in there, you guys stayed,
when other people left” (Mills, 2015).
JDC as ineffectual
As mentioned, the Joint Development Committee was formed as a solution to the impasse
between NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC, along with the new Cooperative Endeavor Agreement that
spelled out the details of the new world order. However, while looking good on paper (as most
comprehensive agreements do), in practice the JDC really hasn’t accomplished much beyond
reshaping the severed relationships within the public-private partnership. The JDC has proven
just as dysfunctional as the previous coalition, owing to the fact that most of the same individual
players (good and bad) still have a seat at the table. The local politicians are still driving the
agenda, and NOFA has been completely disempowered. Councilperson Palmer comments on the
formation of the JDC:
“I mean, the amount of crap that we had to go through to form this JDC and shit I had to
slide in to make sure, like, Jeff couldn't chair both the JDC and the ADD. I mean, I had
to finagle all these kind of under the table stuff because -- and then they were trying to do
the same thing” (Palmer, 2015).
Gregg Habel provides his initial optimistic view of the JDC during its earlier formative stage:
“The JDC seemed to be the only way to get the project back in its direction. It shouldn't
have been necessary to begin with and I think a lot of people would argue that the JDC is
an extension of ADD more so than it is an inclusive partner with NOFA” (Habel, 2015).
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Bill Garrett and Colonel Dempsey comment on the JDC’s dysfunction:
“The Joint Development Committee…was not very functional either because of the
players that were involved in that in the early days. They did not get along at all...there
was a lot of infighting in those early days of that committee” (Garrett, 2015).
“They make every effort to work around us and not through us in terms of our
membership on the JDC” (Dempsey).
Marine Colonel Bill Davis offers a consequence of the JDC’s formation:
“During the process of creating the JDC, the JDC's creation essentially got rid of General
Mize. Once they created that, the next step was to eliminate General Mize” (Davis,
2015).
Lawyers as self-serving.
Of note, it is worth mentioning the sea of attorneys that participated in the Federal City
project over its duration. While nothing nefarious was noted during the interviews, a general
sense of exploitation was felt, as dozens upon dozens of lawyers were hired to represent their
client’s interests in the lengthy negotiations to come. All factions – NOFA, ADD, HRI/ECC, the
DON, HQMC, and MARFORRES – required legal representation. While the attorneys
representing the U.S. Government (i.e., the military) were salaried federal civil servants, all
others were retained from private firms. The thousands of billable hours that accrued, paid for
with public funds by the way, were primarily spent negotiating and fighting for the best possible
position for their individual client. Notwithstanding the quality work they turned out
individually, the characterization overall was observed to be self-serving and wasteful. Several
respondents offer their varied opinions regarding attorneys associated with the project:
“So you had three separate groups of attorneys on the other side of the table from the
government each with their own, you know, attorney/client privilege requirements that
they had to meet in protecting their own client and advocating for their client” (Shy,
2015).
“You would hear the lawyers -- I mean, the NOFA team had a lot of lawyers. Between
NOFA, HRI, Woodward, and all the other guys, there was a lot of lawyers sitting around
the table and we've got two. I've got Shannon Shy, Ralph Lombardo, and the occasional
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other guy that would bow his head in to kind of give us some background. And they're
government employees so they are paid salaried employees. The other guys through the
negotiations, there was a lot of feeling sometimes that they were racking up hours. I
mean, we would have the most inane discussions about small sentences or words
throughout this thing. There were a lot of times that our lawyers felt that these guys were
just trying to continue the negotiations to rack up billable hours. If you ever got to look
at what it cost, there is a huge -- lawyer fees is probably the number one expense after the
construction” (Davis, 2015).
“Adams and Reese have made a fortune off this project, a fortune” (Dempsey, 2015).
“The lawyers made out like bandits. It was ridiculous. I mean we paid hundreds of
thousands of dollars. And Lee Reid is still sitting on that board and he's still billing, you
know. I'm not beating on Lee Reid because he's just doing what lawyers do” (Dempsey,
2015).
“Kutak Rock is trying to push a position. They are trying to establish precedence. If they
can get this approved, they establish precedence which helps their business do more stuff
like this...But as a lawyer, I have an agenda to try and drum up more business...So if I can
get this to work, oh man, we're going to make a lot more money doing more deals like
this across the country” (Davis, 2015).
Actor interaction by phase
The following chart illustrates the level of intensity of involvement for each faction by
phase. It is intended to provide a holistic view of the interactions amongst the actors and to serve
as a reference for the complexity of activities that transpired during the Federal City project. Of
interest is the pattern that emerges with regards to NOFA’s entanglement with ADD during the
sustainment phase. In regards to the chart legend, high intensity is reflected by the color red,
moderate is reflected by the color orange, slightly moderate by yellow, and minimal by gray.
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Figure 26. Federal City Actor Involvement/Impact

Conclusion
In conclusion, the 21 hours or so of taped audio interview captured varied
characterizations related to the behavior of the key actors both within and external to the
coalition. To summarize the preceding chapter for the principle actors:
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NOFA, with Dave Mize as the principle protagonist, was the sole driving force that galvanized
the local New Orleans community, the State legislature, and key elements with the Department
of the Navy, to convince the BRAC Commission to modify their plan to close the NSA New
Orleans, paving the way for the Federal City project. Throughout the entire lifecycle of the
coalition, their behavior is best characterized as being purely idealistic. However, with the
unpredicted change of fortune that the SECNAV imparted through his decision to not allow
NOFA to be the lease signatory, forever changed the dynamic of the coalition. Consequently,
NOFA’s loss of power and authority rendered them completely vulnerable to attack.
ADD, with Jeff Arnold as the principle protagonist, had very little engagement with the
Federal City project nor the BRAC defense against closing the NSA. In fact, their participation
didn’t begin until mid-2007 during the final stages of the Navy lease negotiations when it
became apparent that they would inherit control of both the land and financial resources to
prosecute the Federal City project. Their subsequent behavior characterized throughout the
interviews reflects one of ignorance and self-interest, as they were ill-equipped, intellectually or
ideologically, to carry out the lofty vision of the Federal City concept. With their accession to
power, there agenda was to push NOFA out of the equation, claiming redundancy and
mismanagement of their developer as primary reasons for their elimination.
HRI/ECC, as the selected developer for the project, had nothing to do with the Federal
City project until they were brought in to help with completing and prosecuting the Master Plan
that NOFA had initiated. However, due to the vagueness in the legal documents associated with
the navy lease and other related agreements, their demonstrated behavior was one of exploitation
and greed, as captured in the interviews. Their legal battles with NOFA furthered the latter’s
vulnerability with ADD, setting them up for an inevitable showdown from which they would not
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survive. LtGen Bergman best summarizes the relationship between NOFA, ADD, and HRI: “I'm
going to give you three adjectives...NOFA, idealistic…ADD, slick…HRI, greedy. Okay. When
you put those three together, that is what you've got. And if you let any one of them control it,
the outcome is going to be bad. So how does -- how is a balance struck to let none of those three
entities get absolute control? In the end, slick and greedy basically, as you would expect, made
the idealists either get pissed off or disinterested or in some cases just give up, throw up their
hands and said I'm done” (Bergman, 2015).
The Navy’s behavior was seen as logical, albeit hurtful locally from a community sense.
They were not deceptive in any way with regards to their intentions to depart New Orleans, for
both strategic and QOL reasons. The timing of their departure, however, on the heels of
Katrina’s devastation to the region, will forever leave a bad taste in the mouths of most New
Orleanians. After over a century of occupation and involvement with the affairs of the local
community, the Navy departed during a time when the city needed them the most. The
interviews reflect this characterization.
The Marine’s behavior echoed their reputation as the selfless, loyal organization that their
institutional culture perpetuates. While somewhat agnostic during the BRAC negotiations
related to MARFORRES staying in New Orleans or being realigned to Belle Chasse, the Marines
got behind the Federal City plan once the decision was made and their marching orders issued.
Throughout the lease negotiations, the construction of their new Headquarters, their move across
the river, and suffering through the delays and failed delivery of the Federal City prophesy, the
Marines maintained their commitment to the community of Algiers and the City of New Orleans.
National military strategy and geography brought the Marines to New Orleans centuries ago,
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politics kept them here for decades, and cultural integration (and Katrina) has cemented their
presence here for decades to come. General Rich Mills concludes:
“So I think there are a lot of factors that play as to why the Marines stayed…to include
like I said a brand new building, and our long tradition with New Orleans, dating back to
the War of 1812…we’ve always had a presence…so I think that all played into it. But I
think we benefitted at least the perception of locals that, hey, everybody left but the
Marines stayed…you know…God Bless the Marines” (Mills, 2015).

Figure 27. Demonstrated Behavior Model

Collectively, it appears that each actor or group behaved as exactly as they should have,
based on their individual cultural ideology and perspective. In other words, taking into account
the background of each actor, there should have been no surprises, once the SECNAV and the
Governor changed the rules of the game. This will be discussed in much more detailed in the
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Legal Negotiations chapter ahead. Demonstrated behavior was a direct consequence of
individual ideology and associated cultural influence.
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CHAPTER 5C
NARRATIVE SHIFT
Introduction
As mentioned earlier, different narratives drove the intensity, direction, and pace of the
Federal City dynamic over the many years of its existence. Beginning with the earliest threats of

Figure 28. Relationship between narratives, behavior, and subsystems

yet another BRAC round to threaten the NSA New Orleans, through the formal announcement
that the NSA was on DOD’s recommended list for closure, through Katrina’s devastating blow
to the region and subsequent rebuilding effort, various ideological meso-level narratives were
present, subtly influencing behavior and activity. Each will be identified and examined as the
interviews revealed their nature and effects.
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BRAC Prep
Several of the respondents had significant experience with the DOD BRAC process, with
direct experience dealing with the numerous previous BRAC rounds as they impacted various
Navy and Marine Corps interests throughout the nation. Speaking to the complexity of the
BRAC process, Greg Preston comments:
“I mean, the BRAC world is an unholy alliance in the federal government…and our deals
are complex and difficult” (Preston, 2015).
Consequently, the narrative normally attributable to the looming BRAC threat for the local base
facing closure was one of futile inevitability. As Bob Braithwaite states:
“I can't tell you how many times I've dealt with local communities…’oh you can’t do
that,’ ‘please don’t leave us,’ and seen it in other places fighting tooth and nail to keep
their units there or other organizations or whatever it was… but I never saw anybody win.
Once the BRAC made a decision, it was just ‘too bad’” (Braithwaite, 2015).
However, an interesting observation was raised concerning the change in the BRAC narrative
after the tragic blow to this nation’s security on 9/11:
“The pre-9/11 stuff from the earlier BRAC rounds, a lot of it was, okay, somewhat, we're
glad that the military is leaving. We don't really need them anymore. Let's move on and
make money rather than -- there wasn't that patriotism if you will” (Preston, 2015).
Within New Orleans, as news of the BRAC 2005 round reached the civic and military
leadership, reactions were initially mixed relating to the threat to the military bases in the region,
especially the NSA. According to varied respondents:
“And there was no doubt that one was coming. At that time, we just didn't really know
when. So I got their attention and they definitely didn't want to lose the bases. So that
registered with them” (Mize, 2015).
“Prior to 2005, the writing was on the wall. I don't remember the exact date, but it could
go back to as early as 2004, perhaps even earlier than that when people suspected -- they
knew that another BRAC round was coming. And there was some clamoring, hey, we
have to get ready. We have to shore up our defenses. And even go back further than
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that, people were always -- there was at one point people realized that there is an
economic benefit to having a substantial military -- any community with a military
presence is going to want to save that military presence. And this place was no different”
(Purpura, 2015).
“Everybody suspected that Naval Support Activity was going to be on it. It was
essentially an administrative base. There's no real training mission…there was no
military mission here” (Purpura, 2015).
“No jets, no tanks, no ships, no nothing. Just an expensive base that straddled two sides
of the river and needed a shuttle to get across...And there was a lot of cost associated with
that” (Purpura, 2015).
“It was not at all disingenuous when in May 2005, Naval Support Activity was
recommended for closure in the '05 BRAC. It wasn't disingenuous on the part of the city
or the state to say, hey wait, Navy, you were receptive to this idea of Federal City. Now
you're going to close it? Wait. We've already made some efforts. And that was an
argument that they carried to the BRAC commission” (Purpura, 2015).
“So in the 2005 one, the Marine Corps definitely looked at other options, but they
couldn't find a cheaper one than staying here in New Orleans. So they weren't overly
excited about that, but they also weren't falling on their sword about trying to find
another option because they couldn't make a case for going any place else. The Marine
Corps got a much better deal” (Mize, 2015).
“So when all of this stuff started with BRAC, I think it was kind of the senior officer
relationship in town that had a lot of impact on the Marine Corps wanting to stay in New
Orleans” (Braithwaite, 2015).
However, the semi-concerned message that was carried during the early phase of the
BRAC 2005 fact-finding months was quickly replaced with outright concern once the
Department of Defense formally announced that the NSA New Orleans would be summarily
closed. The theme quickly changed from one of half-hearted preparation to the classic “Save the
Base” narrative.
Save the Base
As soon as word had gotten out that the NSA was indeed named on the DOD’s closure
list, City leadership quickly turned to General Mize and NOFA for help in attempting to assuage
the BRAC Commission into sparing the West Bank of the NSA. In General Mize’s words:
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“...it was obvious that nothing had been done to do anything for BRAC or save the bases
or anything...I mean, there were a few ideas thrown out, but nothing was done, zip. So
we had no organization; no real ideas or anything...I talked to the mayor some more and
then I talked to the governor” (Mize, 2015).
Corroboration from a key actor close to the situation, Captain Bill Garrett, offers:
General Mize, you know, was really the father for lack of a better term of leading the
charge to try to find a way to revitalize this -- the West Bank facility. As that played out,
that turned into a save-the-base once it came out that it was on the hit list” (Garrett,
2015).
Furthermore, General Mize comment’s to the City and State leadership on his actions to proceed
with the defense:
“The only way I think we can do this is you've got to really make some significant
commitments that you're going to fund and support things. So I'm not going to take on
the job unless you're saying you're going to put some money and some effort in. You're
going to give me the latitude to put an organization together here to do it because
otherwise we're all wasting our time. So both the governor and the mayor said, hey,
we're scared. We don't want to lose it on our watch. You've got it. We'll back you. And
in fact both of them ended up doing that” (Mize, 2015).
“I said, okay, we're going to do this, but I'm going to do it only if two things; if you allow
me to make a nonprofit organization that will run the effort that is totally outside the
political process because it will hamper us and screw us up and it will ruin our credibility
if the Department of Defense sees a local government running or doing this because they
just won't have belief or credibility...So it's got to be a nonprofit that is outside of the
local political process and you've got to make a commitment that you are going to give
me some money for the plan I'm going to present to you” (Mize, 2015).
However, from the perspective of Washington, D.C., the Save the Base strategy normally fails to
achieve any results. According to the Navy’s BRAC Project Manager:
“For the most part, all the save-the-base -- I would say 9 out of 10 of those efforts fail.
For the most part, if you wind up on the list, you generally stay on the list and the saveour-base doesn't work” (Preston, 2015).
For two months or so General Mize and NOFA had rallied the coalition, to include the Louisiana
State legislature, to persuade the BRAC Commission to save the West Bank portion of the NSA.
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Various expressions were captured during the interviews that describe differing points of view of
this narrative, even some with negative connotations:
“Easy to get people here to come up with a fuck-the-feds policy. And that's pretty much
what it was. It was, you know, the feds are out to screw us again. So everybody came
together to stop the feds from screwing us. How dare they take our base? We've had a
base here since we were here. How dare they come and do that? So yeah, everybody
comes together purist of hearts. Then reality sets in” (Deckert, 2015).
“You had General Mize..., this was his place…you had Jackie Clarkson…who grew up
here… this was her place…and a lot of the other folks that had been here…this was their
place… they had almost ownership…Here it was more ‘we need to have the military
because we’re supposed to have the military.’ It was also ‘we’re supposed to be here’ as
opposed to a logical reason why you wanted to be here” (Bald, 2015).
“People bonded and then banded together of like minds who felt for different reasons that
this base should be saved in some type of format. When it couldn't be saved as a base,
then the idea of a Federal City was conjured up” (Bergman, 2015).
“It could have never have happened at the local level. It never could have happened just
at the state level and it never could have happened at the federal level. It had to have
been a combined effort of everybody working together in order for it to be saved. That's
my opinion” (Palmer, 2015).
The Save the Base narrative was eventually coupled with the vision for Federal City, the latter
offering the prospective future for the former Algiers portion of the NSA. The original idealistic
Federal City vision was a picture that everyone could imagine and rally behind.
Federal City Vision
If the Save the Base theme was the initial conventional argument to save the NSA, then
the Federal City vision was the future for the City should the BRAC rebuttal become successful.
General Mize describes the early tenets:
“So then I came up with the Federal City plan because we needed to have some plan that,
you know, when you compared our plan with DoD plan, it was going to save DoD more
money and be better. Again, with my background in BRAC and knowing how this
works, that's the only way you're going to be really credible of making the case” (Mize,
2015).
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“And the idea was the state would provide the money to build the new facility, the new
headquarters facility. And we would have a concept where you could kind of live, work,
and play and you're all in the same area and be energy efficient and have all the quality of
life amenities” (Mize, 2015).
However, elements of Headquarters Marine Corps were not necessarily fully aware of NOFA’s
Federal City plan nor in support of it initially, as the following suggests. According to Mike
Tilghman at HQMC I&L:
“We started to get wind of this idea of Federal City and we didn't like it. None of us
really liked that idea at the time” (Tilghman, 2015).
“So we don't feel like, at least at the I&L level, we had been brought into what was taking
place up on the hill at the BRAC commission or wherever the hell they physically sat. I
found out later, oh, General Mize went and talked to the commission. Because what
surprised us was we thought it was supposed to be apolitical. So when a two-star shows
up with Congressman Jefferson, Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu sitting there right next
to him, that doesn't look apolitical to us and that was one of our big complaints”
(Tilghman, 2015).
“Anyhow, I believe that I was not alone by any stretch, but I think myself and a couple
others made a pretty strong case that Federal City is a stupid idea for the Marine Corps to
agree to. There's too many unknowns in it. Too much risk. We put our Marines at risk”
(Tilghman, 2015).
But the optimism of the Federal City vision was overwhelming in the early days, as articulated
by numerous respondents:
“The way I saw Federal City in that sense was, you know, a quasi-civilian, federal
military -- military, civilian federal entities collocated with all your civilian support
functions outside the base line supported by the local economy, not base housing, not the
chow line, not a dining -- public works, all those military functions you would see on a
military base. The local economy would support that stuff. And that's what I recall
seeing as what the Federal City concept was about, that you would have your groceries,
your restaurants, your housing -- apartments, some sort of living just off base or away
from your civilian federal job whatever it would be; whatever they could get here. And it
would be -- and I'm thinking back on here and I may be taking some leaps here, but it
was like a symbiotic relationship” (Purpura, 2015).
“I think what they parlayed the federal city thing into was ‘if you put this investment and
keep…keep the military here in New Orleans and we’ll bring other people in…we’ll steal
them from other places, not within state but from outside…this will show that through
economies of scale, we can bring other organizations in from out-of-state and tell them
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that they can achieve greater things if they’re in New Orleans. Because all the stuff is
already set up for them…’” (Bald, 2015).
“The Marine Force Reserve headquarters became the linchpin of the entire plan and it
had to be in New Orleans because no one is gonna relocate from out-of-state to go to
Belle Chasse” (Bald, 2015).
“The folks who were behind keeping these buildings here and keeping a military
presence, they didn't know what the presence was going to be, but they knew they wanted
to do it. They were creating a marketing plan to sell both the federal agencies -- largely
the federal agencies who would bless this and send resources, and they were also
developing -- and again, these are my words, marketing plan, to enlist the aid of any
influencer; business heads, government, you know, whomever that they could get to sing
the praises of the value that having the Federal City here would bring to New Orleans”
(Bergman, 2015).
“I mean, the bottom line is that the rising tide and all the boats are going to be lifted with
respect to, you know, the vision, you know, of the Federal City. Okay” (Quinton, 2015).
“And it was a noble vision. I mean, noble endeavor. I get that” (Quinton, 2015).
“He had a vision of more GSA type government tenants. He saw Army reserve, he saw
Army, he saw multi-service agencies…” (Garrett, 2015).
“And it was expected all the military tenants in New Orleans would move to the new
Federal City, which made sense. There would be new buildings, everybody in one place,
and there would be a synergy there too” (Cotton, 2015).
“There were 43 GSA leases out in town. And the idea being that in a post 9/11 world that
those guys would eventually need to move in -- some of them would need to move into a
secure facility to comply with post 9/11 antiterrorism force protection. So then we would
all be shared within this little compound getting back to the Federal City idea they had
originally” (Davis, 2015).
However, pessimism of the Federal City Vision was also captured:
“So it is extremely difficult to get somebody to come in and buy into Dave's
overoptimistic vision. Overoptimistic is probably an overstatement. Extremely
optimistic vision of how this was going to -- Play out” (Garrett, 2015).
And also cynicism:
“And that was kind of Mize's approach on -- and it was a phase where it was needed,
bringing everyone together to say that we need to save this entity and how you work it
and who you bring in. And the guys that they ended up bringing in came up with the
Federal City idea. Okay, fine. We'll call it that. We can't call it a base. Call it Federal
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City. All right, great. And who are we going to get to come in and do that? We're going
to get Coast Guard, go ahead and take a piece. Excellent. Wonderful. Marine Corps has
already been dragged across the briar bush and up the cactus plant three times after the
Navy snuck out of town and pissed off every elected official. So they commit to a piece
of it. What about the rest of it? We're going to do some commercial redevelopment and
some other stuff and we're going to bring these other -- excellent. Wonderful…”
(Deckert, 2015).
Taken together, the Save the Base narrative along with its Federal City Vision,
successfully enabled the coalition to influence the BRAC Commission’s reversal of the DOD
recommendation to close the NSA in New Orleans. As expressed through several accounts, that
reversal was considered extremely rare. However, very little time was allowed for celebration.
Hurricane Katrina
The ink on the BRAC Commission’s final report was not even dry when Mother Nature’s
wrath would upend the project, the City of New Orleans, and the entire region through its
devastating assertion that she still ruled the planet. As several key members of the Louisiana
delegation attest:
“We got those [BRAC Commission] decisions on like a Tuesday. Friday night,
everyone, including David Vitter, Mary Landrieu, all the people, the adjutant general, all
the people who should have been watching that damn hurricane, we were all sitting in a
private room at Antoine's celebrating our collective contributions to this project. And
then Sunday, boom, everything went to hell” (Dempsey, 2015).
However, Katrina also forced a shift in the overall narrative of the project. Save the Base was
quickly replaced with national sympathy for New Orleans:
“I think New Orleans -- the Katrina factor in New Orleans made it very unique. And as
much as I think a lot of folks, particularly on the Navy/Marine Corps side that were not
from New Orleans felt a real connection to try and make sure that this thing worked out
and that it was kind of the right thing to do” (Preston, 2015).
“Katrina scared the wits out of everybody, so I think that really pushed everyone
together…”okay, even if this isn’t a great idea, we need to do it…we need to have
something…” Everybody at that point was like “oh my God, what do we do next.” So
Katrina became a galvanizing force for these guys to come together, to at least try and
bring this plan in, and make the best of the plan, because it was a plan”.
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“…everyone wanted to help New Orleans, because they saw the pictures of the
Superdome, they thought the entire city of New Orleans was 10 feet underwater for
months, which it wasn’t, it was just an utter disaster. Americans like to help people who
are in disasters. NOFA seized on that…they took advantage of the goodwill that was
being brought out…I think they took advantage of the perceptions that President Bush’s
administration had screwed New Orleans, and the Administration was trying to make
amends… so this gave NOFA the ‘you want to make amends, you can amend us…’,
which okay, that’s a good way to help… and I think as people, as the hundreds of
thousands of people came down here to help – church groups and everything else, and
they generally genuinely liked the people. Now this goes back to the whole cultural thing
we had…in the neighborhood…” (Bald, 2015).
And Katrina’s impact to the Federal City project was captured in various forms:
“Katrina gave them an economic advantage of I think resources poured here that
otherwise would not have. And that sped up the timeline. It delayed it initially because
there weren't people here to do the construction, et cetera. But it also brought additional
resources that then maybe took them off their ultimate timeline of what they were trying
to achieve” (Habel, 2015).
“Because it [Katrina] killed all the plans that we were currently working on. And then
those options that we had developed -- just to develop options on what buildings we
could occupy was negated by Katrina because three-quarters of them were damaged
beyond...” (Maguire, 2015).
“Of course Katrina was a New Orleans defining event in so many ways – the
commitment was still there to do this project” (Garrett, 2015).
“There was an overwhelming consensus within the community that we’re going to be
resilient. We’re going to rebuild. We’re going to – this is not going to be a death blow
for New Orleans. And it wasn’t going to be a death blow for this project. So that was
kind of the attitude was, you know, we’re going to be resilient” (Garrett, 2015).
It appears that Katrina’s impact to the Federal City project, aside from its galvanizing effect of
resiliency for the City, was time and money.
“New Orleans was in shock and moving very slowly. But the biggest way it hurt us was
it pushed up constructions costs. And when we came back and we had to recalculate it, it
cost us 50 million dollars more to do the same thing” (Mize, 2015).
“So we didn't lose any scope because of Katrina. We just lost some time. We lost in the
big picture about a year, so we had to do things in two years instead of three years. So
that made things a lot more [pressurized]…” (Mize, 2015).
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“I think that all Katrina did to the Federal City project was it slowed things down. Maybe
reordered a few priorities on the part of everything” (Bergman, 2015).
“Well it obviously slowed Federal City down. It probably accelerated some of the BRAC
because, honestly, the whole country felt sorry for New Orleans and the Gulf Coast”
(Cotton, 2015).
In summary, as the dramatic effects of Hurricane Katrina eventually settled down, the narrative
of Save the Base slowly transitioned to a Rebuild New Orleans one, with the Federal City Vision
remaining intact as the conduit to prosecute the latter theme.
“Then after Katrina it became “we’ve got to do something, we have to have some kind of
an economic driver within New Orleans or New Orleans may very well cease to exist”
and this became one of those keys I think in the philosophy of both the politicians and
the nonprofit that having a strong military base here would (1), make people feel safer,
(2), bring in at least $100 million a year in federal money, sustained, that you know will
always be there, salaries, contract support, buying stuff… and it wasn’t Louisiana money,
it’s federal” (Bald, 2015).
“The branding changed. That’s probably the cleanest way to say that” (Garrett, 2015).
Rebuild New Orleans
Following the initial shock of Katrina as the recovery efforts began, the scale of
devastation and the required reconstruction illuminated an interesting parallel with 9/11 and the
national sense of patriotism:
“We’ve talked before about Katrina and 9/11…and some of the parallels there. I do
believe that this being a very, very, large construction project, the Federal City, was a
focal point… something that people could look at and see what we’re rebuilding, we’re
coming back, not unlike the freedom Tower” (Bald, 2015).
“Why in the world would you build another skyscraper on the exact same spot were two
of them collapsed? Why would you build this whole brand-new Marine Forces Reserve
headquarters in the location that was just devastated by a hurricane? It’s because you
want rebuild… you own it you want to rebuild it…you want say ‘we’re better than
this…better than nature, better than attackers…whatever it might be’” (Bald, 2015).
“So if you throw the patriotism in with the overall Katrina effect, I think that played a
large role at least in the passion and the personal touch that I think a lot of us that worked
the project had” (Preston, 2015).
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Furthermore, the federal government in DC recognized the need to support the New Orleans
Federal City project as a means to enable the recovery effort. One of the respondents for
Headquarters Marine Corps comments:
“The pivot, and it didn’t require much of a pivot but it was very smart on their part, was
look, now more than ever New Orleans needs to have Federal City so we can start the
rebuilding process. And that became sort of the theme or subtheme. New Orleans has
been devastated and -- we owe it to them as a nation” (Tilghman, 2015).
However, even though General Mize and NOFA were successful in reversing the BRAC
Commission’s recommendation, skepticism concerning the Federal City project’s solvency
remained popular in certain circles of the DOD. Recognition of Katrina’s effect on that
skepticism was articulated through the DON BRAC Office:
“If Katrina wasn't there, I would have put the odds more likely than not that it would
have closed. So I do think there was the -- the Rebuild New Orleans factor was a critical
piece to ultimately having that building built” (Preston, 2015).
Within the Rebuild New Orleans narrative, the sympathy and support from the nation and the
federal government was also revealed during the interviews:
“I believe you had the governor also saying, look, we've got to rebuild this great
American city and stuff like this. I mean, I know at one point the SecNav basically was
summoned down to Louisiana to meet with Governor Jindal and he did go down and
meet with Governor Jindal” (Tilghman, 2015).
“And they thought this would be, they being Louisiana and the entities that were trying to
make this happen, for them, this was the shot at revitalization economically of that area;
of New Orleans as a whole saying this is, you know, we have to make this happen
because it's going to bring all of this business, all of these jobs here. And so everyone
had their foot on the gas. And we understood that, right. I mean, we understood it was
going to be necessary or at least helpful to revitalization” (Shy, 2015).
“Once Katrina happened, this was another ‘oh my goodness, we’ve got to do something
for New Orleans’" (Braithwaite, 2015).
Rebuilding New Orleans…
“So from the Federal City project, it needed to find its place in the priorities of a city and
state rebuilding itself after Mother Nature had taken a strong vote” (Bergman, 2015).
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“But Federal City…It was folded into this, ‘let's rebuild New Orleans’” (Purpura, 2015).
The Rebuild New Orleans theme remained in play throughout the bulk of the coalition’s
sustainment phase, slowly waning from the public spotlight as the City of New Orleans
recovered over the years, returning to normalcy. As national attention displaced to other world
events, the Federal (and State) government’s attention to the Federal City project diminished
significantly, enabling the local political actors (e.g., ADD) to influence the coalition’s internal
dynamics and, consequentially, the project’s direction.
Navy Leaving
It is important to describe a related narrative that surfaced quite commonly during the
interviews, and that is the impact of the Navy’s leaving New Orleans. For many years prior to
the 2005 BRAC, the U.S. Navy had been developing a national strategy to reorganize their
Reserve forces to better align with the overarching National Military Strategy and to mitigate the
service’s dwindling resources due to budget cuts. Admiral Cotton, Commander of the Naval
Reserve Force, describes the Navy’s vision:
“The Navy in Washington, D.C., where the Chief of Navy Reserve office is, was looking
to align functionalities with the goal of reducing staffs and becoming more effective”
(Cotton, 2015).
“So Reserve Forces Command needed to be in Norfolk to align with us. BRAC 2005
was our vehicle. We moved out of the warehouse; moved the functionalities; used the
BRAC vehicle to pay for this; and then we got a new building built in Norfolk, which
was the Reserve Forces Command” (Cotton, 2015).
A local Navy respondent characterizes the Admiral’s efforts:
“And he [Cotton] had a singular vision -- and you'll hear it from him -- he had a singular
vision of active component Navy responsibility and ownership for the Navy reserve and
complete integration. So what his vision was is he saw Navy Reserve Forces Command
tied directly to Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk” (Garett, 2015).
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Furthermore, Admiral Cotton further describes his actions towards achieving the Navy’s vision
for the future force:
“So we did everything with lots of thought beforehand. This was a strategic alignment of
dwindling Navy resources to better position the Navy reserve for the future” (Cotton,
2015).
“So there was a lot of due diligence, do the right thing to strategically and tactically align
the outputs” (Cotton, 2015).
Notwithstanding the Navy’s explanation described above, senior Marines close to the project
offer additional insight and perspective. According to General Rich Mills:
“I think from the active duty perspective, the Navy was anxious to leave the gulf coast
because it was just no longer as important…” (Mills, 2015).
“I think the Navy was moving...was going out to the East Coast and West Coast and were
consolidating. And I think that this base, probably from a Navy perspective, had outlived
its usefulness. There was no longer a Navy fleet in the Caribbean…all those kinds of
reasons. I think the Navy was kind of looking for a reason to get out…and two very
convenient reasons came around…the BRAC and two was Katrina” (Mills, 2015).
And also a slightly pejorative comment characterizing the Navy’s timing, as expressed by bob
Braithwaite:
“Katrina, I think, was the final straw for the Navy…just that they didn't want to deal with
that again, and I think that was the final [arm motion up] ‘we’re outta here’. But I think
they saw Katrina and the impact on the headquarters and all and saw that as a golden
opportunity to get out of town” (Braithwaite, 2015).
The local reaction to the Navy leaving on the heels of Katrina was not surprising:
“But I've run into some people in New Orleans who didn't make the move who are still
angry today that we left and their government job is no longer there” (Cotton, 2015).
“New Orleans was crushed when the Navy, in my mind, pulled a Baltimore Colts and
kinda slipped out of town. I truly think they were crushed. I think they were surprised and
I think they were a family and were hurt by that.” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“They didn't even want to come back after Katrina hit...the DoN and the Navy itself did
not even want to spend a penny renovating or even fixing to a level where we could come
back and actually start operating again” (Quinton, 2015).
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“...my perception always was that New Orleans was a Navy town. The Navy had been
there forever…they loved the Navy… they were nice to us - the Marine Corps - because
we’re part of the Navy” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“Oh, they still think they're a Navy town. There ain't no Navy anywhere” (Dempsey,
2015).
“Like I said, I think they were in total shock that the Navy was leaving town, and I
remember myself thinking, “holy cow,” it kind of caught us off guard too that the Navy
was totally pulling out” (Braithwaite, 2015).
Some additional personal commentary on the subject further reinforces the theme:
“The fact that the Navy left...I think that it softened it a little by the fact that we [the
Marines] stayed. I think there would have been more animosity towards the United
States Navy had we left as well” (Habel, 2015).
“But again, they had a commander who was -- he was an asshole. Okay. Admiral
Cotton. His scheme was to get out of New Orleans. Okay. His scheme was -- he had the
grand vision. Okay. And his vision was to remake the naval reserve into a bunch of
Kelly girls. Okay. You know, to divest itself of its infrastructure, divest itself of all of its
installations. And he was the one who pulled the trigger on, you know, let's make us a
collection of individual sailors that could go anywhere at any time. And, you know, he
was the one that coined the phrase, the Navy's reserve” (Quinton, 2015).
“From what I understand, there was a conversation between Admiral Cotton and General
Bergman. And Admiral Cotton said, ‘you know, I'm cutting my losses, dude. I'm
leaving’. And General Bergman said ‘we're staying. Goodbye. See you. We don't need
you anymore’” (Quinton, 2015).
Effects of the narrative shift
The most recognized impact of the shift of narratives from the conventional Save the
Base story to the dramatic Rebuild New Orleans due to Katrina was the level of effort and
visibility of the populace. Prior to Katrina, the overall sympathy for New Orleans’ plight of
potentially losing its century-old Navy base was luke warm at best. However, with the global
coverage of Katrina’s devastating blow to the region, sympathy for those affected was nothing
short of absolute. Not only did the hurricane response come from all elements of the nation,
international aid and sympathy also followed with both significant financial and human
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assistance. The Rebuild New Orleans narrative remained in its position of influence for several
years during the City’s recovery, enabling a steady flow of federal resources into the region. The
fact that the Federal City project was included in this narrative allowed its Phase I execution to
proceed, as the evidence supports. However, it appears that over the years following Katrina,
national attention towards ongoing New Orleans recovery projects slowly waned, to the point
that after 10 years most efforts returned to solely local and regional. This observation
concerning narrative shift may very well have had an impact on the fracturing of the coalition’s
solvency due to the varied actor behaviors addressed earlier.
Epilogue: Riverside at Historic Algiers
Towards the end of the fragmentation phase of the coalition when the JDC was
established and NOFA was essentially rendered impotent, a conscious recognition was made that
the title of the Federal City project was poisonous. Rather than objectively trying to understand
the true nature of the project’s failure, the JDC and ADD embarked on a new pathway to
resurrect the project by rebranding the name. Consequently, along with a (somewhat) renewed
Master Plan along with a new potential developer, the “New Orleans Riverside at Historic
Algiers” project surfaced as a pseudo-replacement to the defunct Federal City campaign. As of
the writing of this paper, the project remains in a perpetual state of inaction. To the point of a
narrative’s impact on a project, clearly one with national attention bodes well in driving patterns
of behavior and acquiring external resources. “Federal City” had federal attention; “New Orleans
Riverside at Historic Algiers” has local New Orleans attention only. Perhaps the Rebuild New
Orleans theme was powerful enough at the height of the coalition’s power to have enabled the
project to succeed before catastrophic legal decisions were made at the State and Federal level
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that derided the project’s ownership. This latter point will be addressed in the forthcoming
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5D
LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS, CONFLICT, AND RESOLUTION
“The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly”

The title of the chapter ascribed above jokingly in reference to one of Clint Eastwood’s
famous films summarizes the overall context of the information presented here. Having
previously described the history, culture, subsystems, and associated behavior of the actors
involved with the Federal City project, this chapter will present and highlight the qualitative data
collected related to the actual legal and financial activities that led to the project’s initial success,
but eventual downfall. A brief review of the timeline of critical legal events affecting the project
and coalition:
Initial DOD BRAC Report
BRAC Commission Testimony
BRAC Approved by POTUS
NOFA as State Agent MOU
NOFA Business & Enhanced Use Lease Plan
Navy Lease Negotiations
Developer Selection
Louisiana HB 56
State Audit Report of ADD
CEA: ADD, NOFA, and LED
Navy Lease and Sublease Signature
Master Plan Published
Parking Garage Development Agreement
NDAA directing the Fee Simple Transfer
Tri-Party Parking Garage Management Agreement
Parking Garage Use Agreement
Law suits: NOFA vs. HRI/ECC
CEA: ADD and NOFA; JDC Birth
Secure Compound accepted by DON
Lease and Sublease terminated
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May 13, 2005
July 22, 2005
Sept 15, 2005
2005
Feb 14, 2008
2007 - 2008
Oct 2007
Mar 24, 2008
Apr 23, 2008
Sep 29, 2008
Sept 30, 2008
Aug 12, 2010
Aug 31, 2010
Jan 7, 2011
Jan 31, 2011
July 14, 2011
Nov 23, 2011
Dec 1, 2012
Jul 30, 2013
Mar 18, 2014

BRAC Commission Testimony – “The Good”
“The Good” element of the chapter subtitle reflects the overall attitude, conduct, and
success of the coalition during the formation and mobilization phases of the life cycle in the early
days of the project. This early, pre-Katrina era witnessed General Dave Mize personally embark
upon a mission to galvanize all elements of the coalition, which included City and State
leadership, the State Congressional delegation, in addition to numerous other public and private
civic lobbies. In response to the initial DOD BRAC Report naming the closure of NSA New
Orleans, General Mize and NOFA coordinated the comprehensive counter-proposal to the BRAC
Commission, as exhibited in the subsequent BRAC Commission Regional Hearing Testimony on
July 22, 2005 in New Orleans. Highlights from the testimony:
Governor Kathleen Blanco:
“We have contributed more of our sons and daughters to the current war efforts than any
other state”
“We also have a legacy of making financial commitments to the military here in
Louisiana…the legislature and I have guaranteed funding for the Federal City project.”
“Louisiana stands by ready to continue our legacy of supporting the national defense.”
Mary L. Landrieu, U.S. Senator, Louisiana:
“The leadership of Louisiana has been completely united behind our military
communities…the military is intertwined in the fabric of Louisiana”
“Louisiana has a long tradition supporting our military. This support comes in three
forms: Louisianans have always answered the call to serve; Louisiana is host to a
number of military installations; we have supplied our armed forces with the tools of war
for several generations.”
David Vitter, U.S. Senator, Louisiana:
“The DOD BRAC Report used a dramatic expectation of savings for NSA…our analysis
of the same report will concretely illustrate those savings to be grossly over-inflated. In
addition to this miscalculation on savings, the DOD BRAC announcement does not take
into consideration the City Of New Orleans’ ‘Federal City’ proposal.”
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William Jefferson, U.S. House of Representatives, 2nd District, Louisiana:
“The proposed Federal City project presents a unique opportunity for the Department of
Defense to take advantage of state-of-the-art facilities that would replace current facilities
at Algiers, at no federal cost. Louisiana stands ready to develop the facilities at Federal
City and allow the Department of Defense to utilize its numerous benefits for wellbelow-market costs.”
“With our continued effort, we feel that the Navy and Marine Corps would have a bright
and successful future in New Orleans, and maintain their beneficial association with the
neighborhoods and people of New Orleans.”
C. Ray Nagin, Mayor, City of New Orleans:
“Please consider that the Greater New Orleans community and the State of Louisiana
have created a compelling alternative to base closure with our Federal City plan…It
creates a new model for national security, and it makes good economic sense for the
federal government and the City of New Orleans.”
“Not all great ideas come from Washington. We ask that you help the big bureaucracy in
Washington apply some good common sense and adapt a program that is better for the
country, better for the DoD, and better for Louisiana.”
General Mize summarizes the BRAC Commission testimony quite succinctly, culminating
several months of hard lobbying on NOFA’s part towards marketing the Federal City alternative
to the DOD’s proposal for the outright closure of the NSA:
“So we made our pitch and we got great feedback on it. Some of the BRAC
commissioners told me it was the best one they had seen and it was obvious our case
saved DoD a lot more than the -- but the Navy didn't want to do it even after we won the
deal. So they wrote up the law in the BRAC on how it would go. And so they went back
to what was in the original DoD BRAC thing and they lined out the Navy. It had the
Navy going and then they penciled in, okay, the Marines stay and go to Federal City”
(Mize, 2015).
As has been well-established, the overwhelming success of the coalition’s reclama effort
was short-lived, as Katrina’s blow to the region just days after the victory quickly buried the
celebration into obscurity as all eyes turned to the recovery effort. However, to the point of this
Chapter, the successful effort by NOFA and the Louisiana delegation to reverse the BRAC
decision should be regarded as tantamount to the coalition’s political power and should serve as
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proof of what can be accomplished by advocacy coalitions when all members are completely in
synch with a common goal. But, as the reader will see, early success is no guarantee of
subsequent triumphs, particularly if the coalition fragments. The next several sections will
explain the dynamic of the Navy lease negotiations, to include several unforeseen actions that
completely derided the coalition’s solvency.
Developer Selection
Following the enormous recovery effort of the region, NOFA slowly resumed the Federal
City project’s execution, having validated the coalition’s enduring support first. A critical
element for the project to proceed was the selection of the master developer to partner with.
During the late 2006 timeframe, NOFA developed the appropriate Request for Proposal for the
Federal City project and proceeded to recruit potential developers. General Mize describes the
actions that took place with regards to the solicitation:
“So I had 15 major developers come in, you know, fly in. Most of them spent a day with
me looking at the site and me pitching what our concept was of Federal City, et cetera.
So we generated a lot of interest and we had 150 million dollars seed money which we
thought would be pretty attractive. And then we had the final conference and we had like
177 people there and we had 37 different companies there. So I mean, we had a great
interest. And so after the final bid conference, they had like six weeks to turn in your bid
or something like that. So we were pretty excited with all the interest and questions and
we answered all kinds of questions and stuff. And when the bids came, we only got two
bids” (Mize, 2015).
Not surprisingly, the shock of only receiving two actual bids severely disappointed the NOFA
members. General Mize further explains:
“So we got two bids. So that kind of crushed us. And I went back and I called about
three of the people that had been really interested and been down here a lot and said, what
happened? Why didn't you bid? And they said almost the same verbatim thing. ‘When
it got down to us actually -- when we did the preliminary work and you're going to do the
bid on, our senior leadership said I just can't believe that if we get involved in this, the
local politicians down there won't screw it all up. They will want to get their money out
of this and it would just be too much of a hassle. And so in the final analysis, even
though the opportunity is tempting, I believe down there in Louisiana they'll just figure
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out somehow to get their -- local guys get their hands in it so it's just not worth it’. So
that's almost verbatim to what they told me” (Mize, 2015).
Unintended consequences of the negative perception of Louisiana politics appear to have
influenced the decision for many vendors not to engage in the project. As NOFA Board Member
Bill Ryan offers:
“It was Louisiana and people just didn't -- you were using state money and they just
didn't necessarily trust the process. And it was very complicated to say the least. But we
ended up with two viable bids. And the one we selected, Bob Farnsworth almost left the
board on that because he couldn't get along with HRI at all. And we should have” (Ryan,
2015).
NOFA recognized the risk of selecting HRI/ECC, but proceeded with the project nonetheless
vice risk attempting to repeat the solicitation. The deadline to begin the project was quickly
approaching. General Mize states:
“…we really ended up with one choice. So that's how HRI got the job. And we knew it
was going to be a challenge, but it was either pick them or not have a project” (Mize,
2015).
It appears that the foreboding concerns about the developer exhibited by numerous respondents
earlier proved true several years later, as will be discussed towards the end of the chapter.
The Navy Enhanced Use Lease (EUL) Negotiation – “The Bad”
The revised BRAC language that was passed into law specifically stated “If the State of
Louisiana obtains funding and commences construction of the Federal City project proposed for
the Naval Support Activity West Bank property on or before September 30, 2008, then relocate
Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve to the Naval Support Activity West Bank property”
(BRAC, 2005). With that hard milestone date set by law, it was critical that the entire Federal
City project business plan be developed, to include a negotiated and signed Enhanced Use Lease
(EUL) agreement between the Department of the Navy and the State of Louisiana.
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In 2007, NOFA, along with its coalition select partners in Louisiana, began developing
their initial proposal for the project, entitled NOFA Business & Enhanced Use Lease Plan, and
submitted it to the BRAC Program Office Southeast, Department of the Navy on February 14,
2008. Concurrently, NOFA, acting as the appointed agent for the State of Louisiana, also
entered into detailed negotiations with the Navy for the lease of the NSA West Bank property
(Mize, 2015). These negotiations, beginning in 2007 through the Spring of 2008, became
exceptionally complex and polarizing. On the State side, you had NOFA leading the charge,
along with their developer, HRI/ECC. Additionally, they had their counsel, Adams and Reese,
present during all negotiations. NOFA’s and HRI’s position in the negotiation was to attempt to
minimize the amount of space and funding for the MARFORRES requirement of the Federal
City project, thereby allowing more capital for the commercial development of the project.
On the Federal government side, the DON had formed a more formal negotiating team
consisting of the BRAC real-estate contracting officer, Greg Preston; the BRAC Southeast
project manager, James Anderson; a Navy attorney, Ralph Lombardo; an attorney from the
Headquarters Marine Corps Counsel’s Office, Shannon Shy; and Colonel Bill Davis from
MARFORRES in New Orleans. Contrary to the State’s strategy, the Navy’s intent was to ensure
that the Marine Corps’ full requirements were met for the new MARFORRES Headquarters
compound within Federal City. Consequently, this dialectic in opposing viewpoints led to a
natural conflict – many months were spent analyzing proposals and counter-proposals, with little
progress actually being made. Attorneys for each side entrenched themselves as the negotiations
drew on. Colonel Davis offers a perspective from the Navy point of view:
“So again, we went through a series of negotiations that just didn't cut it because
financially -- it was not financially suitable or very effective for the Department of the
Navy or the Marine Corps what was being proposed by NOFA and their development
arm, HRI/ECC” (Davis, 2015).
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“And we really are hammering down the deal. I mean, we went back and forth, back and
forth. NOFA and HRI was pushing to constrain the secure facility where you had to have
a badge to get into the smallest footprint possible so that the rest of the property could be
developed. So that was their objective... to put us into the smallest footprint” (Davis,
2015).
Other observers to the lease negotiation process reinforce the dynamic. Mike Tilghman offers:
“And some pretty rough negotiations back and forth. I mean, there was no shortage of
punches thrown back and forth on the state's side and by the government's side”
(Tilghman, 2015).
Bill Garrett reinforces this point:
“The lease negotiations were just so painful because there was so much posturing
between HRI and their staff, their attorneys, the BRAC program office, the real-estate
lawyers, Greg Preston who was actually the signatory of the -- was going to be the
signatory of the lease for the United States government as the real-estate attorney...there
were times when none of us thought that even that was going to happen” (Garrett, 2015).
Even the developer agreed with this standpoint. As Eddie Boettner states:
“The Navy was trying to hold a hard line [during the lease negotiations]. The
negotiations were originally plagued with conflicts with traditional military demand.
Hoops to jump through…exception after exception” (Boettner, 2015).
However, as the negotiations wore on, more and more pressure was applied to the teams
as the deadline approached. This pressurization forced intervention at the highest levels of
government, culminating with the Secretary of the Navy personally discussing the matter with
the Governor of Louisiana. As was revealed during the interviews by several respondent, this
senior level dialogue resulted in specific guidance back to the negotiating teams “to make it
happen.” As one of the attorneys for the DON, Shannon Shy, states:
“The governor of Louisiana had basically said, ‘look, Glenn, give them what they want.’
So they came back and they not only gave us what they had previously put on the table,
but they added more space too” (Shy, 2015).
Eddie Boettner from HRI/ECC corroborates:
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Consequently, in order for a solution to be reached, compromises to the terms of the lease
had to be made by both sides, oftentimes with intentional vagueness written into the
language in order to allow for acceptance by both sides. However, vagueness leads to
interpretation. This latter point enabling factional posturing several years later. As one
of the negotiators confided: “Sometimes you want vagueness to get to an
agreement…then later it haunts you” (Boettner, 2015).
The last critical event during this tense period of legal maneuvering ended up being a
fatal action for the coalition and the project, albeit unrealized at the time. Up until this point in
time, all parties fully recognized that NOFA was the authorized agent for the State of Louisiana
for all actions related to the Federal City project, to include the Navy EUL. However, at the last
minute, the DON’s Counsel’s Office weighed in and ruled that the DON would not agree to
allow NOFA, a non-profit entity, to serve as the lessee. As an observer explains:
“NOFA fully expected to be the signatory of the lease. They fully expected to be the
signatory of the lease. And it wasn't really until the 11th hour when the Secretary of the
Navy made a trip to Baton Rouge to where there was some questions about, you know,
you can't really sign this agreement under 501c. It really needs to be a state entity with
the ability to levy taxes and do TIF. So that's how ADD ended up as the signatory of the
lease” (Garrett, 2015).
And from NOFA’s perspective, Colonel Dempsey states:
“Well the Navy didn't really want to deal with NOFA. Why? Because we weren't
recognized by the state legislator. So they wanted somebody above us kind of almost as
a pass through that the state legislator recognized. That somebody would be the Algiers
Development District. Okay” (Dempsey, 2015).
General Mize summarizes the challenge they faced from his perspective:
“We had a couple meetings with myself, Senator Vitter, and Senator Landrieu on one
side, the Secretary of the Navy -- and one meeting the Chief of Staff of the Navy and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and whatnot, you know, come to Jesus as tough a
meeting as you can have. So we were at loggerheads because neither side would bend.
And we had done this -- we got it through past 50 lawyers, you know. This one guy at
the last -- at Secretary of the Navy's level said that – ‘misdeal’. So we were desperate to
find some way because, again, the timeline was about out on this” (Mize, 2015).
General Mize further describes the resolution and reveals his concerns about local politics:
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“And so what we came up with was, okay, how about you do the lease with ADD
because they are a quasi-state agency and then ADD will do a total pass-through to
NOFA...But the idea then was ADD didn't have to do anything except for sign the lease
and we did then the sublease for all the rights and responsibility for payouts through
ADD to NOFA so that we could -- thought then that we would -- we hated that to happen
because we had worked so hard to get the political guys out and the Department of the
Navy were the ones who put the local political guys back in the deal” (Mize, 2015).
Even the developer recognized the fateful decision by the Navy:
“The major fly in the ointment was ADD. The lease to NOFA needed a public
entity…ADD. The fuse was lit when ADD signed the lease” (Boettner, 2015).
At this point, we now have a complex EUL with the Department of the Navy and the
State of Louisiana, with ADD, comprised of mostly local New Orleans politicians, now serving
as the primary lessee and signatory for the $150 million Federal City deal. However, the fact
that all parties were able to close the deal before the deadline and symbolically break ground on
Sept 30, 2008 was a feat in and of itself. Regardless of the legal mechanics behind the scenes,
the project was officially underway and all coalition partners were amicably rowing in the same
direction. Woodward Design/Build, the selected builder, proceeded in quick order with the
construction of the Phase I requirements, which focused primarily the MARFORRES
Headquarters secure compound.
Fee Simple Transfer
Following the stressful tribulations related to the Navy lease negotiations, the DON
subsequently determined that it was in their best interests to hand over a significant portion of the
leased land outright to the State of Louisiana via a fee simple transfer. All of the property less
the secure compound, the parcels encompassing the PPV Housing, and Quarters “A” (the historic
LeBeuf Plantation) was included in this transfer, authorized in law with the passing of the FY11
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on January 7, 2011. This action would cede all
property rights over to the State, effective in 2013. ADD’s power would summarily increase
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from that of lessor to one of outright landowner. Assorted commentary from the respondents to
this event:
“So '13 is when ADD became the landowner…but there were some exclusions to that;
obviously, the Marine Corps compound. The Coast Guard headquarters predated the
Marine Corps Support Facility. Quarters A was excluded and also the PPV housing was
excluded from the fee. Everything else was theirs. So that was as much of a defining
moment in terms of changing the direction of what would be the development of the
project” (Garrett, 2015).
“ADD was now in control because they owned the land” (Garrett, 2015).
“And then I think that what went haywire was that fee simple transfer that then gave the
endgame to the ADD. Because at that point they had all the power” (Palmer, 2015).
If the lease was considered the “lighting of the fuse” with regards to the catalyst for
ADD’s power ascension, the fee simple transfer was the explosion, at least from a legal
perspective. The local politicians of ADD were now in complete control of both financial
resources and land title as they related to the Federal City project.
NOFA versus ADD
As the dynamics of the coalition slowly evolved, it became increasingly apparent that the
ideologies driving each faction slowly crept into the exhibited behavior of the varied actors (as
described in the early chapters). Specifically, the friction between NOFA and ADD grew more
tenuous over time, as described by Kristen Palmer:
“There was a lot of distrust on the ADD side of the NOFA side, especially with General
Mize. They just totally did not like him” (Palmer, 2015).
The primary catalyst for the friction was over money, with ADD now in charge of all outlays
associated with the project, to include NOFA’s operating expenses. NOFA board member Dell
Dempsey describes the situation early on:
“So the State comes to us and they said, if you are going to be the -- we got Mize on
board as the director of the project. We were not going to pay him I think 225 a year was
what his salary was plus his whatever travel expenses. And the state says we need an
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operational budget for five years because that's what BRAC paper is, five years in the
project. So we needed an operational budget for five years. So we got together and we
talked about it and came up with a five year budget and we went back and said we need
five million dollars” (Dempsey, 2015).
The subsequent informal agreement between ADD and NOFA over the funding plan for NOFA’s
operating expenses was a sourcing combination of the State’s mega-fund and the local TIF
account, both controlled by ADD. Dempsey offers:
“So the state came back and they said you've got that TIF down there. We don't think we
ought to have to put up the whole five million dollars. Tell you what, we'll put up twothirds and you guys down there use the TIF for the other third” (Dempsey, 2015).
“Well the TIF is controlled by ADD still. That's the only reason for the ADD to exist is
to control that TIF money. So we go back to the ADD still thinking we have a bunch of
supporters there and say, this is the way we're going to do this. Is that good with you?
Yeah, it's good with them except they said, look, we've used so much of this money
getting through this BRAC process, there are some other projects we would like to get to.
Do this, use the state money up front and then we'll come in on the tail end with the last
few operational years. We were like, good to go. No problem. The only problem is
Adams and Reese never put any of that in any legal documentation. So it was almost like
a gentleman's agreement” (Dempsey, 2015).
“So we now are kind of running out of operational money from the state and we write a
letter to the ADD saying, hey, it's time for you guys to set the plate. Here we need our
two million dollars in the bank, you know, so we don't lose any momentum here. The
ADD comes back and says no. And we are like, what do you mean no?” (Dempsey,
2015).
Eddie Boettner from HRI/ECC offers his comment regarding ADD and money:
“I think it was just a matter of power struggle between Jeff Arnold being the political
animal that he is. He needed to control the money from ADD. The ADD gets all their
money from a TIF” (Ryan, 2015).
As ADD consolidated its power base, it was necessary for them to expand their staff through the
hiring of consultants and a larger legal team. Since they were the sole authority for the control of
the TIF funding and the project mega-fund, this was within their legal right. Consequently,
ADD’s tactics appeared to shift accordingly as they saw their role changing. NOFA’s apparent
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usefulness [to them] was duplicative. From the Marines perspective of the growing impasse
between NOFA and ADD, Colonel Bill Davis comments:
“But essentially, ADD is saying, well, NOFA is pretty darn expensive. They've got these
hired consultants and General Mize and a big staff” (Davis, 2015).
“ADD starts complaining about the costs and they don't want to pay any extra money out
of their -- now ADD has the purse strings because the money from the 150 million has to
come through ADD down the chain. They are part of the approval process. So they were
leaning on General Mize and his group to cut costs and do whatever...He [Mize] lets go
of the consulting team and some of the staff to reduce his costs. He's still fighting with
the HRI guys. What's funny is it's around this time that not long after he lets go of the
consulting team is when they [ADD] hire them” (Davis, 2015).
Other comments related to the topic of redundancy were revealed:
“So much money was wasted. So many duplicative services between ADD and NOFA.
You know, you had separate accounting, separate construction management, separate
staff. It was the amount of money that was wasted” (Palmer, 2015).
“They were using the word redundancy; said redundant spending. ADD and NOFA both
were spending money on consultants who were both spending money on – lawyers”
(Purpura, 2015).
The theme of ADD “starving NOFA to death” financially was quite prevalent in the captured
interviews:
“And now it's just like one punch right after another, right after another. And they finally
effectively starved us to death is what they did” (Dempsey, 2015).
“I think they wanted to starve NOFA with money and then just wait them out. And that
in and of itself cost so much money. And nobody really cared about the end-game. I
think NOFA always did” (Palmer, 2015).
“But the fact that we [NOFA] never got a written agreement that put that money into
place in that last two years of operational funding, that's really what opened the door for
them [ADD] to do this (Dempsey, 2015).
Interestingly, this internal coalition funding fray was observed from outside agencies. As
revealed from the primary journalist covering the military desk for the Times-Picayune states:
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“So after the fee simple thing was approved and so forth, ADD started reneging. They
started reneging; they started pulling back from their handshake agreement…” (Purpura,
2015).
“NOFA was starving. It was a shame. It was, to me, humiliating. I felt humiliated for
General Mize to have to go up to that board, to the ADD, the politicians, and saying, hey,
we need money. And the politicians are holding it back and they might give him a little
money here or there or something. And I remember Tom Arnold making a motion, look,
we just have to get this over with. We are getting hammered. The press is saying we
were starving them out” (Purpura, 2015).
“So I wanted to call the kettle black. My use of the word renege in the context of ADD
reneging on that handshake funding agreement, I had the paperwork. But at any rate, the
point is that using the word renege to describe to what ADD did to NOFA and starving it
into submission, that's what was happening” (Purpura, 2015).
And from the developer’s perspective:
“NOFA and ADD were throwing grenades at each other…with HRI caught in the
middle” (Boettner, 2015).
Deputy Counsel for MARFORRES, Ron Bald, summarizes it best with his recounting of the
coalition’s dynamic at this point in time:
“ADD funded NOFA for operating expenses and an audit in 2008 could not account for
$1.7 million that had been given to NOFA. The auditors could not find it…still. I think
the argument is what we were spending on Federal City, what were we spending it on?
Yeah it's… it's hard because I think at that point the distrust started, politicians are going
‘this is taxpayer money going to a nonprofit, I have my constituents to look after and if I
can't tell them that we know where all the money is going I’m going to get unelected.’ So
that started to create that whole mistrust, as was the money. It all came down to the
money, and as that distrust grew you started getting into the lawsuits, into the us-versusthem, to the whole ‘we don't need you’” (Bald, 2015).
In the Fall of 2011, following the Marines’ successful move across the River during June
and July into their new MARFORRES Headquarters compound, the coalition’s worsening
relationship was approaching collapse. As ADD and NOFA continued their struggle over money
and operating expenses, NOFA’s relationship with their developer HRI/ECC was also quickly
deteriorating, following a year of disagreements related to interpretation of responsibilities
defined in the Navy lease in addition to other previously agreed upon legal documents. The
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vagueness intentionally written into the Lease earlier as a compromise to allow for signature
would end up haunting NOFA at this point in time. The disagreement over the payment of utility
bills for Federal City beyond the Marine compound would be the specific catalyst that would
propel NOFA and HRI/ECC to war. As Colonel Bill Davis confirms that point:
“The initial issues were between HRI and NOFA. Somewhere in their negotiations,
whether written or verbal, there was some gray space. Considering the number of
lawyers that were involved in this, I am amazed that there was some gray space… there’s
a gap in there that created the source of a lot of the animosity that started with who got
paid what. It really came to a head over the utility bills” (Davis, 2015).
Fortunately for all parties, the unravelling relationships amongst the coalition did not
impede the successful completion of the MARFORRES move across the river within the
prescribed BRAC timeline. The Marines’ met their obligation to transition to Federal City
seamlessly and the Navy similarly closed both sides (East Bank and West Bank) of the NSA as
directed by federal law. However, as the Marines were “settling in” to their new environment on
the West Bank, the vision of the Federal City live-work-play prophesy slowly faded as the
development of the commercial aspect of the project completely stalled due to the fractured
ADD/NOFA/HRI relationships. The promise of restaurants, shops, boutiques, and other
traditional community-support venues failed to materialize for the 1000+ members of
MARFORRES. The isolation of Federal City in the economically-barren section of Algiers
soured expectations of many servicemen and their families.
Another Source of Friction: The Master Plan
As a related side note, the topic of the Master Plan surfaced numerous times during the
interviews that serves to illustrate the friction amongst the coalition partners. As has been
demonstrated already, General Mize’s vision regarding the Federal City project was somewhat
singular, in that it appears to be one man’s view of a possible future state. The physical Master
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Plan was developed in earnest by Duany Plater-Zybek & Company, a successful architectural
firm out of Florida that specializes in new urbanist development. The Master Plan was
considered unrealistic by many, as illustrated by several of the respondents below:
“I had that personal sense with the Duany plan and that the Duany plan was what General
Mize's vision was. So it was kind of -- it wasn't quite a self-licking ice-cream cone, but it
was a -- self-fulfilling prophesy” (Garrett, 2015).
“I knew the only way that Federal City was going to be successful is if we integrate into
the greater community. That was the only way. That 500 thousand dollar master plan
was a piece of shit. And you can quote me. Piece of shit. And we paid 500 thousand.
That came up before me, right. So they hire the damn guy that was the architect from
seaside who was going to do -- it was horrible” (Palmer, 2015).
“But the master plan was only done by one entity, not shared with the other
entities…there was no buy-in…It was NOFA that did it, they published it, and ADD got
pissed off” (Bald, 2015).
“We spent a lot of money on a master plan for that Federal City. And Arnold had gone to
Dave on maybe two occasions wanting to put, like, churches in there and other things that
weren't included in the master plan and Dave said, fuck you. So now Jeff was looking for
more of a way to get rid of Dave. That's where it started unravelling” (Dempsey, 2015).
Further critique of the master plan in the context of the retail portion of the commercial parking
garage business endeavor:
“How are you going to get a business to go into your bright, shiny parking garage if there
is nobody there aside from the Marines. That's just not going to happen. Whatever. I'm
an idiot. Maybe I just don't know what I'm talking about. So that was frustrating. I was
a community activist. I do not come from politics” (Palmer, 2015).
The developer commented on the mega-fund distribution, critiquing the decision to fully fund the
Marine compound at the expense of the commercial development side. Of note, the developer
did not invest any of its private resources into the project, unlike traditional public-private
partnerships involving land development.
“The bulk of the money going to the Marines upset the Master Plan. HRI committed
remaining resources to mitigating the project. There was not enough subsidy to develop
the private retail side…” (Boettner, 2015).
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Taken together, it appears that the Master Plan was not well socialized by NOFA and was
another source of tension amongst the partners as the project evolved.
NOFA versus HRI: The Law Suits – “The Ugly”
In late November of 2011, NOFA filed a law suit with the Orleans Parish Clerk of Courts
against HRI/ECC for breach of contract (?), specifically citing their responsibilities for paying
various operating expenses associated with the contract. While the focus of the law suit was on
the aforementioned utility bills, the suit covered several other grievances. Shortly thereafter,
HRI/ECC counter-sued. The lawsuits were litigated for well over a year in the court system,
costing both parties significant amounts of (public) funding in attorney fees. NOFA board
member Bill Ryan comments:
“And of course we had lawyers. And the lawyers, they didn’t care what we did because
they were billing us by the hour and we weren’t getting a discount on it either. But it was
very contentious. We spent a great deal of time – I don’t know what year it was – we
spent a great deal of time in the courthouse fighting with them” (Ryan, 2015).
Other collected comments related to the NOFA – HRI/ECC law suits:
“The next defining point almost as much as Katrina was the NOFA/HRI lawsuit. Alien
Versus Predator was out at that time, so I did a slide. "No matter who wins, we lose."
That was the tagline in that. So that was kind of the Navy's view of that. He goes, man,
this is bloody” (Garrett, 2015).
But the consequences of NOFA’s legal battle in the court system had other effects, especially
towards supporting ADD’s agenda:
“So what that did was that took HRI basically out of the picture. Dave was working
behind the scenes trying to maintain control as the thing imploded” (Garrett, 2015).
“So that was the defining moment for the decline of NOFA and put them on the ropes.
Because now they are -- the developer they hired is now suing them. So that was
debilitating for them” (Garrett, 2015).
“And now we've got -- and now there are a couple of lawsuits that start flying back and
forth because we don't have the operational funds now to pay the light bill or anything
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else. So these lawsuits become really, really important to the whole story” (Dempsey,
2015).
“But they eventually settled the lawsuits. They bought out HRI. They closed the deal.
HRI walked away with the money and the hotel, so they are still running that. But that's
what kind of brought that to a close...So there really isn't much left of NOFA” (Davis,
2015).
“That law suit became more ammunition, more fodder, for ADD to use to say, hey,
they're fucked up; they can't get their shit together; we've got to step in; we've got
redundant expenses and so forth” (Purpura, 2015).
The lawsuits were eventually settled through the creation of the Joint Development
Committee, governed by a new Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) signed by both NOFA
and ADD.
Resolution: The Joint Development Committee
As mentioned, the embattled protagonists were directed to settle the dispute through the
creation of a CEA, administered under the newly established JDC. The JDC consisted of a board
of directors, with three members each from ADD and NOFA in addition to an appointed
representative from the City of New Orleans and an elected Chairman. The JDC was given full
authority to manage the Federal City project. MARFORRES Deputy Counsel Ron Bald
describes the action:
“But there were different ideas and there was no process for Algiers Development
District and New Orleans Federal Alliance to come to come up with an agreed-upon
answer, so it wasn't until October 2012 that they came up with the second cooperative
endeavor agreement that created a Joint Development Committee where you had a certain
number of votes for each side with additional support from the business community and
appointed by the mayor… and now it kinda makes sense, and you have all the players in
the same place coming to the same meetings voting on the same things and coming to
some type of resolution…you all get your say at the table…there has to be one
answer…everyone is not gonna win all of the time, but you would hope that the process
would lead to the best answers, and the best use of the money, the best use of property,
and I think that's what's happening” (Bald, 2015).
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However, it became apparent that many of the same incumbents that served on the NOFA and
ADD boards during the years of dysfunction now served on the JDC. Critique of the JDC was
captured during the interviews, as expressed by Colonel Davis:
“They should be merging. That becomes this nexus for creating this Joint Development
Council that they push on. That went on for about another year. And the JDC thing was
the idea that, okay, a couple people from NOFA, a couple from ADD. We'll do a joint
board and they'll be the ones that run the project and work together. The NOFA board
was getting pretty disinterested because it's just they are not getting anywhere. They've
got all these hassles and they're not getting anywhere. So I could tell that they were kind
of frustrated” (Davis, 2015).
“The JDC thing really, you know, at the end of the day when you look at the
documentation, ADD is large and in charge. And the JDC really doesn't have any
authority because whatever the JDC does has to be approved by ADD because they have
the money” (Davis, 2015).
However, when City Councilperson Kristen Palmer replaced Jackie Clarkson on the JDC, the
tone of the Committee began to recover somewhat:
“Once they got the JDC established with Kristin Palmer and some other people, that
really became the impetus to settle everything that was going on” (Davis, 2015).
Councilperson Palmer offers her observation regarding the JDC:
“It had already unraveled at that point when I came on. And so I was trying to get us to a
point of bringing it all together to move forward” (Palmer, 2015).
“…it was a mess. Everybody is a piece of the puzzle. Right. My piece is a little different
than most because I already came in when it was just imploding. And I was very
frustrated with it because nobody was putting the mission above themselves. And there
was already so many personalities. It's like it boiled down to the Mize's, the Pres
Kabacoff's, the Jeff Arnold's. Very strong personalities” (Palmer, 2015).
She further offers in the context of the original coalition:
“It had to be destroyed in order to be reborn” (Palmer, 2015).
Unfortunately, despite the JDC’s efforts to attempt to jump start the Federal City project, all
development remained stalled. Subsequent efforts to rebrand the defunct and poisonous project
name “Federal City” into the new “Riverside at Historic Algiers” has also failed to produce any
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progress. The CEA and the JDC did accomplish a few things though: it enabled the buy-out of
HRI/ECC as the project developer; it terminated the sub-lease with NOFA, removing the latter
from all business dealings with the project except for the Parking Garage; and established
somewhat clearer ownership of the project’s future.
Summary
Taken collectively, the complex task of negotiating the Navy lease proved exceptionally
daunting, owing to the nature of the challenge to find compromise from two very distinct
perspectives: that of the federal government representing the macro-level versus that of local
community meso-level. Further, defaulting to ADD to serve as the signatory and recipient of
both land and resources set in motion a series of (seemingly) catastrophic legal events that led to
the coalition’s ultimate demise.
Central to the subsequent legal impasse between NOFA and HRI/ECC, and the friction
between NOFA and ADD, was the inconsistency and vagueness of the original Navy lease.
General Jack Bergman offers some commentary related to this issue that summarizes the
dysfunction neatly. Regarding interpretation of unclear legal agreements, LtGen Bergman offers:
“In any process where you are trying to develop, if you will, an agreement, there is
always arguing about the words. Insert this, delete that, add this. Yes, no, maybe. Let's
go back. What does this really mean in the negotiations? And that's just part of the
process of business. Where it differed here, there was no clear entity in charge. If you
asked NOFA who was in charge, they would say they were. If you asked ADD who was
in charge, they would say they were. If you asked HRI who was in charge, they would
say, I don't know” (Bergman, 2015).
Events were set in motion by unforeseen catalysts that deteriorated the fragile relationships of the
coalition, culminating with complete disintegration of the coalition and a cessation to the Federal
City project. From this perspective, the project was considered a failure in that it was
unsuccessful in achieving the commercial development, despite the early Marine compound
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Phase I success. The last finding captured in the qualitative research which includes views of
success and failure, along with lessons learned will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5E
VIEWS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Introduction
This chapter will explore the information captured during the interviews as they relate to
the differing views of success or failure of the coalition and the Federal City project as a whole.
It will also report common themes and critiques revealed through the research that lend
themselves to a better understanding of the overall consensus of the study respondents as it
relates to the lessons learned through this unique case study.
Owing to the nature of the project’s intent to serve the interests of the Marine Corps
through the planned relocation of the MARFORRES Headquarters across the River to the
Federal City complex, the views of the Marines locally will be described first. Interestingly, all
respondents with a Marine service background universally considered the Federal City project an
abject failure, despite the successful effort to construct a premier state-of-the-art modern facility
for the largest Command in the Marine Corps. The visionary promises of General Mize and
NOFA failed to achieve their lofty goals of the commercial development and housing aspects of
subsequent phases, caused mainly by the circumstances of fate described in previous Chapters.
The Marine perspective:
The overall consensus from the Marine respondents appears to denote a feeling of
overwhelming frustration and disappointment, as reflected in the below comments. However,
these comments must be absorbed while considering the points made earlier concerning the
Marine ethos, character, and ideology. While Marines will normally endure any hardship or
“bad deal” dealt without missing a beat, this was (is) an undercurrent of disillusionment to the
fact that the Federal City prophesy failed to produce the advertised result. While the “troops”
(i.e., the junior enlisted Marines) are not necessarily overtly suffering at the hands of the quasi172

substandard QOL of the West Bank, they are certainly not thriving either. The promises of the
Federal City campaign promising a rebirth of Algiers…a live-work-play utopia whereby the
Marine Staff Sergeant fictionally portrayed in the opening vignette could conceivably pick up
her son after school (on foot), run him by the Baskin-Robins for a quick treat, and drop him off
at the Fitness Center for a couple of hours of intramural basketball while she completed her
workday within the MARFORRES basilica. That is not the case. In today’s atmospherics, the
young son would be able to walk across the street to the sole Subway sandwich shop, purchase
three chocolate cookies for $1.99, and eat them while he meandered to the Ochsner gym where
he would do his homework until his Mom collected him at 1630 when she got off work
(assuming of course they had a paid membership). While a relatively feasible scenario by innercity scenarios, it is hardly utopic, or even close to what the movie trailer prescribed. It is through
the eyes of the hundreds of junior Marines (and sailors) ordered to serve at MARFORRES in
New Orleans that the Federal City campaign must be gauged, not through the eyes of the senior
leadership (e.g., the modern day military “gentry”) that can afford North Shore or Uptown
lifestyles and associated QOL benefits (e.g., good schools, crime-free neighborhoods, etc.).
Recognizing this dynamic, the Marine respondents offered the following commentary
(recognizing that all Marine respondents are senior Marine officers with decades of experience
and an intimate knowledge of New Orleans):
“There was a gap there between the, you know, the promise, the dream, and the outcome
and the reality. You know, we wound up with a goddamn parking garage and this, these
29 acres inside this fence line” (Quinton, 2015).
“I don't think any development has been spurred in Algiers as a result of this headquarters
the way it could have been. Contrary to what was advertised” (Habel, 2015).
“For the most part, I don't think the promise was delivered on” (Habel, 2015).
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“At the end of the day, the parts of Federal City that function are this headquarters, you
know, the Navy Federal Credit Union, which is completely tied to the headquarters here,
you know, a Subway shop that is tied to the fact that people, you know, have to eat lunch
somewhere, and the school. Nothing else has materialized” (Habel, 2015).
“There was supposed to have been multiple restaurants. There was supposed to have
been hotels there…So from the perspective of the military that thought that there would
be a community here that supported this headquarters where we could have large
conferences come in here and we would -- they could stay at a hotel here, walk to this
headquarters. They would not need rental cars. They would be able to have a choice of
eating at various restaurants, none of that ever materialized” (Habel, 2015).
“So they put the hook in us, brought us over here, but then they didn't keep all the
promises” (Maguire, 2015).
“You know, MARFORRES is the anchor tenant and hence the name Federal City. That
should bring in other -- you know, should bring in the Navy, the Army, the Air Force.
That was the vision. That's not what happened” (Tilghman, 2015).
“…the world class facility is not really a world class facility at the end of the day; that the
Federal City project itself goes bankrupt, right, and now there's really nothing over there
for the Marines” (Shy, 2015).
There was (is) a universal recognition that the new MARFORRES Headquarters building, at a
staggering cost of over a $100 million Louisiana tax dollars, is the de facto modern symbol of the
U.S. military in a post-Katrina rebuilt-New Orleans world, but it is a hollow portrayal. Several
respondents echo the point of the new facility’s opulence:
“…the success of NOFA, it was not the establishment of Federal City per se. It was the
building of this headquarters here which became the cornerstone of Federal City, but
really, the only thing that remained on time, on target, you know, on budget” (Habel,
2015).
“That's the best headquarters building I've ever seen in my life. And I'm pretty sure
anybody else that has been in it will tell you the same thing” (Tilghman, 2015).
In summary, the Marines appear quite grateful for the State’s investment in such a
modern convenience that is the MARCORSPTFAC 29-acre “best-place-to-work-ever”
compound. However, to the individual, it appears that they would trade most of the trappings of
grandeur for basic QOL relief such as safer, more affordable places to live, better public schools,
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and, – if it’s not too much to ask - , a local gas station or convenience store whereby you don’t
need an armed guard to pump gas or buy a gallon of milk after dark. In 2015, there were 146

Federal City

Figure 30. 2015 Capital murders in New Orleans

murders in New Orleans, with many within one mile of Federal City (see chart above). Algiers
has hardly demonstrated its ability to be the preferred host to this nation’s most treasured
resource, its Marines.
The Community/City perspective:
Similar in tone to that of the Marines, the perspective of local community leaders also
revealed disappointment regarding the failed promises of Federal City. Former City
Councilperson Kristen Palmer comments:
“My opinion of Federal City is that it is not a success, you know. Basically, Phase I, if
they couldn't build a building for free with hundreds of millions of dollars, then what was
the point? Anybody could have done that. I hate to say it. But, you know, what -- so all
the ancillary projects and economic development and housing failed. So the only people
that were beneficiaries were the Marines” (Palmer, 2015).
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“it was a huge use of public funds and the benefits that were promised have yet to be
seen. And we are at constant threat because the benefits have not been seen” (Palmer,
2015).
“Now, people in Algiers, they just think it's a joke” (Palmer, 2015).
Gregg Habel, retired Marine Colonel and current Executive Director for MARFORRES
(and Algiers Point resident) offers a complementary point of view:
“Algiers itself, I think there was a false expectation on the part of the community at large.
I think they felt… that somehow…this Marine base was going to somehow police the
area, that somehow, you know, crime would drop just because you had Marines stationed
here like we would be out patrolling the streets or something. And so I think there was
some disappointment on the part of the people that live here locally that it did not bring
as great a drop in the crime rate. I don't know if it even brought any drop in the crime
rate” (Habel, 2015).
Additional comments reinforce the sentiment:
“So I think the local community is a little bit frustrated with the lack of the progress…a
lot of frustration with things not coming to fruition --” (Maguire, 2015).
“So it's sucking out of the community into the black hole. And the locals are getting
Heisman'ed as far as their input” (Deckert, 2015).
“Nothing, nothing has happened” (Purpura, 2015).
“I'm very frustrated... I don't believe in one big sexy project flipping a neighborhood
overnight. It just doesn't ever work” (Palmer, 2015).
And lastly, a senior representative from the local developer, HRI, provides a (very) candid
commentary related to the project as a whole:
“This was not a viable business deal…this was the most fucked up public private
partnership I've ever seen…” (Boettner, 2015).
Taken collectively, the data paints quite a clear picture regarding the views of success
and failure from the meso-level. Disappointment and frustration are the most common
descriptions of the Federal City project.
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Federal perspective
However, what was revealed through the interviews was a singular exception to this
overwhelming pattern of veritable project failure: the perspective of the DON BRAC Real
Estate Office in Washington D.C.:
“I look at that building...it might be one of the nicest buildings in the entire department's
inventory to be honest with you. It's a hell of a site” (Preston, 2015).
“From the Navy's perspective, my belief is that if I had to transfer that property, we
would have done an economic development conveyance of some kind. It probably would
not have been redeveloped -- not probably, definitely would not have been redeveloped in
the manner it was redeveloped because there was no money there. At that point in time,
we had just started the financial crisis, so we probably would have wanted to get out at all
costs because it was costing us money to be there. So we probably would have cut the
same type of deal that we cut on the East Bank and just tried to get out of it. So we came
out way, way ahead” (Preston, 2015).
“It's a project I'm proud of. I'm very proud to be involved in that one” (Preston, 2015).
To the DON’s defense, the
comments are most likely in
the context of the alternative
course of action relating to the
original prescribed base
closure of the complete NSA.
His reference to the East Bank
portion of the NSA (shown in
the photo below) was the part
Figure 31. Hebert Defense Complex on Poland Avenue in 2015

that was closed as directed by

BRAC, and handed over to the City of New Orleans via fee simple transfer as soon as the
Marines moved out in the summer of 2011. The historic East Bank property (recall the
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invaluable Port of Embarkation details illustrated in Chapter 7) remains completely shuttered,
chained, inundated with graffiti, and overtaken by five years of Mother Nature’s unyielding
reclamation. The property remains completely undeveloped with little hope of recapitalization a truly sad prologue to a once glorious past. To the DON point, at least the West Bank of the
NSA was provided a fighting chance for survival, albeit unrealized through the mismanagement
of the Federal City campaign by the powers that be.
Use of metaphors and analogies
Throughout the interviews, several common metaphors were used to describe various
points related to the dynamics of the coalition and to the Federal City project. Of primary
interest to this study are the following three metaphors, illustrated within their respective context.
All metaphors are used to convey a particular viewpoint that the respondent attempts to share.
The fear of Federal City failure: “Fort Apache” view
In reference to the lone U.S. cavalry outpost in eastern Arizona during the late 1800s, the
term “Fort Apache”
normally connotes a vision
or sentiment of solitude and
vulnerability in a hostile
unforgiving environment.
As the cavalry posted to the
original Fort had to endure
repeated attacks from angry
Apache natives without
Figure 32. Artwork portraying Ft. Apache in the West during the late 1800s

reinforcement, so too is the

178

fear that the Marines aboard the failed Federal City will become a lone outpost in the
surrounding crime-ridden neighborhoods of Algiers. The original story was captured first in the
famous John Wayne and Henry Fonda feature film of the same title in 1948, and then again in
the popular adaptation “Fort Apache: The Bronx” (1981) film starring Paul Newman, set in an
embattled downtown New York City ghetto. The use of the metaphor to describe the Marines’
plight as it relates to the Federal City project was popular amongst respondents:
“In the end, if for whatever reason, the Federal City project fails and everything here just
turns into Fort Apache as we talked about, I guarantee you ADD will be the first one to
say, ‘it wasn't our fault’” (Bergman, 2015).
“We felt there was no chance Federal City was going to come to anywhere even near a
fraction of fruition to what the vision was and that we would be a nice headquarters with
all the bells and whistles, but it would be Fort Apache in the Bronx because we are
already in a crappy neighborhood. And we thought urban blight would be what we're
surrounded with. Which I believe today is basically what they are still surrounded with
down there” (Tilghman, 2015).
“But the catalyst for the development of the Algiers never took hold, never really got
hold. And so you have all around there -- if you drive all around there, it's just -- it's not
something that you would expect the Marine Corps -- it's like Fort Apache” (Ryan,
2015).
“There were those who wanted the military to stay. They just liked that affiliation with
the military. And then there were those folks who really believed that New Orleans could
benefit from having, you know, campuses like this as opposed to let's say ghettos. I
mean, strong word, but you know, the joke was our concern -- still was and still is -- you
can't have places like this turn into a Fort Apache” (Bergman, 2015).
“...the military was very very concerned that as you know Gerry, that we become Fort
Apache… that we would be the only thing on this piece of land…” (Bald, 2015).
“Part of what the Marine Corps was always afraid of out here was it looking like Fort
Apache in the Bronx, which it's kind of doing that. And if they are having problems here
with crime and all the rest of it, they'll pick up and go to Norfolk” (Dempsey, 2015).
Taken collectively, the comparison of the MARFORRES compound to “Ft Apache” is implied to
be pejorative, and as fate would have it, has materialized as feared.
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References to dogs (Canis lupus familiaris)
Next, a significant amount of reference to “man’s best friend” (an unqualified reference
of course) was captured in the interviews which is worthy of mention. The more popular one is
described first, and is used to portray the disillusionment or dismay of the reality of when a
proponent actually catches its quarry when unprepared for the aftermath. In the context of
NOFA’s initial success of swaying the BRAC Commission decision to approve the Federal City
project:
“Now what? And that's the dog catching the bumper. Fuck, it's steel. So what do you do
with it once you've got it? And with the amount of energy that went in to getting it, there
was an equal lack of energy on what do we do now?” (Deckert, 2015).
“And the single biggest things in all honesty, I believe really the biggest things coming in
and the oceans of lawyers and stuff was all designed mainly to get around the EPA
aspects because every other deal like this around the country could be summed up as the
dog caught the bumper. Once the locals got ahold of whatever, they found out they
couldn't do anything with it because they lost the EPA type protections” (Deckert, 2015).
“They [ADD] are smart enough and savvy enough to know how to work the political
system to derail something, but they are not smart enough to then run something once
they get it. So it's like the dog catching - the bus” (Mize, 2015).
“...we were almost like the dog that caught the bus. The dog that caught the bus, you
know, not the car. It's like, all right, now what do we do?” (Dempsey, 2015).
The suggestion from the use of this metaphor points towards the unpreparedness (or naiveté) of
the broader coalition in having a well-thought out plan for execution of the Federal City project
once the initial success of the BRAC reversal was achieved. As has been discovered thus far,
numerous assumptions, false expectations, and frail relationships conspired to sabotage the
success of the project in the long term. The next two quotes reference dogs in a “protective”
capacity:
“The public sector was in a watchdog role…oversight on top of oversight. ADD was the
watchdog over NOFA; NOFA was the watchdog over HRI” (Boettner, 2015).
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“The way that that was put together was it said that they kind of were our watchdog”
(Dempsey, 2015).
These last three statements also apply the dog metaphor in various descriptive ways to reinforce
their points:
“But the HRI leadership were the bulldogs. They kept pounding us, pounding us,
pounding us. So there was never any, is there a way you would be comfortable” (Garrett,
2015).
“By the time I got there NOFA and the BRAC process had started and they were already
kinda set up and running…and General Mize was clearly the lead sled dog on that
operation, with Jackie in the background providing a lot of support” (Braithwaite, 2015).
“If I was ADD or HRI, I would be applauding NOFA in the early stages. I would be ---sitting back. I would be supporting them. Anything I can do to help you, absolutely. Let
me know if I can make an introduction. And it's like hunting -- bird hunting. Use a dog.
Pure and simple. Get a good dog” (Bergman, 2015).
The coalition as a marriage
Lastly, in the context of describing the coalition during the formation and mobilization
phases, a multi-generational New Orleans resident and retired Marine Colonel that was close to
the NOFA and ADD dynamic offers his colorful analogy:
“She’s hot, I’m horny. This is good” (Deckert, 2015).
“And then you realize at that point that love is not an erection. Love is holding
someone’s hair while they vomit in the toilet. And what we ran into was shortly after
consummation, your vomiting in the toilet annoys the shit out of me and I’m out of here.
So the more mature group is one of, you know, love is taking care of you when you’re
down, not when everything is rolling” (Deckert, 2015).
Notwithstanding the baccalaureate (or Marine) humor in the analogy, it is certainly thought
provoking, if not downright brilliant intellectually, in the context of the complex dynamic of the
coalition’s internal relationships – especially in trying to qualify the curious relationship between
NOFA and ADD.
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Lessons Learned
Respondents were specifically asked to comment on any lessons learned that they felt
that the Federal City experience had enabled. Significant commentary was provided, and the
findings reveal commonality across several patterns. One common theme described the need for
clarity in regards to the overarching Federal City concept/vision, to include the prerequisites for
realism and flexibility. The plan for any type of endeavor such as this should also be unified and
made with a long-term focus, and have complete buy-in from all stakeholders. Some comments:
“Understand that things happen and you need to modify your plan based on what's
happened. That's probably one of the big takeaways. I think that's probably the biggest
ones of all. Things change” (Davis, 2015).
“I think the other takeaway was clarity in the process…I don't think as much clarity was
outside the fence line which led to the lawsuits and the friction points. Things weren't as
clearly defined” (Davis, 2015).
“You cannot take anything for granted…something is going to happen to screw with your
plan. Business is not a pretty thing. Negotiations are not a pretty thing. They are ugly.
But in the end, that is part of the process” (Bergman, 2015).
“You've got to have a plan and you have got to make sure that the partners own up to that
and then put it in writing” (Maguire, 2015).
“I think the keys to success were a true desire by the people of this city and I think that
goes back to the -- to how much they love the military to keep the Marine Corps here”
(Habel, 2015).
“There has to be that one effort of commonality and you've got to put everybody together
in the same place, give them ownership” (Bald, 2015).
Another common theme involved the interaction of people, specifically the need to understand
relationships, roles, motives, and agendas of all stakeholders involved with a coalition and
complex project such as this. Additionally, the need for an enduring “champion” to serve as the
principle advocate for the project throughout its entire life cycle was suggested. Regarding
leadership:
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“The only thing that could have been done was truly to create some leadership, some goal
to aspire to, somebody or whatever to be held accountable to because none of these
entities felt accountable to anybody” (Bergman, 2015).
“Somewhere, people lost track of the ultimate objective as people struggled with their
piece of the pie. What were they getting out of this? And people lost sight on the
ultimate objective. So keeping people tethered to the ultimate objective, having a strong
influence from the city leadership about not allowing people to get off track would have
made this a much more successful project” (Habel, 2015).
“Entities that have succeeded, it's because their leaders were selfless. And it is not
enough to have one selfless leader. You have to have a group of people who believe that
their purpose for being together is greater than who they are as individuals or even who
they are as a group of individuals” (Bergman, 2015).
“I think keys to success were identifying an early champion for this cause” (Habel, 2015).
“So the key is you have to find the right people with the right desire, strength, fortitude,
to push an issue that they believe in” (Bald, 2015).
“Everybody has an equity, everybody has a piece of ownership, everybody is part of the
solution, as well as part of the problem if something goes wrong. I’m a big believer in
you have to have skin in the game in order to care… so if you're not at the table, you’re
not gonna care…” (Bald, 2015).
Regarding the need for City and State leadership throughout the entire process:
“We should have had the mayor's office involved from the get-go. And I don't know,
they might tell you that he tried because he's the chairman of the mayor's military
advisory committee” Dempsey, 2015).
“We should have been better at getting more of the local people involved because when it
came time to reach out politically, we didn't have the reach” (Dempsey, 2015).
“...instead of just letting the ADD being our pass through, we should have said to the
Navy -- we should go get a special thing in the State legislature that recognizes us...let's
get ourselves recognized as the entity that's going to do this. And then we wouldn't have
had that association with the ADD at all” (Dempsey, 2015).
Understanding roles and motives…
I think first it was helpful to understand the roles of all the parties… I think you really
had to understand the motives of the other parties” (Shy, 2015).
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“It’s important to just keep reminding yourself of what those objectives are, what the
parameters are, and what the motives of the other side are and what their fears are” (shy,
2015).
Lastly, the need for the backing of the community and the importance of community
involvement:
“The dedication of the people involved…the strong feelings that there needed to be a
military presence in New Orleans and that very important people with access to highranking politicians forced that issue. I think that's probably the number one thing; the
drive of the people involved…” (Bald, 2015).
“I think there should have been more community engagement at every step of the way”
(Palmer, 2015).
Taken together, the lessons learned that tumbled out of the interviews were quite logical,
and appeared to address the concerns articulated in the exacting critiques described earlier.
Summary
The common themes and causal factors associated with the aforementioned views of
success and failure that surfaced in the interviews can be summarized as follows: impact of local
politics; change in scope of ADD’s role; the rigidity of the Master Plan; the deliberate vagueness
within the Navy lease; lack of clarity regarding the long-term governance and management of
Federal City; the complexities associated with the coalition’s relationships, and an overall lack of
City and State leadership. These ideas, among others identified in previous chapters, will be
expanded upon in greater detail within the Conclusions chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION
Overview
The analysis chapter consists of two main elements, each of which reveals insight into
answering the two principle research questions. The chapter will first attempt to integrate the
themes discussed in the findings chapters as they relate to the coalition life cycle and the Federal
City project’s post-mortem pathology. The second part will explore these same revelations but
through the lenses of the modern theories that were offered for analysis during the earlier
sections of this paper. Restating the research questions for the reader:
(1) What circumstances, conditions, or events led to the early success and subsequent failure of
the Federal City project? What contributing factors led to the evolution of the coalition life
cycle?
(a) What were the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the coalition and the project?
(b) What lessons can be learned from the NOFA/Federal City experience that can inform
future military base closure efforts such as this?
(2) What contemporary theories (e.g., ACF, PET, NPF, GM, etc.) explain the dynamics of the
coalition during the various phases of its life cycle and to what extent?
Summary Discussion of the Pathology of the Coalition’s Life Cycle (By Phase)
Formation Phase (“We love our military…”)
To begin, the information presented in the earlier Findings chapters – taken collectively –
reveal significant insight into this case study. First, the cultural history of New Orleans, to
include centuries of military integration into the fabric of its society, played a large part in
shaping the motivation for the City to fight to maintain a local military presence.
After surviving numerous previous BRAC fears, the looming 2005 BRAC threat of the
NSA base closure prompted NOFA’s birth. At the core of the NOFA movement was Marine
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Major General David Mize, the recognized champion. His leadership skills coupled with his
knowledge of the political dynamics of DOD and, to a lesser extent, of New Orleans allowed him
to maneuver effectively at the federal level.
Both State and City leadership recognized the economic impact of the military’s presence
in NOLA and provided overt support to General Mize and NOFA. Through formal venues such
as the Mayor’s Military Advisory Council, many senior Marine leaders during the 1990s and
early 2000s coordinated with City and State officials to seek relief to quality of life (QOL) issues
for military personnel stationed in New Orleans. Poor public schools, expensive insurance, and
high crime rates (to name just a few examples) have been continuously associated with New
Orleans’ reputation as an undesirable duty station. One of the early Federal City design
principles was aimed to mitigate these QOL issues through the establishment of a positive livework-play community ecosystem in Algiers.
New Orleans governing subsystems, the product of centuries of cultural influences, began
to influence the coalition’s behavior early on. Specifically, the effective use of politics to
galvanize the growing power of the local coalition towards a Save-The-Base narrative was a
clearly observable tenet that led to early coalition success.
Mobilization Phase (“Damn the Feds…”)
Actual publication of the DOD BRAC Recommendations in May of 2005 was the forcing
function that mobilized the coalition into kinetic action. The loose network tightened quickly
and brought significant political forces to bear on DON and DOD via the Louisiana legislators in
Congress in seeking relief to the base closure. General Mize, the focal point for the effort,
exploited his network of elite military and legislative contacts at the Pentagon and on the Hill to
raise awareness of the New Orleans reclama effort.
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Driven primarily by Mize, the Federal City proposal was developed as a viable alternate
course of action to full NSA base closure. NOFA, along with its abundant public and private
allies, developed the Federal City argument, the elite politicians sold it to the BRAC
Commission during the local testimony, and the proposal was successfully accepted with three
principle conditions: the State of Louisiana had to make good on its pledge of $150M to fund
the project, groundbreaking for the project had to occur prior September 30, 2008, and the NSA
had to officially close by September 15, 2011.
At this point, it was observed that all local factions had subordinated their micro-level
agendas for the broader meso-level goal of convincing the federal government to stave off the
complete base closure by offering an alternative reutilization of the property through the Federal
City proposal. The coalition was completely in synch; no evidence of fractures were detected
whatsoever. All factions within the coalition saw the potential for the Federal City
vision…albeit naively. The adversaries at this point were the Department of Defense and the
BRAC Commission. After the successful campaign to change the BRAC language to enable the
Federal City project to proceed, the entire region was sent into chaos on the heels of Hurricane
Katrina, just days later. The Mobilization Phase marks the highlight of the coalition’s political
power, as evidenced by what a unified, organized, and well-led disparate group can accomplish
when in complete synchronization.
Sustainment Phase (“New Orleans is resilient…”)
Following a brief respite due to Katrina, the coalition reunited and again resumed their
campaign, but this time the adversary was the Department of the Navy, the landowner of the
NSA property. Katrina’s effect on the coalition and the Federal City project were quite varied.
Positive effects included an overwhelming national sympathy towards the region, which included
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overt federal political support and associated funding towards efforts associated with the
rebuilding of New Orleans, physically and emotionally. Negative effects, beyond the obvious
horrific loss of life and property, included delays in project resumption, dramatic increases in
construction costs to include fierce competition over materiel resources, and limitations related
to qualified developers willing to vie for the Federal City project. It is unclear whether or not the
project would have fared any better had Katrina not occurred. Complicating the matter
somewhat, the U.S. military was still heavily committed to prosecuting the ongoing war in Iraq
and Afghanistan, while contending at home with the Administration’s Budget Control Act, also
referred to as sequestration. The senior level DON attention and support provided to the Federal
City saga may very well have been categorized as “noise” had not Katrina thrust New Orleans
onto center stage of world events.
However, the overarching narrative in support of the Federal City project did shift from
Save-the-Base to Rebuild New Orleans as a direct result of Katrina. Each narrative was used in
driving actor behavior towards political agendas, especially that of the coalition’s. Of significant
importance, the Navy’s untimely departure from New Orleans was observed to be a very
emotionally sensitive topic, apparently having a lasting impact on the city’s legacy impression of
the military. Although the Navy’s argument to realign its century-old presence to other locations
within the U.S. (Norfolk, VA and Millington, TN) was arguably legitimate due to the operational
and strategic reasons noted earlier, the timing couldn’t have been more damaging to both the
Navy’s reputation and to the raw injury just sustained by the citizens of New Orleans from
Katrina’s wrath. However, it is clear that the senior Marine leadership – fully integrated socially
into the local New Orleans culture – displayed the classic Marine character that decries their
motto, Semper Fidelis, by not abandoning their host city in their time of need. Evidence is
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overwhelming that Marine culture weighed heavily on their decision to stay in New Orleans even
though they had the opportunity (like the Navy) to resist the Federal City proposal post-Katrina
and relocate to an alternate location in the U.S. such as Norfolk or Quantico, or accept the Belle
Chase option. Conversely, Navy leadership apparently held no such loyalty or obligation to the
city of New Orleans in the context of remaining in town or even delaying the BRAC process to
relocate. This action speaks to the senior Naval leadership’s intent to realign their forces in
accordance with their strategic desires, despite the tragedy that just befalled the region. Again,
the qualitative research reveals a distinct difference in military service ideologies: Marine
leadership felt emotionally obligated to stay and rebuild with their host city, while Navy
leadership felt unemotionally obligated to fulfill their original intent to realign their forces
strategically. I believe this is directly attributable to the fact that the Marine senior leadership
had been fully integrated into the local New Orleans society while the Navy senior leadership
had not. Specifically, Major Generals Livingston, Dave Mize, Wilkerson, Lieutenant Generals
McCarthy, Jack Bergman, John Kelly, Steve Hummer, Rich Mills, and Rex McMillian had all
physically lived in New Orleans over the past two decades, embracing the local culture and fully
feeling that they were a part of the local society. Conversely, Admiral Cotton, while
Commander of the Naval Reserve Force in New Orleans, lived and worked from Washington,
D.C. Consequently, his non-integration locally allowed for a truly objective perspective and, to
the detriment of New Orleans, allowed for a rather non-emotional reaffirmation on the part of the
Navy to follow through with the BRAC exit strategy for the Navy Commands. Their hasty
departure will be starkly remembered by segments of the New Orleans community, mostly
within Algiers. For the West Bank citizens, the omnipresence of the faded Navy water tower is a
harsh reminder to that legacy. However, regardless of the philosophical and ideological
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elements associated with the Navy and Marine leadership’s decisions, the fact remains that the
Navy left and the Marines stayed.
In the subsequent years, the required Lease negotiations with the Navy along with the
catastrophic outcome, was the single most relevant action that impacted both the project and the
coalition’s solvency. The lengthy and heated negotiations revealed the differing agendas and
viewpoints of the varied factions: NOFA was driven to accommodate the Marine headquarters
with suitable facilities, but with an eye towards saving as much capital as possible for the
revenue-acquiring commercial development portion of the project. Conversely, the DON and
HQMC attorneys were striving to bolster the Marine compound and facilities with as much as
possible, owing mostly to fears of what would happen should the commercial development
element of the project fail (which is exactly what happened). Add into this equation the lack of
complete recognition that NOFA was the state agent for these negotiations led to further delays
and clarity. With time running out on the approaching BRAC-imposed deadline, senior State
and DON leadership were compelled to get involved to force the settlement between the
negotiating parties. Consequently, the remaining lease impasses were intentionally left vague in
order to allow for factional concession towards a compromised solution, resulting in issues later
on.
Politics again reigned supreme during this phase, as actors postured their positions in
accordance with their prescribed organization’s interests. The highlight of this phase, and the
ultimate root cause of the coalition’s subsequent fragmentation, was the last-minute change by
the Secretary of the Navy Counsel’s office to not allow NOFA to sign the lease on behalf of the
State. With no time to coordinate formal Louisiana legislation to properly anoint NOFA as their
legal representative, the Governor defaulted to designating ADD as their signatory for the lease,
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and as the recipient for all State funds for the Federal City project. For years, NOFA and the
State were operating under the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between NOFA
and LED, with the latter document stating that NOFA was the State’s agent for all negotiations
regarding Federal City. The SECNAV Counsel, the final decision authority for DON, apparently
determined that this MOU was not of sufficient legislative authority so as to allow for a 75-year
lease with a non-profit organization that could dissolve at any time.
Up until this point, ADD, led by Jeff Arnold, had been in a supporting role to NOFA, was
not truly engaged in the details of the negotiations, but had provided political support where
applicable at the local level. Even after the change in governance, the intent was still for ADD to
function as a pass-through element, and not as a major decision-making player within the
coalition. However, the associated power shift created by this Navy decision was the beginning
of the end of the coalition, although the effects would not be realized for several years. Since
this action completely changed the governance architecture of the project, the coalition quickly
adjusted their plan by creating a sub-lease to NOFA to execute the project’s Master Plan.
Concurrently, NOFA was in the throes of developer selection and was forced, again by lack of
time, to select HRI/ECC, the sole legitimate developer capable of fulfilling the role. HRI/ECC
was subsequently integrated into their sub-lease contract with NOFA.
This phase is again wrought with political maneuvering, the outcome of which set the
conditions for factional agenda pursuits, particularly with ADD’s instant rise to power and
NOFA’s corresponding decline from power. With local politicians now in complete control of
both the land and the funding for the project, disaster was inevitable. The subsequent fee simple
transfer simply amplified ADD’s consolidation of power, turning over complete land title of a
large portion of the Federal City property to Jeff Arnold.
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Once the construction of the major Phase I facilities were complete, the coalition’s seams
were exploited by ADD, and the covert – and then overt – actions to eradicate NOFA from the
project began to take shape. As ADD accumulated its own development experts and attorneys
using the Federal City project funding, the claim that NOFA was an unnecessary redundant
activity and had outlived its usefulness in regards to the Federal City project became a common
theme.
Fragmentation Phase (“You reap what you sew…”)
NOFA’s problems with its developer also began to worsen during this time, again with
individual political agendas surfacing. HRI/ECC’s determination to squeeze all possible profit
from the vague lease arrangements despite an absence of investment of their own funds led to
law suits with NOFA. Additionally, this showdown between NOFA and HRI continued to bleed
public funds in attorney’s fees and court costs, meanwhile playing right into ADD’s argument
that NOFA couldn’t even control their own developer.
While NOFA was embroiled with its legal battle with HRI, ADD increased their efforts
to further emasculate NOFA by starving them of operating funds. Again, due to the vagueness
of the lease and other informal arrangements/agreements with ADD and the State, NOFA was
powerless to challenge or repel ADD’s attacks. Owing to the nature of ADD’s existence as a
State entity, along with its composition primarily consisting of local politicians sitting on various
State Committees and Boards, seeking relief through the State court system was not possible.
Again, local (and State) politics greatly fostered the coalition’s fragmentation, creating an
unfair advantage for ADD, an entity driven mostly by local politicians and local politics.
General Mize’s initial apprehension during the formation phase as expressed to the Mayor and
Governor was fully realized, to his unfortunate dismay. Due to sustained political pressure to
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settle the dispute, the law suits were summarily dismissed, the leases terminated, the developer
bought out, a new CEA developed, and the JDC created. The CEA essentially removed NOFA
from any direct control of the project, relegating their organization to a three-member
contribution to the new JDC’s board of directors.
General Mize was subsequently removed from NOFA’s leadership position through a
board vote. NOFA no longer had the operating funds to afford his salary, nor was he
empowered to execute his previously assigned duties due to the CEA’s provisions. The founding
father of the Federal City project was essentially dismissed without so much as a “Thank You”
from what was left of the coalition; the same coalition that would not have even received a
returned phone call from the BRAC Commission a decade ago, let alone a formal audience for a
reclama.
The JDC, along with its NOFA and ADD components, has remained stagnant despite
early optimism for a resurgence in the rebranded Riverside at Historic Algiers effort.
Furthermore, even with the unanimous selection of a new developer, Vista Louisiana, last year
(2015), the project has failed to mature due to internal JDC squabbling, active and passive
resistance, and unconventional requests for financial information from the developer. Should the
proposed sale of the property not proceed and the Riverside deal become scuttled, the cycle will
once again have repeated itself.
Contemporary Theory Analysis
In addressing the second question, each of the theories described earlier in the paper have
been subjectively mapped across each of the coalition life cycle phases utilizing the below color
gradient color scheme reflecting activity levels (Figure 9.1). As the reader can observe, the color
green represents normal activity while dark red represents the highest possible activity level.
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Normal activity is defined as status quo behavior; conversely, high activity is defined as
abnormal behavior caused by any internal or external catalyst. In the methodology of describing
each theory’s activity by phase, the portrayed color profile will be supported by a narrative
which will reinforce the illustration.

NORMAL ACTIVITY

HIGH ACTIVITY

Figure 33. Activity Scale

Advocacy Coalition Framework
As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the ACF are:




Actors engaging in politics to translate their beliefs into action
Main focus is the subsystem
Focus is on how the coalition interprets and responds to events as external or internal
shock
Recall that the ACF focuses its study on identifying the shared ideologies of the belief

subsystems and relationships of the actors involved or associated with the particular coalition, or
network. The literature suggests that the ACF focuses on myriad of topics from the
organizational structure and stability (or instability) of coalitions, their core actors, supporting
belief systems, and overall dynamics of their formation, sustainment, and decay over the
lifecycle of their existence. Within the framework of the ACF, a core focus of analysis is on
policy evolution in the context of the belief systems. The ACF offers four distinct conceptual
pathways to policy change: (1) external source; (2) internal events; (3) policy-oriented learning;
and (4) negotiated agreement between previously warring parties. Of the four, the first pathway,
external source, is very similar to a major “punctuation” in Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
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(PET) in that it serves as a forcing function for a significant policy shift. The latter key factor is
very much akin to the policy entrepreneurs designated with the Multiple Streams Analysis
(MSA), exploiting the event-produced MSA “policy window”. These external events are also a
central element and requirement of both the PET and MSA concepts and theories. These
external events, such as natural or man-made disasters, increase the likelihood of major policy
change but require several enabling factors such as the mobilization of advocacy coalitions,
utilizing compelling narratives to garner overwhelming political support to attract attention.
Based on the findings and analysis to date, it is clear to see the parallels between the ACF tenets
and the formation of NOFA in response to multiple BRAC attacks culminating with the 2005
BRAC decision to close the NSA (a secondary external event). An important consideration
within this synthesis of complementary theories is the direct impact Hurricane Katrina had on the
coalition’s ability to garner significant public support, and, more importantly, its use in appealing
to a whole new set of powerful actors (with resources) owing to the national attention received
by the disaster. The New Orleans political subsystem was the primary vehicle by which the
coalition translated their collective beliefs into action, motivated initially by the repeated external
BRAC threats, and then again in response to Katrina, another external threat. As the chart below
illustrates, the ACF theory played heavily during the mobilization and sustainment phases,
waned during the transition to the fragmentation phase, and then began to reappear as the Joint
Development Committee formed and rebranded the effort into the replacement New Orleans
Riverside at Historic Algiers project. Additionally, ACF also claims that individuals are
motivated by beliefs and prone to devil shift, a concept shared with NPF in which actors tend to
“exaggerate malicious motives, behaviors, and influence of opponents” (Sabatier, Weible, 2014),
which accounts for the NOFA, ADD, and HRI/ECC conflict. Further, contemporary

195

understanding by scholars of shared policy beliefs is an advocacy coalition’s “glue”. In the
Federal City case study, the coalition had the shared belief of preventing full base closure
initially, a motivation that certainly held to the “glue” standard. Unfortunately, time was the
solvent that weakened the glue and allowed the actors to default to their fundamental core belief
subsystems.
Coalition Stage
F o rm a t io n

2003

2004

M o biliza t io n

2005

S us t a inm e nt

2006

2007

2008

F ra gm e nt a t io n

2009

2 0 10

2 0 11

2 0 12

2 0 13

2 0 14

Joint Development
Committee

New Orleans Federal Alliance

Figure 34. Advocacy Coalition Framework

Multiple Streams Analysis
As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the MSA are:




Interactions between wide group of actors in a policy community to refine solution
policy entrepreneurs searching for right time to propose solutions
Focusing events shift attention to the problem
Recall from the literature review whereby the Multiple Streams Approach, or MSA, was

described as a popular framework that explains or attempts to understand the dynamics of how
government policies are created under ambiguous conditions. Through the identification and
analysis of three core streams related to a particular paradigm – problem streams, policy streams,
and politics streams – the creation of policy windows occur, enabling the opportunity for policy
change on a system level through the manipulation of policy entrepreneurs. The aforementioned
five structural elements constitute the interaction of the Multiple Streams Framework.
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The problem stream constitutes various contemporary issues and/or conditions that
policymakers and lobbyists want addressed. Examples span across the full spectrum of the
political landscape, from environmental disaster recovery to inflation to budget crises. Focusing
events such highly publicized events by the media (e.g., terrorist attacks, trade union strikes, etc.)
serve to draw public attention to these problems. The policy stream includes the conglomeration
of shared ideas, concepts, ideologies, or concerns throughout various organizational networks of
proponents involved with the particular problem. This commonality bridges the disparate
communities (e.g., academics, bureaucrats, politicians, technical specialists, etc.) and varies in
depth and resolve depending upon the particular problem faced, both technically and temporally.
The politics stream consists of three supporting elements - the national mood, individual lobbies,
and individual government position transition/turnover. According to Nikolaos Zahariadis in his
essay on MSA, “of the three elements in the political stream, the combination of the national
mood and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on agenda” (Sabatier, 34).
Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, as these first three elements converge during focusing
events, policy windows are created within the particular political stream. As an example, tragic
events such as an offshore oil spill an oil rig explosion will immediately bring national attention
to the petroleum exploration and development debate. Lastly, the policy entrepreneurs are
poised to exploit the situation once a window is created, furthering their individual or group’s
goals or objectives.
In the context of the Federal City project, the initial problem stream was the BRAC
closure threat to the New Orleans NSA. The policy stream reflected the formation of NOFA and
its coalition partners through their shared ideas related to the Federal City concept as a response
to the threat. The politics stream, which reflects the national mood, individual lobbies, and
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individual government position, greatly influenced the creation of the policy window once
Katrina hit New Orleans. This policy window enabled the immediate opportunity for policy
change on the system level through the manipulation of the project’s principle policy
entrepreneurs, General Mize (along with NOFA). Later, another pivotal policy window was
created with the Navy’s fateful decision to force ADD to act as the signatory for the lease. This
enabled Jeff Arnold to serve as a policy entrepreneur, assuming control of the project and
associated resources. The below chart (Figure 9.3) graphically depicts the MSA activity level
across the coalition’s life cycle, illustrating the principle policy windows created by Katrina and
the lease governance change.

Coalition Stage
F o rm a t io n

2003

2004

M o biliza t io n
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S us t a inm e nt

2006

2007

2008

F ra gm e nt a t io n

2009

Katrina

2 0 10

2 0 11

2 0 12

2 0 13

2 0 14

ADD Takeover

Figure 35. Multiple Streams Analysis

Narrative Policy Framework
As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the NPF are:






Measures how narratives effect policymaking
Setting, characters, plot, and moral
Situated within the meso level of subsystems
Context important
Events treated as focusing events
Recall from the literature review in which it was offered that, within the overarching

framework of the individual advocacy coalitions, focused narratives are developed to describe
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the issue or problem seeking address. To further inform the relationship, Sabatier reveals
“Advocacy coalitions engage in narrative strategies in an attempt to successfully influence the
public’s and decision-makers’ policy preferences” (Sabatier, 2014).
Restating the NPF tenets, four policy narrative core elements are used to organize and
define the particular context of the issue – the policy setting or “stage”, the characters or actors
(e.g., heroes, villains, and/or victims), the plot of the story, and lastly, the “moral of the story”.
Additional description of the NPF include its core assumptions: social construction (i.e., the
“meaning” assigned by humans to the policy); bounded relativity (i.e., the boundaries of the
particular belief system); a simultaneous operation at three levels (individual/micro, group/meso,
and institutional/macro); and the homo narrans model of the individual (i.e., how individuals
absorb and process information) (Sabatier, 2014). In the context of the Federal City project,
these tenets are clearly illustrated: General Mize, NOFA, and the Marines as the heroes, Jeff
Arnold, ADD, HRI, and the Navy as the villains; plots (and subplots) of the latter abandoning the
city in its time of need and the former covertly (and then overtly) sabotaging NOFA’s efforts for
political and financial gain; and all occurring across all three levels (micro-, meso-, and macro-)
simultaneously. On a colorful side note, it has been suggested by many that the Federal City
story, with all of its twists, turns, backstories, and conspiracies, be sold to television producers
(perhaps HBO) and turned into a mini-series. Hollywood has got nothing on New Orleans when
it comes to drama.
As the below chart depicts, the NPF plays a large role throughout the entire coalition life
cycle, especially during the first two phases in which the Save the Base and then Rebuild New
Orleans narratives are used extensively by the coalition as a rallying cry to garner political
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support. However, the actual narratives have a lesser influence towards the latter years of the
sustainment phase even though the plots, heroes, villains, and conflicts surface significantly.

Coalition Stage
F o rm a t io n
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2004

"Save The Base"

M o biliza t io n

2005

S us t a inm e nt

2006

2007

2008

F ra gm e nt a t io n

2009

2 0 10

2 0 11

2 0 12

2 0 13

2 0 14

"New Orleans
Riverside at Historic
Algiers"

"Rebuild New Orleans"

Figure 36. Narrative Policy Framework

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the PET are:





Subsystems are a source of stability, power, and policy continuity for long periods
Instability and major change born from interactions between policy subsystems and
macro-political system
Unpredictable
Major events as catalysts
Much like MSA, the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) is a popular and powerful

policy system analytical tool. Recall that PET generally characterizes or explains system level
policy as constantly evolving over time as societal ideological changes drive the political system
to modify the status quo to keep pace. Throughout this continuous ebb-and-flow of minor policy
change, major “punctuations” or significant external events occur, forcing a paradigm shift and
associated changes to system policy on a national level. An historical example of punctuation
would be the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, forcing the U.S. government’s change in its
decade-old Western Pacific policy/strategy of Japanese containment into a declaration of war
against the attackers. A recent example of punctuation is the infamous and tragic terrorist attack
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on 9/11. While the national security strategy and U.S. citizen’s rights have evolved in tandem,
the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon enabled the national legislative response of
the Patriot Act, changing system policy in such a dramatic fashion that would have never
occurred without the punctuation. Moving forward to the present, the U.S. foreign policy as it
relates to the Middle East has steadily evolved in concert with the emerging threat of ISIS.
However, a significant change in national policy will not occur without a further dramatic
punctuation, such as ISIS acquiring and detonating a dirty bomb on U.S. soil, killing thousands,
as an extreme example.
In relation to the Federal City project, the punctuation was Hurricane Katrina. Its epic
effects on New Orleans, and on the nation, are still felt today. As illustrated in detail within the
Narrative Shift chapter earlier, Katrina’s principle contribution to the project was the resultant
national (and global) sympathy shown the people of New Orleans, along with an enormous flow
of recovery aid, measured in resources, labor, and political support. Arguably, the punctuation
enabled the project to proceed initially, but then, as the theory proffers, the political system
returned to normalcy. The latter revealing the cracks in the coalition which ultimately led to its
demise. The chart below (Figure 9.5) illustrates these points.
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Figure 37. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
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2 0 14

Growth Machine Theory
As described earlier during the literature review, the principle tenets of the GM Theory
are:



Coalitions of land-based elites, tied to the economic possibilities of place, drive urban
politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth
Places localities in chronic competition with one another; at their own risk

As discussed previously, in most modern capitalist societies, the commodification of land
and associated improvements (e.g., buildings) have enabled urban areas to serve as a principle
arena for property entrepreneurs, public entities, and other civic institutions to maximize
investment return through coordinated developmental ventures. Generally accepted literature
suggests that virtually all U.S. cities are dominated by a small, parochial elite comprised of
public and private members having business and/or professional interests linked to the
development and economic growth of their respective locales. Molotch (1988) suggests that
these elites use their public authority and private power as a means to stimulate local economic
development to enhance/further their individual business interests. Furthermore, this dynamic
essentially transitions cities into fluid instruments, or growth machines, to enhance the personal
wealth of elites through the accomplishment of associated growth goals and development
projects. The growth machine thesis contends that these local elite “place entrepreneurs” form a
virtual political coalition that lead collective efforts to further economic activity aimed to
increase the “exchange value” of local urban real estate (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Kirkpatrick
and Smith (2011) describe this coalition as a forged alliance between formerly disparate groups
with conflicting perspectives, but with a common goal of a pro-growth ideology that associates
urban growth with community prosperity. The resiliency of the growth machine is directly tied
to the resiliency of the supporting coalition that exploits it.
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This paper substantiates that the coalition that formed to pursue the Federal City vision was
in fact a de facto growth machine by the very definition just offered. The prophesy called for the
aphorism "a rising tide lifts all boats" pro-growth ideology aimed to enable a resurgence in the
Algiers community prosperity, in addition to creating an ecosystem that would resolve, or at a
minimum mitigate, the quality of life issues that have plagued the military personnel within New
Orleans for decades. The initial successes of the coalition in this campaign was short-lived
however, as the common goal of pro-growth dissipated in the face of factional agendas and
associated behavior driven by individual political subsystems. However, as the life cycle of the
coalition concluded with a dramatic end to the fragmentation phase, the die is re-cast with
different circumstances under the JDC’s oversight that may allow for the life cycle to begin
again. This time, the growth machine construct will be a more conventional public-private
partnership and not complicated by external punctuations, policy windows, or federal agency
negotiations to contend with. The New Orleans Riverside at Historic Algiers will remain a local
project, coordinated by local authorities, funded through traditional private developer resources,
and in accordance with a Master Plan derived from well-informed market research.
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Figure 38. Growth Machine Theory
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2 0 11

2 0 12

2 0 13

2 0 14

Re-attempt to develop
Federal City (Phase II)

Summary of Theory Observations
Taken individually, no one theory explains the dynamic of the coalition’s complete life
cycle, its motivations, its relationships, nor its inherent characteristics. However, when applied
collectively, each theory contributes to a better understanding of what occurred, why it occurred,
and the root causes of the ultimate demise. This case study also serves as a contemporary
example to better understand the principle concepts of each of the theories discussed in practical
terms. Hurricane Katrina is as perfect an example of a punctuation as one could design; the
demonstrated use of the New Orleans political subsystem and its positive and adverse effects is a
wonderful example of a policy stream; Save the Base and Rebuild New Orleans are perfect
examples of powerful narratives; and the two polarized protagonist-antagonist personalities of
David Mize and Jeff Arnold serve as textbook examples of the hero and villain in the storied plot
of the Federal City campaign.
Root Cause Analysis
As an additive perspective to better understand the relationships amongst the varied
factors that contributed to the coalition’s evolution through its life cycle, a popular and quite
useful technique will be borrowed from the technical field of manufacturing quality control,
specifically the use of the Ishikawa, or fishbone, diagram. Developed by the famous Japanese
scholar and noted father of the field of quality control, this visual analytical framework has been
widely used for decades within numerous industries to aid in better understanding cause-effect
relationships. The following paragraph describes the methodology.
Traditionally, the primary result that the cause-effect contributors are designed to reveal
through the analysis is depicted by the main trunk arrow in the diagram. Five main “bones” are
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drawn from this main spine, each representing one of the “5M” categories – Man, Method,
Machine, Measurement, and Material. While these categories are no absolute and can be
modified as required in deference to supporting the principle result sought, they are a sufficient
METHOD
(Master Plan)

MAN
(Major Actors)

CAUSE
(How did X contribute
to the result?)

Flawed Assumptions

Behavior
Culture
Poorly Socialized
Culture

Motivation

Did Not Modernize

Unachievable

Lease Negotiations

Law

No Real Audits

RESULT
(Why did the Federal
City Project Fail?)

Deadlines
Coalition Conflict

ADD
Contracts

No Options

Control of Resources

Agenda

Poor Market
Analysis

Agenda
Agreements
Culture

Coalition Conflict
Not Binding

MEASUREMENT

NEW ORLEANS FEDERAL
CITY PROJECT
MACHINE
(Means)

MATERIALS
(Money/Land)

Ishikawa Diagram
(Root-Cause Analysis)

Figure 39. Ishikawa Diagram

starting point to begin the analysis. In this case, four of the traditional 5Ms have been substituted
with a similarly related “M” to better identify with the Federal City project’s scope. Specifically,
the five “Ms” are Major Actors (Man), Master Plan (Method), Means (Machine), Money/Land
(Material), and Measurement. From these, supporting “bones” are identified by asking the
simple question “how did X contribute to the result.” As an example (referring to the diagram
below), the root causes of “how did the Master Plan contribute to the Federal City project’s
failure” are determined to be Flawed Assumptions, Poor Socialization, and Did Not Modernize.
Each of these root causes can be further refined by delving deeper into each cause until the roots
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are satisfactorily identified. Upon completion, the diagram provides a useful holistic portrayal of
the root-cause architecture of the result. In this case, the illustrated root-causes easily
corroborate the findings established through the coding analysis previously derived from the
qualitative data collected from the research. Of interest, note that culture, politics, and behavior
are a common root-cause within the diagram.
Summary
As highlighted by the individual theoretical explanations, the Federal City project and the
coalition designed to bring it to fruition, was seemingly doomed for failure from the start. Had
more conscious thought been given during the coalition’s formation phase related to a long-term
plan for the project, many of the identified pitfalls could possibly have been avoided. However,
even with pure hindsight, no one could have predicted the reversal of fortune by the Navy’s
Counsel unwitting decision to empower ADD over NOFA. All factions within the coalition
demonstrated behavior commensurate with their individual belief subsystem, based on local
culture, born from decades of local history, and influenced by overarching narratives.
Conclusions and recommendations will be covered in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
In summary, based on the findings and subsequent analysis, is appears that eventual
coalition fragmentation and project failure was inevitable, based on several conditions and events
that occurred over time. Numerous keys to early success were identified, as well as several
doorways to eventual failure. Each is briefly summarized below:
Keys to Success
1). There was an identified and universally recognized coalition/project champion, General
David Mize, who possessed a substantial network of federal, state, and local contacts (both
political and social).
2). A common goal/agenda was established that enabled the champion to galvanize and mobilize
all elements of the coalition to resist the BRAC threat and advocate the Federal City project.
3). The BRAC reclama and associated Federal City proposal was well coordinated at the local,
state, and federal levels.
4). The champion and the coalition had the overt backing of both the Mayor of New Orleans and
the Governor of Louisiana, but only initially.
5). Although unforeseen, Hurricane Katrina provided significant national sympathy, which
enabled federal political and financial support to the project’s solvency.
Doorways to Failure
1). Despite the Memorandum of Understanding between LED and NOFA for the latter to serve
as the agent for the State in Federal City negotiations, NOFA was not officially recognized
via State legislation in the eyes of the SECNAV Counsel.
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2). Various Louisiana politicians (State and local) did not honor informal agreements made with
General Mize and NOFA related to enduring political or financial support.
3). SECNAV Counsel’s unwillingness to sign the EUL with NOFA was the pivotal event that
led to the coalition power shift and NOFA’s eventual demise.
4). The State’s decision to authorize ADD to serve as lessee of the Navy EUL and “banker” of
the project State megafund created the conditions for ADD’s rise to omnipotence.
5). Several flawed assumptions with the original Master Plan contributed to problems during
execution; The Master Plan was unsocialized, unrealistic, and did not modernize as the
situation changed.
6). The influence of the New Orleans culture and political subsystem was grossly
underestimated in the context of predictive behavior for the varied coalition actors
representing different factions.
7). As time progressed, coalition actor behavior defaulted to core factional agendas and
individual motivations, conflicting with the overarching goal of the coalition.
8). There was an observable lack of City/State leadership during the sustainment and
fragmentation phases, which permitted ADD’s wielding of political power without
consequence.
9). The lack of a vetted and documented long-term governance plan for Federal City created
seams in the coalition and the project, creating opportunities for ADD to exploit.
Who Benefitted
Throughout the research project, several discussions took place with respondents related
to who benefitted from the Federal City project, knowing that the commercial development
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aspect of the project failed to achieve the intended results. The following segment captures the
general observations collected from the data related to the topic:
Beneficiary:
Algiers Community:

City of New Orleans:

NAS/JRB Belle Chasse:

State of Louisiana:

Headquarters Marine Corps:

Marine Forces Reserve:

United States Navy:

Opinion:
No. The proposed development failed to provide
the economic growth and infusion of new jobs,
retail shops, restaurants, housing, etc. within the
local area.
Yes. With the MARFORRES Headquarters
remaining in Federal City, the economic impact
served Orleans Parish vice Plaquemines as the
original BRAC realignment directed the move the
Belle Chasse.
Mixed. While Belle Chasse was eventually denied
receipt of the MARFORRES Headquarters as
originally directed in the BRAC 2005 proposal, the
base did in fact gain responsibility for the
provision of typical base support functionality for
the MARFORRES Marines, Sailors, and their
families (e.g., housing, PX, Commissary, Day Care,
Fitness Center, etc.). This additive responsibility
for infrastructure functionality for military
personnel enables additional federal funding to
flow to Belle Chasse for sustainment and
operating costs. However, Belle Chasse serves as
host to the satellite MARCORSPTFAC 15 miles
away vice hosting on NAS/JRB property.
Yes. The Marines remained in Louisiana, along
with their $100M annual economic impact.
Yes. They were able to acquire a new $150M
headquarters for MARFORRES at little expense to
them. Overhead for the sustainment of the
Marine compound in Federal City does carry a
significant cost in manpower structure and
operating costs.
Mixed. While the Marines benefited from
receiving a state-of-the-art new headquarters
building, the failure to develop the commercial
aspects of Federal City have kept the Marines
isolated in Algiers. Also, the QOL issues remain
unresolved for the younger servicemen and their
families.
Yes. They were able to off-load the NSA East
Bank property to the City of New Orleans and a
large portion of the NSA West Bank to the State
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of Louisiana. They also successfully realigned
their Commands out of the region as planned.
However, the Navy’s reputation, at least locally,
was severely tarnished by their untimely
departure.

Final Recommendation:
Related to future BRAC actions, DOD agencies should refrain from engaging in
negotiations with State or City governments for land development projects involving EULs. The
land associated with BRAC-directed closures should either be sold outright or gifted to the State
government in accordance with federal policy/law. Should State governments choose to entice
military departments into an ad hoc construct such as what Federal City proposed for their
military unit(s), then the deal should not include land title of the property in question. In other
words, the land associated with the BRAC closure should not be included in an alternative longterm lease arrangement just to maintain a federal claim to the property. Either keep it and sustain
it, sell it, or fee simple transfer it to local public authority. This case study illustrates the
dramatic complexity added to the Federal City concept including the EUL element in the
proposal. Simply put, DOD needs to avoid local Save-the-Base too-good-to-be-true deals such
as the one painfully experienced in the Federal City project. However, if a State does in fact
attempt to host a military unit on recently acquired DOD property via BRAC, then the terms of
that scenario would require crystal clear clarity in order to avoid the many pitfalls experienced
by the many actors in New Orleans.
Recommendations for further study
Based upon information discovered during the research and analysis for this paper, the
following issues emerged as potential topics for future study:
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1). Forensic accounting audit to determine the actual disposition of all public funds associated
with the Federal City project (e.g., the $150M megafund, TIF funds, DOD funding, etc.).
2). Legal analysis relating to the use of public capital for investments into revenue-producing
public-private activities (e.g., the Federal City parking garage facility).
3). An analysis of the Federal City project from a Public Private Partnership perspective.
4). An analysis of non-profit organizations coordinating land redevelopment in multi-level
(federal, state, city) government projects.
Epilogue
In closing, the following two vignettes are offered to illustrate two potential scenarios for
the future, the first one reflecting an optimistic outlook and the latter pessimistic. The reality
will most likely fall somewhere in between, but only time tell. In any event, I would hope that
the city and state leadership would strongly consider that the ongoing presence of the military in
New Orleans, specifically the Marines, is a fragile existence. If the quality of life issues for the
junior military personnel and their young families are not mitigated soon – or worsen – I fear that
the Department of the Navy would not hesitate to relocate the remaining Marine commands out
of state at the earliest opportunity. With another round of BRAC looming on the horizon, and
the new Marine Corps Support Facility in Algiers portrayed as a modern day “Ft. Apache”, it is
in the best interests of the local political leadership to figure out how to resolve the stalled
redevelopment project sooner rather than later.

Closing Vignette A
The Sergeant Major glanced at her watch while she patiently waited in line for her morning
coffee at the local Starbucks. 0540. “Plenty of time” she thought to herself, as her mind quickly
ran through the morning’s scheduled commitments at work. As the Command Sergeant Major
for the MARFORRES Headquarters in New Orleans, her responsibilities to both the 3-star
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Commander and to the tens of thousands of enlisted Marines under her purview were
tremendous, and she took her job quite seriously. As she slowly inched towards the counter to
order her standard venti dark roast, she briefly glanced around the room, taking in her
surroundings. Having just recently reported aboard the Marine Corps Support Facility, she was
still in awe at the transformation that took place since her previous tour at MARFORRES over
ten years ago. The dozens of shuttered and dilapidated buildings that once littered the former
Federal City landscape had been replaced with rows of modern shops, boutiques, and
restaurants, adorned with well-designed gardens throughout the town square. Becoming slightly
disturbed by the large order placed by a patron at the front of the line, she distracted herself by
striking up a conversation with a Marine Colonel standing just behind her in line. Knowing the
man vaguely from previous travels somewhere unrealized, the chat quickly confirmed their
acquaintance from a conference they both attended three years prior in Guam regarding the
post-war reconstitution efforts following the bloody South China Sea conflict, the country’s most
recent skirmish with the belligerent Chinese government. After a brief exchange of catching up
banter, the Colonel revealed that he was in town for the annual TEEP Budget Conference that
was being hosted at the Riverside Marriott across the street. Apparently, she recalled from a
recent discussion with the MARFORRES Counsel, the Historic Riverside at Historic Algiers
development was a resounding success once the Governor finally weighed in back in 2017 and
disbanded the entire JDC/ADD boards for incompetence. Once the State LED took over the
project and dealt with the developer, Vista Louisiana, directly, the construction took off at a
rapid pace. With Woodward Design/Build swinging the hammers, it was no surprise that the
development hit all the Master Plan milestones ahead of schedule and under budget. This was
all fantastic news for the Marines who had been forced to suffer through years of working at “Ft
Apache” as the Marine Corps Support Facility had become nicknamed.
The patron that had stalled the line with his “Box o’ Joe” and assorted pastry request had
finally been processed, so the SgtMaj quickly grabbed her coffee and headed for the door. Just
as she reached the curb, she realized that she had forgotten her CAC Card back home. “Damn
it” she uttered, frustrated with herself for not properly checking before her hasty departure 20
minutes earlier. She walked briskly across the street, through the town square beneath the
recently repainted 150 foot water tower, and across another street to her two-bedroom studio
apartment located in the former NSA Building 10, directly across from the village auditorium.
Despite her momentary misfortune regarding her ID card drama, she briefly smiled for just a
moment as she entered her home on the second floor. The hardwood floors and 12-foot ceilings
were classic New Orleans Victorian style; the developer had sold out the entire 20-unit complex
in just under a month of advertisement five years earlier. Retrieving her wayward credentials
from the granite countertop, she set out hurriedly through the door towards the side gate
entrance to the Support Facility just four blocks away. As she retraced her steps from just a
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short while earlier, she again took stock in the dramatic changes that had taken place since her
last tour here. She recalled the feelings of contempt she had for whomever had let the Federal
City project fail so miserably, forcing her fellow Marines to suffer in the Fort Apache

Figure 40. Artist's rendition of Federal City town square

environment that they had found themselves working in during the early days after the great
migration across the river. But then her outlook quickly changed as her mind focused back to
the present. Even the young Marines under her charge – unaware of the circumstances ten years
earlier – were much more content with the amenities offered to them by the Riverside campus.
Many young military families had taken advantage of the new housing opportunities nearby,
along with the new public elementary school, Rouse’s supermarket, and other essential
mainstays of a modern community. The troops were much happier now that the quality of life
issues that had plagued New Orleans for so many decades were beginning to dissipate. New
Orleans was no longer the hardship tour that it used to be, at least from the standpoint of the
junior enlisted Marines.
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Closing Vignette B
The Deputy Sheriff drove his patrol car down Behrman Avenue heading towards the river,
unwittingly glancing from left to right and back again continuously, a consequence of 15 years
on the job working the 15th Ward of Orleans Parish. The dozens of shuttered building and
abandoned lots of the former Navy base hadn’t changed in years, he thought to himself, made
worse with ADD’s failed attempt to
resurrect the redevelopment project
with the Riverside at Historic
Algiers plan. As the story had been
retold over and over again, the local
politicians couldn’t get out of their
own way and finally had run off the
only developer willing to take on the
project, Vista Louisiana. A couple
of years after that fateful day in July
of 2016 at the Joint Development
Committee meeting, Vista leadership
finally threw in the towel following
the unwarranted emotional
reprimand from Jackie Clarkson and
an hour-long childish inquisition by
Figure 41. Common sight aboard Federal City
a new committee member. Vista’s
investors had simply had enough of
the local political bureaucracy and land development incompetence, and had decided to cut their
$2 million dollar losses. Had the representatives “of the people” realized the disastrous effects
that their indecision would cause years later, they would immediately have changed their
attitude, if nothing more than to save their own individual reputations. However, unbeknownst
to the JDC/ADD folks at the time, the 2020 BRAC wasn’t even on the drawing board yet within
the bowels of the Pentagon at that time. No one could have foreseen how, with the dramatic
change in Administration, the subsequent hostilities in the South China Sea, and the need to
restructure the Defense infrastructure strategically, that history would repeat itself with another
round of BRAC rolling into the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. With the
Department of the Navy needing to shift forces to the Western Pacific to contend with China’s
growing threat, several administrative shore commands had to be sacrificed to compensate for
the capital investment needed to reinforce overseas outposts, such as on Guam. With a rather
large bill to pay, the Marine Corps’ contribution to the campaign was realigning its
MARFORRES Headquarters to Quantico, Virginia, sending its Major Subordinate Commands to
Joint Reserve Base at Fort Worth, Texas, and completely divesting itself of its Marine Corps
Support Facility in New Orleans. With only a minimal capital investment in the facility by the
Marines Corps (recall the State financed the facility), and the unresolved quality of life issues
that had plagued the servicemen and their families for decades still weighing heavily, the choice
was easy to make. So, from the indifferent eyes of the ever-watchful faded Navy water tower in
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Algiers, the Marines finally departed New Orleans in 2021, after nearly 250 years of faithful
service to the region.
Having lost the principle anchor to the hopes for an Algiers resurgence in economic growth, the
area fell further into disarray. The beautiful MARFORRES Headquarters, considered at one
point to be the most modern, opulent headquarters in DOD, was gifted back to the State with the
stroke of a pen, along with the transfer of the remaining land upon which it sat. The Navy didn’t
even haggle over attempting to obtain a sale price, they simply gave it away. The State, after
attempting to sell the property and the facility unsuccessfully, ceded it to the Parish to deal with.
With no commercial takers either, the decision was made to transition the 400,000 square foot
facility into a pseudo-municipal building. However, even with the leasing out of a significant
portion of the building to Delgado Community College, several government agencies, and
hosting the Orleans Parish West Bank Court system, the Parish was barely able to cover the
operating expenses to sustain the facility in addition to the property of the former Federal City.
The Marines’ departure could have been avoided had the City and State leadership truly
recognized the value of their presence. You would have thought that the New Orleans political
machine would have learned its lesson from the Navy leaving town following Katrina.
Apparently not. “Laissez les bon temps rouler,” but without the Marines…

“No better friend, no worse enemy”
1st Marine Division Motto
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APPENDIX A
FEDERAL CITY CHRONOLOGY

[separate file]
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APPENDIX B
PARTICIPANT LISTING

Respondent
Ron Bald
Jack Bergman
Bob Braithwaite
John Cotton
Bill Davis

Paul Deckert

Dell Dempsey

Terry Ebbert

Bill Garrett

Gregg Habel
Ed Maguire
Richard Mills
David Mize

Kristen Palmer

Association

MARFORRES


MARFORRES 


MARFORRES


NAVRESFOR


MARFORRES 


MARFORRES 


NOFA, LA



NOMMA, City

of New Orleans


ADD; NSA New

Orleans XO


MARFORRES 


MARFORRES


MARFORRES


NOFA



ADD; City of

New Orleans


Remarks
Retired U.S. Coast Guard Commander
Deputy Counsel, MARFORRES
Retired USMC Lieutenant General (3-star)
Commander MARFORRES 2005-2009
Board of Directors, NOMMA
Retired USMC Colonel and SES
Executive Director 2005-2011
Retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral (3-star)
Commander NAVRESFOR 2003-2007
Retired USMC Colonel
AC/S Facilities 2006-2010
Commandant, NOMMA 2011-2015
Retired USMC Colonel
Multi-Generational New Orleans Native
Attorney
Retired USMC Colonel
Louisiana Economic Development (LED) Director
New Orleans Native (Algiers)
Retired USMC Colonel
City of New Orleans Disaster Recovery
Board of Directors, NOMMA
Retired U.S. Navy Captain
XO NSA New Orleans 2007-2011
ADD Executive Assistant 2015-2016
Retired USMC Colonel
Executive Director 2012-2016
Algiers Resident
Retired USMC Lt Colonel
Deputy AC/S Facilities 2007-2016
Retired USMC Lieutenant General
Commander MARFORRES 2014-2015
Retired USMC Major General
Commander MARFORRES 1998-1999
Chairman of the Board, NOFA 2005-2013
New Orleans City Councilperson
Board Member, ADD/JDC
New Orleans Native (Algiers)
223

Greg Preston

DON

Paul Purpura

Journalist

John Quinton

MARFORRES

Bill Ryan

NOFA

Shannon Shy

HQMC

Mike Tilghman

HQMC















DON BRAC Real Estate Project Manager SE
New Orleans Times-Picayune Military Desk
Long-time New Orleans Resident
Retired USMC Lieutenant Colonel
Budget Officer, MARFORRES Comptroller
Multiple Tours with MARFORRES 1990s-present
Board Member, NOFA
New Orleans Businessman
Retired USMC Colonel and Attorney
Counsel, HQMC
Navy Lease Real Estate Negotiator
Retired USMC Major
Contractor for HQMC Installations & Logistics
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APPENDIX C
CORE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS


Please describe your personal and professional experiences with New Orleans.



Describe your observations of the historical relationship between the citizens of New Orleans
and the military. Are there any distinctions between the different services represented here
locally?



Despite BRAC, do you have any insight regarding why the Navy did not resist leaving the
area but the Marines fought to stay? Did Katrina play a role?



From your individual perspective, what were the defining characteristics that brought NOFA
together as a coalition, understanding that each member and partner had different
philosophies and/or ideologies based on their individual values and beliefs?



As the NOFA (and its partners) group dynamics evolved over time, what factors had the most
influence on its solvency? On its fragmentation?



Understanding that NOFA and its partners consisted of varied influential actors from not
only the public and private sector but from the military as well, how did the group interact
over time with external agencies? Did any one group dominate the agenda?



How did Katrina impact NOFA’s group dynamic as a coalition over time? How did Katrina
impact the Federal City project overall?



Please summarize, if you can, the keys to success that led to the approval of the Federal City
project? Are there any lessons learned that can be applied to communities facing similar
situations?
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